

THE
ECONOMY OF THE COVENANTS
BETWEEN
GOD AND MAN:
COMPREHENDING
A Complete Body of Divinity.

BY HERMAN WITSIUS, D.D.

PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY IN THE UNIVERSITIES OF FRANEKER, UTRECHT, AND LEYDEN;
AND ALSO REGENT OF THE DIVINITY COLLEGE OF THE STATES
OF HOLLAND AND WEST FRIESLAND.

FAITHFULLY TRANSLATED FROM THE LATIN, AND CAREFULLY REVISED,

BY WILLIAM CROOKSHANK, D. D.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,

THE LIFE OF THE AUTHOR.

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IN TWO VOLUMES.



VOL. I.

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## RECOMMENDATIONS.



THE famous HERMAN WITSIUS, Professor of Divinity at Utrecht, in Holland, and the Author of a treatise entitled, *The Economy of the Covenants between God and Man*, and various other learned and theological tracts, was a writer, not only eminent for his great talents, and particularly solid judgment, rich imagination, and elegance of composition; but for a deep, powerful, and evangelical spirituality and savour of godliness: And we most heartily concur in the Recommendation of his works to serious Christians of all denominations, and especially to ministers and candidates for that sacred office.

JOHN GILL, D. D.

JOHN BRINE,

JOHN WALKER, L. L. D.

WILLIAM KING,

THOMAS HALL,

THOMAS GIBBONS, M. A

The late Reverend, learned, and pious Mr. JAMES HERVEY, in his *Theron and Aspasio*, Vol. II. p. 366. having mentioned a work of the above WITSIUS, adds, “ *The Economy Of the Covenants*, written by the same hand, is a body of divinity, in its method so well digested ; in its doctrines so truly evangelical; and (what is not very usual with our systematic writers) in its language so refined and elegant; in its manner so affectionate and animating; that I would recommend it to every student in Divinity. I would not scruple to *risk all my reputation* upon the merits of this performance: and I cannot but lament it, as one of my greatest losses, that I was *no sooner* acquainted with this most excellent author, all whose works have such a delicacy of composition, and such a sweet savour of holiness, that I know not any comparison more proper to represent their true character, than *the golden pot which had manna*; and was outwardly *bright* with burnished gold; inwardly *rich* with heavenly food.”



### EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM A CLERGYMAN IN THE COUNTRY TO THE PUBLISHER.

The sale of WITSIUS' *Economy of the Covenants*, increases among my friends. The translation is very just, and the excellency of the work merits a place in every Christian's library; I shall do my utmost to recommend it at all times, and on all proper occasions. No pious person on earth can forbear reading the 3d Book without wonder, rapture, and devotion. It exceeds all commendation: Hervey might well say, “*I would not scruple to risk all my reputation upon the merits of this performance.*” For my own part, I am not ashamed, nor afraid of any scorn and ridicule, that may be poured on me from any quarter, whilst I constantly aver, that the work has not its equal in the world, &c.

CONTENTS  
OF  
VOLUME FIRST.

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|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | Page |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| Dedication to WILLIAM III.....                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | i    |
| A PACIFIC ADDRESS.....                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | vii  |
| <i>To the very reverend, learned, and celebrated Professors of Divinity in the Universities<br/>of the United Provinces of Holland; Pastors of the Reformed Churches, and zealous<br/>Defenders of the Faith once delivered to the Saints.</i> |      |
| THE AUTHOR'S LIFE.....                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | xiv  |
| <br>BOOK 1<br><br>                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |      |
| CHAP. I. - <i>Of the Divine Covenants in general.</i> .....                                                                                                                                                                                    | 26   |
| CHAP. II. - <i>Of the Contracting Parties in the Covenant of Works.</i> .....                                                                                                                                                                  | 31   |
| CHAP. III. - <i>Of the Law, or Condition, of the Covenant of Works.</i> .....                                                                                                                                                                  | 36   |
| CHAP. IV. - <i>Of the Promises Of the Covenant of Works.</i> .....                                                                                                                                                                             | 42   |
| CHAP. V. - <i>Of the Penal Sanction.</i> .....                                                                                                                                                                                                 | 49   |
| CHAP. VI. - <i>Of the Sacraments of the Covenant of Works.</i> .....                                                                                                                                                                           | 61   |
| CHAP. VII. - <i>Of the First Sabbath.</i> .....                                                                                                                                                                                                | 68   |
| CHAP. VIII. - <i>Of the Violation of the Covenant of Works on the part of Man.</i> .....                                                                                                                                                       | 78   |
| CHAP. IX. - <i>Of the Abrogation of the Covenant of Works on the part of God.</i> .....                                                                                                                                                        | 87   |

# Dedication to WILLIAM III.

## KING OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND IRELAND,

Defender of the Faith, the Pious, the Auspicious, the August, Hereditary  
Stadtholder of the United Provinces, Commander-in-Chief of their Armies and  
Fleets, the Father of his Country.

D. C. Q.

HERMAN WITSIUS.

**W**ERE none permitted to approach your Majesty with any other address but what was adorned with elegance of language, and the beauties of rhetoric, or with such as Pliny the consul, lavishing all his eloquence, pleased the ears of Trajan; a Dutchman, unaccustomed to familiar access to kings, and ashamed on the first opening of his mouth, who bewrays his ignorance of the world, and unacquainted with the methods of courts, might well despair of access. But as the God, to whose ministry I was so early devoted, is pleased, not so much with the accuracy of the address of his worshippers, as with the innocence and holiness of their lives, and has a greater regard for him who brings to his temple a pure and sincere heart, than with those, who present the most studied form of words; in like manner your Majesty, who is the most lively image of the supreme Being upon earth, most of all prefers to the gaudy pomp of the most elaborate speech, the candour of an ingenuous breast, recommending itself by no manner of arts.

The wisest of kings has taught us in his Proverbs, that there is a certain penetration in kings. This, if ever conspicuous in any king, since the beginning of the human race, does certainly in a peculiar manner, display itself in your Majesty; who, with an incredible, nay, almost a divine sagacity, penetrates into the inmost recesses, and most secret springs of the human breast, as scarce to be imposed upon by any kind of flattery.

These considerations have greatly emboldened me to address your royal person, entirely relying on your goodness, that you will grant me the same favour now you are king, which formerly you did when you was prince. For though, in point of eloquence, I be inferior to many in the learned world, nay, in respect of merit, to many of my fellow citizens, especially those of my own rank, yet I know of none, either in Holland or your British dominions, to whom I ought to yield in point of duty, submission, and veneration

*Dedication*

for your Majesty. Believe me, Royal Sir, such is my attachment to every thing that concerns your person, that I think myself so interested in all your deliberations, designs, and actions, that in my public and private prayers, I duly recommend them all to God; being well assured, that all your desires and councils solely aim at the welfare of your country, whose guardian, and of the church, whose defender you are.

Wherever you fight for our security, commanding as a general, or acting as a soldier, you expose your person, not only to the wicked stratagems and treachery of your enemies, but also to their swords, and other weapons of war; yet thither, though perhaps a mean attendant, I follow you, not in body, but in mind, and trembling at every explosion of greater or smaller machines, as if close by your side, ardently pray, that heaven may propitiously avert every disaster from so valuable a life. And whenever I behold you returned in safety, from so many dangers, or rather deaths, I think words then fail me, fail the whole Protestant church, fail all Europe in confederacy, duly to celebrate that divine providence, which exposed you so often to such extraordinary perils, in order to display to the world your bravery, your constancy, your uninterrupted composure of mind, never ruffled by any storms of adversity; but which also so soon rescued you, in order to exchange our solicitude for your person, into joyful acclamations for your safety, and shew your very enemies, what a favourite of heaven you are.

Surely I shall never forget that day on which the river Boyne in Ireland had like to be distinguished by your fall, though, by the blessing of God, it was ennobled by your victory: for while, according to your wonted attention and care, you went to take a nearer view of the enemy's camp, a cannon ball, leveled at your person, happened to graze your shoulder; a wound, which gave matter of greater joy to your enemies, of apprehension to your own people, than of real harm to yourself; a wound, which taught us you was a man, but a man above the common rank of mankind, a man dear to heaven: a wound, in fine, which, however great, prevented not your performing all the parts of a brave general, nor suffered you to take repose to your own person till you had procured it for others. O! the wisdom and goodness of propitious heaven! O! a day forever memorable in our calendar! How near were your enemies to exult with solid joy, who now, deceived by the false reports of your death, made themselves ridiculous to the world by a theatrical and unmanly shew of indiscreet rejoicing? Great Prince, with these eyes I saw, in these hands I held, to these lips I applied that military tunick, whose wide rent testified the greatness of your wound. Those precious spoils I saw purpled with your blood, and I mixed my affectionate tears with the royal gore.

*Dedication*

Lately again, your Majesty gave new matter to our anxiety in the battle of Landen. Being prevailed with by no entreaties of your British or Belgic nobility, to pay a greater regard to your valuable life, on which all our safety depends, nor satisfied to have done the part of a general, by drawing up your army in battle array, animating them to the fight, darting every where your watchful eyes, commending the brave, chiding the dastardly, calling back to the charge by promises, by threats, by example, those that gave ground; your Majesty set a pattern to all, and required nothing from your soldiers but what yourself performed before them; being well acquainted, how to blend the general and the fellow-soldier, without derogating from the dignity of the former. And then, where clouds of smoke intercepted not the view, they saw you rushing through fire and sword, and amidst the enemy, turning aside their sacrilegious points with your drawn sword from your sacred side. But further, that day gave us an illustrious proof of the divine favour towards your person: for while, lavish of your own safety, all your attention is employed in ours, or, (if I may be allowed to speak out; and why should I not, where every virtuous liberty is allowable?) while, for our safety you hazard your own life, by exposing yourself to the cannon of the enemy, it was not your prudence, in which, in other respects, you may vie with Ibe Fabii and the Scipios; but, as others would say, your good fortune, or, what I reckon a more religious way of speaking, God's own hand, that interposed between your royal breast and the fatal ball, and suffered it only to violate your military coat, and make a slight contusion on your side, to withdraw you from slaughter, and delivered our hearts from grief had it been possible for us to survive to grieve your fall. Surely all our wishes unite to purchase your life at the expence of our own, and if it could be done to take from our own days to add to yours. For what true-born Dutchman does not glow with the warmest affection for a prince, whom God, by conferring all manner of accomplishments, has rendered the delight of mankind? Who, like an auspicious star has shined on the world, deeply plunged and sunk in darkness. Who, in a word, from the ashes of his father, is providentially come forth to light, as the genuine phoenix of our days, and appears to be born only for the welfare of his country.

When the Netherlands were trodden under foot, distressed, and just on the brink of ruin, then heaven appointed you to relieve, to deliver them, and repel their calamities. The distressed republic flies for refuge to your bosom, being only sure to find an asylum there. Your British subjects also, being almost ruined by the wicked designs of their kings, had long ago been chained, enslaved, and become the prey of lawless tyranny, had not your Majesty hastened to relieve them, while spreading out their suppliant hands towards you, nay, and to relieve them with that

*Dedication*

resolution, prudence and constancy, and with that success which their annals shall declare, to the amazement of posterity, who will hardly believe it. That expedition shall stand transmitted through ages, which was laid with incredible secrecy, notwithstanding so many piercing and watchful eyes, and undertaken with that resolution, in the winter and end of the year, amidst so many fearful dangers of a tempestuous ocean, did preserve and maintain to the Queen of Islands, her liberty, her laws, her religion, and whatever is valuable and dear to generous breasts. And is it to be wondered, that Britain, thus rescued under God, by your Majesty's aid, now destitute of a ruler, her ill-advised king James being expelled, not by your Majesty, nor by the people of England, but by the stings of his own conscience; neither forced away, but voluntarily flying, should gratefully submit to her preserver and deliverer? Indeed to your Majesty, together with your most religious consort, Mary Augusta, by right of succession, the sceptre of the vacant kingdom devolved. And even in those circumstances, your Majesty had declined accepting it, though offered by both houses of parliament, had any besides yourself, and faithful consort, been found worthy to govern Britain, and capable to settle her distracted state, to maintain her liberty, and quash the efforts of envy. So that, not the pleasure and happiness of that station, but the thorns and difficulties thereof: neither your ambition, but the public necessity, constrained you to take the reins of government. Of this can there be a more evident proof, than that, when settled on the throne of your kingdoms, you never suffered a day nor an hour, to pass undistinguished by cares becoming a prince; and managed with incomparable diligence, both at home and abroad, whatever makes for the security of the public good? Against private rivals of your happiness, who were unacquainted with your character, you adhered closely to your own virtue alone, and made use of oblivion, as the most certain remedy against injuries, instead of that revenge, which, if you pleased, was in your own power to take. Against the public disturbers of the peace of Europe, you protect, not so much yourself, as your people, by armies, fleets and confederacies, and, which renders you most of all formidable to your enemies, by your innate prudence and magnanimity. And did not words, equal to your merit, fail me, as it gives me singular pleasure to speak of it, your piety above all things ought to be celebrated, whereby you readily and with justice, ascribe all the honour and success you are favoured with, to the goodness of the supreme Being, and are ready, gratefully to lay down your sceptre at the feet of him who, encircled with the rainbow, sits on his heavenly throne: while you govern with no other view, but that Jehovah may reign, and Jesus rule throughout all your dominions: whose empire you promote and enlarge, not as others do, in support of their superstition and cruelty, by imprisonment, exile and stripes, and every engine of torture, the gibbet and fire; not by

depopulating countries, not by the terror and dreadful blasphemies of dragoons, but by meekness, and by the demonstration of the truth to every conscience; and by what is most of all prevalent, your own example; never offering any violence to the consciences of those who differ in religious sentiments from yourself. But, in fine, what language can set off, as it ought to be, that sacred solicitude you discovered at your very accession to the throne? That your subjects, laying aside their disputes about some points of Christian worship and ecclesiastical government, might unite with the most desirable harmony of minds, in brotherly fellowship, and uniformity of prayers and praises to God. I own, indeed, that I very much doubt whether ever this can be attained by any mortal, amidst the innate blindness and obstinacy that are in the minds of men. But if there be any means to bring this about, your Majesty seems to be the only person, by whose authority, wisdom and moderation, such a happy coalition of different sentiments may be effected. May that day, which is the ardent prayer of so many pious persons, at length appear, when all names of distinction being taken out of the way, and buried in everlasting oblivion, the whole Christian world, from the rising to the setting sun, may with one heart and one mouth, worship and praise one God, and, as it is in the prophecy of Zechariah, Jehovah may be one, and his name one in all the earth! As this certainly ought to be the earnest prayer of all Christians, in an especial manner it ought to be the endeavour of those to whom Jesus, the king, both of truth and peace, has committed the office of preaching the gospel.

And as I rejoice in being one of their number, so I imagine, I ought always to behave in such a glorious ministry of so great a king, so that, while I attempt to set up the light of truth in the minds of men, I at the same time ought to inflame their hearts with the fire of love. To stain the tongue with bitterness, to dip the pen in gall, to screen passion under a zeal for religion, to bring strange fire to God's altar, and under pretext, of maintaining the truth, to attempt what is unlawful for the ministers of peace; I judged to be so contrary to the spirit of Christianity, that if I did not religiously guard against these things, I should certainly account myself not only an unprofitable, but also a perfidious servant, and not escape the punishment due to those who betray the cause of the Lord. I was willing to give some specimen of this disposition in those books which were formerly published concerning the *Economy of God's Covenants with men*, and which I now, with all due submission and veneration, offer to lay at your Majesty's feet.

What I may have contributed towards clearing up the truth, with respect to the controversies at this day, and what towards cementing a peace, interrupted by the violent designs of others; with what moderation I may have treated every particular subject, by what means I may have lessened, removed and decided



*Dedication*

controversies, which others have multiplied without end, always consistently with the faith once delivered to the saints, I would leave to the judgment of your divines, such as your Majesty has of very distinguished characters, both in England and Holland.

Suffer me solemnly to declare this one thing, that it has been my sincere and utmost endeavour, to form my hearers, both by doctrine and example, not to litigious disputations, but to the evident knowledge of the most sacred truth, to the upright and sincere piety of ancient and apostolic Christianity, and to the constant practice of that sacred peace, which the dying Jesus both bequeathed to, and purchased for his people; and I have the pleasing hope, that those who come from under my instructions, not only the natives of Holland, but those of your kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland, of whom there is not a few here, who will bring the same spirit and temper to the churches to be committed to their charge, shall, under your Majesty's government, remarkably enlarge the kingdom of Christ.

Accept therefore, Royal Sir, with your wonted goodness accept this pledge and token of a heart sincerely devoted to your Majesty; and vouchsafe a place among your friends to him, who, next to the Great and Blessed God, would not choose to belong to any other. But, at the same time, accept the most ardent prayers sent from the bottom of my heart. May that God, at whose footstool you daily fall down as a suppliant, may that God, who is the King of kings, and Lord of lords, make you always happy at home, successful abroad, ever august, the guardian of justice, the maintainer of liberty, the defender of religion, the author of concord, the consolation of the oppressed, the umpire of the whole Christian world, and, at last, crown your Majesty his own vicegerent, with the glory of his everlasting kingdom.

Utrecht,

Oct. 15th, 1693.

## A PACIFIC ADDRESS.

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*To the very reverend, learned, and celebrated Professors of Divinity in the Universities of the United Provinces of Holland; Pastors of the Reformed Churches, and zealous Defenders of the Faith once delivered to the Saints.*

THE present age furnishes such a number of books, that the world is almost weary of them, and the church certainly groans under their weight: as this never flourished more than when, in the pure simplicity of faith and love, and without any fondness for disputation, it regarded the doctrine of our Lord alone, and drew the pure and undefiled truth from those writings only which could “make David wiser than all his teachers, and the man of God perfect, thoroughly instructed to every good work.” It is, indeed, very difficult to write anything now-a-days which can please. For so great is everywhere the fruitfulness of learning, or the vain imagination of science; so obstinate the attachment to once received hypotheses, so fixed the study of particular parts, and so malevolent the judgment passed on other people’s works, (which even sometimes affects the minds of good men against their wills,) that whoever thinks by his writings to satisfy your delicate minds, or those who are engaged in a more general search after knowledge, seems to attribute too much to his own capacity, and to be ignorant of the disposition of the times. But I am conscious of the slenderness of my own abilities: and it is impossible for a person not to know the world, who is at all conversant with it. It therefore seems proper to assign some reasons for my appearing in public again; and to show the design of the work I now offer to the churches.

And to whom, reverend and learned Sirs, should I render the reasons rather than to you, who are competent judges of what I write; and by whom, next to God and my own conscience, I long to have my studies, approved. In the first place, then, I sincerely declare, that it is not an incurable itch of writing, a raging thirst after vain glory, an envious disposition of mind, a detestable desire of widening the wounds already made in the churches, the odious pleasure of blackening another’s character, by giving a wrong turn to what is really right; nor lastly, the infamous desire to make, increase, or continue strifes which have occasioned my writing at this time. Besides my own declaration to the contrary, the whole work itself, though but slightly attended to, will acquit me of acting on such motives.

To see the minds of the godly disturbed by the inconsiderate assertions of some, and their uncommon interpretations of the scriptures; or the

suspensions of others, (not at all times dictated by charity, whatever share prudence may have in the case,) gave me indeed the greatest concern. And forasmuch as the doctrine of the covenant of grace, by which the manner of the reconciliation of sinners to God is shewn, and the manifold dispensation of that covenant, have been the unhappy object of controversy in the Netherlands, so that whatever points are now disputed upon, (if we except the new method of interpreting the prophecies, and the opinions of the modern philosophy, which are imprudently introduced into the present system of divinity, may, and ought to be referred to this,) I have thought this subject in the first place deserving my notice. But I have treated it in such a manner as is agreeable to the truths hitherto received in the churches; and without that levity or severity, which is not consistent with the law of love. On which account I have not confined myself to bare disputatious, which are generally unprofitable; and if it were not that they were seasoned with a degree of acrimony, would be destitute of every kind of elegance.

I have chosen to enter on this subject from its very beginning, and have endeavoured, as far as I could, to explain it methodically and clearly, enlightening the obscurer passages of scripture, carefully examining the phrases used by the Holy Ghost, and referring the whole to the practice of faith and godliness, to the glory of God in Christ, that my exposition might be the more useful and entertaining. And as nothing was more profitable and delightful to myself, so nothing could more evident and fully convince the minds of others, than a clear and sober demonstration of the truth to the conscience; which, by pleasing advances, beginning with plain and acknowledged truths, and connecting them together, gradually leads to the more abstruse points, and forces an assent to them not less strongly than to those we are obliged to agree to at the first view; and at the same time by its efficacy, presents some before unknown truths to the inmost soul, fixing it with a degree of astonishment on the contemplation of the admirable perfections of God.

I have found it absolutely necessary to oppose different opinions; either those of the public adversaries of the reformed churches, amongst whom I reckon first the Socinians and the Remonstrants, who, by their daring comments have defiled the doctrine of God's covenants; or those of some of our brethren, who have taken it into their heads to form new hypotheses, and thereby almost root out all true divinity. I persuade myself, it is not in the power of malice to deny that I have acted with candour and modesty: I have stated the controversy justly, not attributing to anyone any opinion which he ought not to allow to be his own; and have made use of such arguments as had before satisfied my own conscience; as if these were not of themselves convincing, I could not think that any force would be added to them by great warmth: especially, I thought that the opinions of our brethren were to be treated with candour. And I have never sought after any inaccurate word, harsh phrase, or crude expression, in order to criticise on them; esteeming it much better to point out how far all the orthodox agree, and how the more improper ways of expression may be softened; remarking only on those sentiments which

are really different and these, I dare affirm, will be found to be fewer, and of less moment, than they are generally thought to be, provided we examine them without prejudice. Yet, I cannot pass over in silence some uncouth expressions, foreign interpretations, or contradictory theses: and sometimes I note the danger attending some of them; but without any malevolence to their authors. For, I confess, I am of their opinion, who believe that the doctrine of the covenant has long since been delivered to the churches on too good a foundation, to stand in need of new hypotheses; in which I cannot find that solidity or usefulness, as is necessary to establish their divinity.

The observation of the threefold covenant of grace; the *first*, under the promise, in which grace and liberty prevailed, with out the yoke, or the burden of an accusing law; the *second*, under the law, when the Old Testament took place, subjecting the faithful to the dominion of angels, and the fear of death all their lives; and last of all, to the curse, not allowing to the fathers true and permanent blessings ; the *third*, under the gospel, when the godly began to be set at liberty from the dominion of the angels, from the fear of temporary death, and the curse which an exact observance of the ceremonial law carried with it, and at length enjoyed true and lasting blessings the circumcision of the heart, the law written there, the full and true remission of sins, the spirit of adoption, and such like things; this observation, I say, does not seem to me worthy to be insisted on in so many academical lectures, so many sermons, and such a number of books, as have been published in the Latin and our own languages, as though the whole of theological learning consisted in these. For, in the following work I have shewn, that, however those doctrines are explained, they are horrible to be mentioned; and are not to be defended with out wresting the scriptures.

But I esteem much more dangerous the opinions of some men, in other respects very learned, who deny that a covenant of works was made with Adam; and will scarce allow that by the death with which he was threatened, in case he sinned, a corporeal death is to be understood; and deny that spiritual and heavenly blessings, such as we now obtain through Christ, were promised to Adam on condition of perfect obedience: and by a musty distinction dividing the sufferings of Christ into painful and judiciary, affirm, that the latter only, or, as they sometimes soften the expression, chiefly were satisfactory: excluding by this means his sorrows in the garden, the sentence passed on him both by the Jewish council, and the Roman governor, the stripes with which his body was wounded, his being nailed to the cursed cross, and last of all his death itself. On these subjects I have given my mind freely and candidly, as became “a defender of the truth, and an opposer of falsehood:” which laudable character was given of the emperor Constantine the Fourth, by the sixth Oecumenical Synod, which met at Constantinople; and which is what all of our order ought to endeavour to deserve.

I have also made remarks on some things of less moment, which did not seem to have a solid scriptural interpretation, or are less accurately conceived of than they ought to be. Nor has my labour been without profit.

Amphilochius is justly commended by Basilius, because he thought that “no word which was used concerning God, should be passed over with out the most careful inquiry into its meaning.” But I have done this without rancour or raillery: “not with a view of reproving the authors, but that the studious reader might be benefited by having their errors shewn him,” as I remember Polibius somewhere expresses himself. And I hope it will not be taken ill by the learned and ingenious, to whom I grant the same liberty I myself take, if, (to use nearly the same words which Augustine uses, when he declares his dissent from Cyprian) whilst “I cannot arrive at their degree of merit, acknowledge my writings inferior to many of theirs, love their ingenuity, am delighted with what they say, and admire their virtues; yet, I cannot in all things agree with them, but make use of the liberty wherewith our Lord has called us.” Especially when they see, that I have willingly adopted their own ingenious inventions, what they have happily found out by searching into the original languages, have learnedly recovered from the reliques of hitherto unknown antiquity, have judiciously confirmed, or clearly explained; and have highly recommended them to the reader.

They will also find that, wherever I think them right, however they may be censured by others, I have cordially defended them, and have wiped off the stamp of absurdity and novelty. And this I have done so frequently and solicitously, that, without doubt, some will say, I have done it too much. But I cannot yet allow myself to be sorry for having dealt so ingenuously by them. For how could any one have done otherwise, who is not attached to any faction, or is not a slave to his own or another’s affections but has dedicated himself to truth alone, and regards not what any *particular* person says, but *what* is said. He who loves the peace of Jerusalem, had rather see controversies lessened than increased; and will with pleasure hear that several things are innocent, or even useful, which had sometimes been made the matter of controversy.

All good men indeed are justly offended with that wantonness of wit, which now-a-days, by dogmatical attacks, rashly aims to overturn wise opinions; and insolently offers a bold, and often ludicrous, interpretation of prophecy, ridiculously hawling into their assistance, what contains nothing but the doctrine of our common faith and holiness; by which the public and our sacred functions are not a little abused: and it is not to be wondered at, if the warmer zeal of some has painted this wantonness as it deserves, or, perhaps, in too strong colours. But yet, a medium is to be regarded in all things: and I do not approve the pains of some, who, whilst they discourse on their differences, not only name some decades of our controversies, but centuries of them ; and frequently with cruel eloquence are very violent on some innocent subjects. Whether this method of disputing greatly conduces to the promoting of saving knowledge, or the edification of souls, I will not now say: but I am certain of this; the enemies of our church are hereby greatly delighted and secretly rejoice, that there are as many and as warm disputes amongst ourselves, as with them. And this, not very secretly neither: for they do not nor will ever

cease to cast this reproach upon us; which, I grieve to say, is not so easily wiped away.

O! how much better would it be to use our utmost endeavours, to lessen, make up, and, if it could be, put an end to all controversy! Make this reverend and learned Sirs, your great concern. This all the godly who mourn for the breaches in Joseph; this the churches who are committed to your care; this Jesus himself, the king of truth and peace, require and expect from you; in the most earnest manner they entreat it of you. “If therefore there be any consolation in Christ, if any comfort of love, if any fellowship of the spirit, if any bowels, and mercies: fulfil ye my joy, fulfil ye the joy of all saints, fulfil ye the joy of our Lord Jesus himself, that ye may be like-minded, having the same love, being of one accord, of one mind.” There have been already more than enough quarrels, slanders, and suspicions; more than enough of contentions amongst brethren, which, I engage for it, will afford no just cause of triumph; more than enough intestine divisions, by which we destroy one another; and more than enough of passion. Let the love of divisions, a thirst after pre-eminence, and schismatical names be henceforward banished from amongst us. Let all litigious, satirical, and virulent writings be blotted out; “as they only serve to revive the fires of hurtful questions.” But if we must write on those controversies, let us lay aside all evil dispositions, which are hinderances to us in our enquiries, and mislead our readers. Let us fight with arguments, not railings, bearing in our minds this saying of Aristophanes, “it is dishonourable, and by no means becoming poets, to rail at each other.” How much less does it become Christians to do so! The streams of divinity are pure: they rise only from the fountain of sacred learning, and should be defiled with none of the impure waters of the ancient or modern philosophy. Let us abstain from harsh and unusual expressions, and from crude and rash assertions; from whence arise envy, strife, railings, evil surmisings. The instruments of both covenants should be handled diligently by all, but with sacred fear and trembling. Let none please himself with his commentaries, because they contain something new and unknown by our predecessors. Let him who thinks he has found out something preferable to the received opinion, offer it to the public with modesty, without vilifying the brethren; not asserting or determining rashly, but submitting his thoughts to the censure of the learned, and the judgment of the church; not forcing them on the common people to the distraction of their minds; nor hastily offering them to incautious youth, who are improper judges of such weighty matters. Nor let any reject, on account of its novelty, what is agreeable to the meaning of the words, to scripture phrases, to the analogy of faith, or to the relation the text bears to others. Cajetan, who is commended by our Chameir, has not badly expressed himself on this head: “If a new sense of the text offer itself, though it be different from that of divines in general, let the reader judge of it for himself.” And in another place he says, “Let none refuse assenting to a new sense of sacred writ, because it differs from that given by the ancients; for God has not bound himself to the truth of their expositions of the scriptures.” Let the depths of prophecy be also diligently searched into;

but reverently, without wresting the scriptures, without violating those bounds wherewith it has pleased God to keep them from human intuition; lest he who attempts to search into the majesty should be overwhelmed by the glory.

Let no one, of however great name, by his authority bind the free consciences of the faithful: but, as Clemens Romanus once said, “Let the truth be taken from the scriptures themselves;” by these alone it should stand or fall in religious affairs; by these are all controversies to be settled. And it was by the sacred and undefiled gospels of our Lord Jesus Christ, that the ancient councils were influenced, nevertheless, let not any one inconsiderately on this pretence, withhold his assent to such forms of expression which are taken from the word of God, and are agreeable to the scriptures, are the bonds of church union, the marks of orthodoxy, the bars of heresy, and the limits of wanton wits; as though they were the remains of the Babylonish tower, which obliged men to think and speak alike in religion.

Let no one choose for himself a guide out of the modern divines; all whose dictates he is determined to receive and defend as celestial oracles; as one who is given as a new teacher and light of the world, as the ancients said of Basilius; and in comparison of whom, all others appear as little children or dwarfs; when he himself, perhaps, protests that he would not be thought the author of any thing new, and made the head of a sect. On the other hand, let no one despise such a man, as if nothing true or good, nothing useful to the understanding of the scriptures could be learned from him: for God has not put it into the heart of any pious persons to search the Scriptures night and day, without opening to them those treasures of his sacred wisdom.

Let us preach the good tidings of the gospel, let us congratulate the church on account of them; and make the best use of them ourselves we can. Let no one who has in general expressed the truth in eloquent language, be heinously censured on account of an improper word, or harsh expression which has slipped from his pen: “Poison does not lie hid in syllables; nor does truth consist in sound, but in the intention: nor godliness in the tinkling of brass, but in the meaning of the things signified.” Yet, let us all endeavour to express ourselves as accurately as possible; and not take upon us to defend what has been imprudently said by our friends, or ourselves, lest others blame us for it; but as far as ingenuousness, truth, charity, and all good men will allow of it, let us pass by, cancel or correct any mistakes; which has been the practice of some great men, both among the ancients and moderns, to their very great credit. Let none of our brethren be stigmatized with the brand of heresy, on account of what is supposed to follow from any of their expressions, when they themselves deny and detest the consequence. Solid learning, manners conformable to Christian sanctity, a peaceable disposition, and a faithful discharge of our duty without noise and confusion, will procure favour much more than inconsiderate warm zeal, and the violent efforts of a passionate mind; which are designed for the most part, to heighten our

own glory and seeming importance, though the cause of God be made the pretence for them.

Let some liberty also be given to learned men, in explaining texts of scripture, in the choice of arguments for the defence of the common truth, in the use of phrases and terms, and in resolving problematic questions, (for in this our state of darkness, it is not to be expected that all men should think and speak alike): but let this liberty be confined within the bounds of modesty, prudence, and love; lest it degenerate into petulant licentiousness, and turn our Zion into a Babel.

These, reverend and learned Sirs, are my earnest wishes; these my sentiments which I recommend to your prudence, faith, and piety; as I do yourselves and your pious labours, to the grace of our Great God and Saviour, Jesus Christ; “Who can make you perfect to every good work, to do his will, working in you that which is well pleasing in his sight;” and, at last, “when you happily have fought the good fight of faith, can bless you with an everlasting crown of glory.” This was long since, and is now, the most earnest wish of, Reverend and learned Sirs, Your fellow labourer, and Servant in the Lord,

H. WITSIUS.

Utrecht,

Oct. 20. 1693



## THE AUTHOR'S LIFE.

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HERMAN WITS (or, as he is commonly called, WITSIUS) was descended from reputable parents. His father, Nicolaus Wits, was a gentleman universally esteemed by his fellow citizens at Enkhuisen, to whom he endeared himself by his fidelity, modesty, justice, benevolence, and unaffected piety, in every character he sustained, either in the church or in the city; for in the former he was first a deacon, and afterwards a ruling elder; and treasurer in the latter. His mother was Johanna, a gentlewoman of great piety and prudence, the daughter of Herman Gerhard; who, after many dangers and distresses, obtained a calm and secure settlement in the church at Enkhuisen, where he preached the gospel for upwards of thirty years, with great reputation; and such was the affection he bore to his church, that he rejected the most profitable offers that were made to him.

The parents of our Witsius, having vowed to devote a child to the ministry, did upon the birth of this son, call him after his grandfather, praying, that in Herman the grandson, might be revived the spirit of the grandfather; and that, endued with equal, if not superior talents, he might imitate his example.

Herman Witsius was born on the 12th of February 1636, at Enkhuisen, a town of West Friesland; one of the first that threw off the Spanish yoke, asserted their own liberty, and, once enlightened with the truths of the gospel, retained the purity of worship ever after, and in the very worst times of Arminianism, continued, above many, steadfast in the faith. And though it was a place noted for trade and navigation, yet it produced men famous in every branch of literature; so that Witsius, even in his native place, had illustrious patterns to copy after.

The care which these pious parents took of young Witsius during his tender infancy, was not intermitted as he began to grow; for, being still mindful of their vow, they brought him in a very pious manner, instructing him in the principles and precepts of religion and Christian piety. In his sixth year they sent him to the public school of the town, to learn the rudiments of the Latin tongue; from which, after spending three years, and being advanced to the highest form there, his uncle by the mother, Peter Gerhard, took him under his own private and domestic tuition; a person well skilled in Latin, Greek, Hebrew, and philosophy. But his principal study had been divinity. This man, then disengaged from all public business, and being as fond of his nephew as if he had been his own son, taught him with that assiduity, that, before he was fifteen, he made no small proficiency in Latin, Greek, Hebrew, and acquired such knowledge in logic and other parts of philosophy, that, when he was afterwards removed to the university, he could study without a master. At the same time he learned the ethic compendiums of Wallaeus and Burgersdicius,

with so much care as to be able to repeat most of the sentences, very frequent in Burgersdicius, from the ancients, whether Greek or Latin. He also perused his elements of physics, and dipped a little into metaphysical subtleties, and committed to memory most of the theological definitions and distinctions from Wendelin. As his uncle was a man of exemplary piety, and was wont to apply almost to every common occurrence of life, some striking passages of both Testaments, which he often repeated either in Hebrew or Greek, while rising, dressing, walking, studying, or otherwise employed; so, by his example and admonitions, he stirred up his nephew to the same practice. Whence it was, that at those tender years he had rendered familiar to himself many entire passages of the Hebrew and Greek Testament which he was far from forgetting when more advanced in life.

Being thus formed by a private education, in 1651, and the fifteenth year of his age, it was resolved to send him to some university: Utrecht was pitched upon, being furnished with men very eminent in every branch of literature, with a considerable concourse of students, and an extraordinary strictness of discipline. What principally recommended it were the famous divines, Gisbert Voetius, Charles Maatsius, and John Hoornbeekius, all of them great names, and ornaments in their day. Being therefore received into that university, he was, for metaphysics put under the direction of Paul Voetius, then professor of philosophy; and being, moreover, much taken with the study of the Oriental languages, he closely attended on the celebrated John Leusden, who taught those languages with incredible dexterity, and under him he construed almost the whole Hebrew Text, as also the commentaries of Solomon Iarchi, Aben Ezra, and Kimchi on Hosea, and the Chaldee Paraphrase of Jonathan on Isaiah, and of Onkelos on a part of the Pentateuch. Moreover, under the same master, he just touched on the mysteries of the Masora, and the barbarous diction of the Talmud; namely, the parts published by John Cocceius, under the title of Sanhedrim and Maccoth, and by Constantine Lempereur, under that of Babha Bathrae: under the same master he learned the elements of the Syriac and Arabic languages, which last, however, he afterwards less cultivated than the others. What proficiency he made in the Hebrew, appeared from a public specimen he gave at the instigation of Leusden, of a well written Hebrew oration about the Messiah of the Jews and Christians, in 1654. But, though almost quite swallowed up in those studies, he by no means neglected the study of divinity, to which he knew all the others were only subservient; but in that sublime science, he diligently used, as masters, the greatest men, and best seen in the sacred scriptures, whose most laudable memory no lapse of time shall ever be able to obliterate; namely, Gisbert Voetius, John Hoornbeekius, Gualterus Bruinicus, and Andrew Essenius. By whose instructions, together with his own extraordinary application, and true piety towards God, what proficiency he made, the reader may easily judge for himself. However, he had a mind to see Groningen, to have the benefit of hearing the famous Samuel Maresius: whither he went in 1654, after the summer vacation, chiefly applying to divinity: under whose direction, he made exercises in

French, by which he gave so much satisfaction to this great man, that, notwithstanding his many avocations, he deigned to correct and purge those declamations of Witsius from their solecisms and other improprieties, before they were recited in the college. Having thus spent a year at Groningen, and obtained an honourable testimonial from the Theological faculty, he next turned his thoughts to Leyden. But the plague then raging there, he resolved to return to Utrecht, in order to build farther on the foundation he had there so happily laid; and, therefore, he not only carefully heard the professors in divinity at this time, as before, both in public and private, but cultivated a peculiar familiarity with the very reverend Justus van den Bogaerdt, whose piety, prudence, and admirable endowments he had such a value for, that he imagined, perhaps from youthful inexperience, no preacher equal to him. From his sermons, conversation, and example, he learned the deeper mysteries of the kingdom of God, and of mystical and spiritual Christianity. From him he understood how great the difference is between any superficial knowledge, which scholastic exercises, books learnedly written, and a close application, may procure to minds quite destitute of sanctification, and that heavenly wisdom which is acquired by meditation, prayer, love, familiar converse with God, and by the very relish and experience of spiritual things; which, proceeding from the Spirit of God, internally illuminating, convincing, persuading, and scaling, gloriously transforms the whole man to the most holy image of Christ. In a word, he owns that by means of this holy person, he was introduced by the Lord Jesus to his most secret recesses, while before he too much, and too fondly pleased himself in tarrying in the porch, and there, at length, learned, disclaiming all vain presumption of science, humbly to sit down at the feet of the heavenly Master, and receive the kingdom of heaven as a little child. But that it may not be thought, he so applied to the forming of his mind to piety, as to neglect for the future all academical studies, the theses he wrote on the Sacred Trinity against the Jews, from their own writings, may, and ought to be, a proof to the contrary; and which he published in the month of October, 1653, to be disputed under the moderation of the famous Leusden; which, though warmly attacked by the most experienced academicians, yet the moderator thought the respondent acquitted himself so well as to supersede his interposition in any account: and when, according to custom, he returned solemn thanks to the moderator for his trouble, this last very politely and truly made answer, He had stood in no need of his help.

The time now seemed to require, that our Witsius, very famous at two universities, should be employed in the public service of the church, and first, as usual, gave specimens of his proficiency. Therefore, in the month of May, 1656 he presented himself at Enkhuysen to a preparatory examination, as it is called, together with his then fellow student, John Lasdragerus, with whom he had a familiarity from his youth, and whom he afterwards had for his most intimate colleague and faithful fellow labourer, first in the church of Leovaarden, and then at Utrecht. And upon this occasion he was not only admitted to preach publicly, which he did

with uncommon applause, and gave so general satisfaction, that there was scarce a country church in North Holland, where he then resided, which wanting a minister, did not put his name in the number of the three candidates, from which the election is usually made. And, at the instigation of the reverend John James le Bois, minister of the French church at Utrecht, he ventured, upon leave given, to preach publicly to the French church at Dort in their language. And from that time he often preached in French, both at Utrecht and Amsterdam; as also sometimes in the course of his ministry at Leovaarden. But because he imagined there was still something wanting to the elegance of his language, he proposed very soon to take a tour to France, and pay his respects to the great men there, and at the same time have the pleasure of hearing them, and improving in their language.

But providence disposed otherwise; for the following year, 1657, and the twenty-first of his age, being lawfully called by the church of West Wouden, he was ordained there on the 8th of July. This village lies almost in the midway between Enkhuisen and Horn, and is united with the parish of Binne-Wijsent. And here, for four years and upwards, he laboured with the greatest alacrity of a youthful mind, and with no less benefit: for, by frequent catechising, and with the greatest prudence suiting himself to the catechumens, both boys and girls, they who before were grossly ignorant, could not only give proper answers on the principal heads of our religion, but prove their assertions by suitable texts of scripture, and repeat a whole sermon distinctly, when examined on it, to the joy as well as shame of their parents and older people. The reputation of so faithful and dexterous a pastor, being thus widely spread, the church of Wormer, in the same tract of North Holland, sufficiently numerous and celebrated, but then too much distracted by intestine commotions, imagined they could not pitch upon a fitter guide to allay their heats, and form their minds. This call Witsius not only accepted, passing to that charge in October 1661, but spent there four years and a half, doing everything in his power to promote Christian unanimity and the common salvation; and as he saw the extensive fruits of his labours among them, so he was universally beloved. Wherefore he could not bear to remove from them to the people of Sluice in Flanders, who offered him great encouragement to preach, but the people of Goese in Zealand succeeded in their call, and he repaired to them about Whitsuntide 1666, and was so acceptable to all by his doctrine, manners, and diligence, as to live there in the most agreeable peace and concord, with his learned, pious, and vigilant colleagues, two of whom he revered as his fathers; and the third, who was younger, he loved as his brother. He was much delighted with this settlement and often wished to grow old in this peaceful retreat. But the people of Leovaarden, in West Friesland, interrupted these thoughts; who, in November 1667, called him with a remarkable affection, to that celebrated metropolis of his native country, that he might prove a shining light, not only in the church, court, and senate, of that place, but to all the people of Friesland, who flocked thither from all parts to the assembly of the states; but the people of Goese doing all they could to hinder his removal, it was April 1668, before he

went to Leovaarden. And it is scarcely to be expressed with what vigilance, fidelity, and prudence he conducted himself; but at a time of such difficulty, when the enemy, having made such incursions into Holland, and made themselves masters of most of its towns, and struck a panic into all, that a man of such spirit and resolution was absolutely necessary. Nor do I know of any, before or since, whose labours were more successful, and who was more acceptable to the church, the nobility, and the court. And therefore he was for some time tutor to Henry Casimir, the most serene prince of Nassau, hereditary governor of Friesland, too untimely snatched away by death; and with remarkable success he instructed, in the doctrines of religion, his most illustrious sister, Amelia, a very religious princess, afterwards married to the duke of Saxe-Eisenach; and he presided at the profession of faith which both princes publicly made, to the great edification of the church, in the presence of the princes' mother, Albertina of Orange.

It is not, therefore, to be wondered, that when, through the injury of the most calamitous times, and the decease, both of the venerable and aged Christian Schotanus, and of John Melchior Steinbergius, scarce installed in the professorship, the theological interests of the university of Franequer seemed to be fallen to decay; and the extraordinary, and truly academical endowments of our Witsius were perfectly well known in Friesland, by an experience of seven whole years; that, I say, he was appointed to the ordinary profession of divinity, in the year 1675, in the academy of his native country, thus happily to be restored. Which opportunity also the church of Franequer prudently laid hold on, being then without a second minister, very cheerfully to commit to him, now appointed professor, that sacred charge. Having, therefore, accepted both these calls, he came to Franequer; and after being declared Doctor of divinity in the academical assembly, by the divine his colleague, he was, on the 15th of April, installed professor of the same, after delivering a solemn oration, with the greatest applause of a concourse of people from all parts; in which he excellently expressed the character of a genuine divine; and as such he soon after demeaned himself, together with the venerable and aged Nicolaus Arnoldus, his most intimate colleague.

In the pulpit, Witsius addressed himself with so much gravity, elegance, piety, solidity, and usefulness, that the general inattention of the people was removed, and religious impressions made both on great and small. The academical chair also gained a warmth from his sacred fire, to which, from the different and most distant parts of Europe, the youth intended for the ministry, resorted in great numbers. And not to be wanting in his duty, or disappoint the intention of those who called him, in any particular, he no sooner entered the university, than, notwithstanding his many daily public and private labours, in both his offices, he set himself to write, and, in a very little time published, besides select academical disputations, mostly tending to establish the peace of the church, and a smaller dissertation, two works pretty large and learned, which went through several editions, and were spread over Europe; being everywhere read with universal approbation. And besides, there was nothing of

extraordinary importance to be transacted, even with the schismatic followers of Labadie, who had then fixed their principal residence in West Friesland, which both the nobility and the overseers of the church did not think proper should be dispatched by this man.

About this time, Mr. J. Mark, on his return from his studies at Leyden, commenced his acquaintance with Witsius, who recommended him as pastor to the church of Midlummen, between Franequer and Harlingen; and afterwards procured him the degree of Doctor in divinity; and, by his interest with his serene highness, and others, Dr. Mark was appointed third ordinary professor of divinity.

But, the justly renowned character of our Witsius was such, that others, envying the happiness of the people of Friesland, wanted to have the benefit of his labours themselves. This was first attempted by the overseers of the university of Groningen, who, to procure a worthy successor to the deceased James Altingius, as well in the theological and philological chairs, as in the university church, about the close of the year 1679, sent to Franequer a reverend person, to offer the most honourable terms, in order to prevail on Witsius. But that attempt proved unsuccessful. For, communicating the affair to his serene Highness the prince, and other overseers of the university, they protested his services were most acceptable to them; and he excused himself in a handsome manner to the people of Groningen, in the beginning of the year 1680; when, upon the decease of the celebrated Burmannus, they judged it necessary to have a great man, to add to the reputation of their university, and to maintain the ancient piety of their church; and being well assured that none was fitter for all those purposes than Witsius, who was formerly one of their own students, they therefore dispatched a splendid deputation to Franequer, to entreat him to come and be an ornament to their university and church, to which he consented with little difficulty, notwithstanding the opposition made by those of Friesland, who were loth to part with one who had been so useful among them; for his obligations to the university of Utrecht were such that he thought he could not shew his gratitude more, than by accepting of their invitation. Accordingly, after a most honourable dismissal from the afflicted Frieslanders, he came to Utrecht, and was admitted into the ministry of that church, on the 25th of April, and four days after, into the professorship of the university, after delivering a most elegant oration on the excellence of evangelical truth, which fully answered universal expectation. And it can scarce be expressed, how happily he lived in credit, and laboured above full eighteen years of his most valuable life, with these celebrated men, viz. Peter Maestricht, Meichior Leideckerus, and Hermannus, then Halenius, after the example of the doctors, his predecessors, whom he always had in the highest veneration. In the ministry he had several colleagues, men of learning, piety, peace, and zeal for God; among whom were his ancient colleagues in the church of Leovaarden, Peter Eindhovius, and John Lasdragerus. In the university, besides the fore-mentioned divines, he had not only his own John Leusden, an excellent philologist, but Gerard de Uries, and Luitsius, famous philosophers, who, for the benefit of the

church, prepared the youth intended for the ministry. Before his pulpit he had a Christian magistracy and the whole body of the people, who admired and experienced the power of his elocution, their minds being variously affected with religious impressions. Before his academical and private chair, he had not only a large circle of promising youths from all parts of the world, who admired his most learned, solid, prudent and eloquent dissertations; but doctors themselves daily resorted in great numbers to learn of him. And therefore, he declined no labour, by which, even at the expense of many restless nights, he might be of service to the university and church. Nor did he think it sufficient by sermons, lectures, conferences and disputations, to produce his various stock of learning, but he exposed his treasures to the whole world, present, and to come, in many public and excellent writings, to last for ever, and never to decay, but with the utter extinction of solid learning and true piety itself. And to the commendation of the people of Utrecht be it spoken, that, not only in ecclesiastical assemblies, they always acknowledged his abilities and prudence, seasonably calling him to the highest dignities in synods; but even the nobility; both by deeds and words, testified, that his endowments were perfectly well known to, and highly esteemed of by them. And therefore they honoured him twice with the badges of the highest office in their university, in 1686 and in 1697. And we must by no means omit, that when in 1685, a most splendid embassy of the whole united provinces was decreed to be sent to James king of Great Britain, afterwards unhappily drawn aside and ruined by the deceitful arts of the French and Romish party; which embassy was executed by the most illustrious Wassenaar, lord of Duvendorden, and the ordinary ambassador, his excellency, Citters, with the most noble and illustrious Weed, lord of Dykveld; that, I say, this last easily persuaded his colleagues of legation to employ none but Witsius for their chaplain: a divine, whom, to the honour of the Dutch churches, they might present in person to the English nation, without any apprehension, either of offence or contempt. Nor was Witsius himself against the resolution of these illustrious personages, for he went cheerfully, though indisposed in body; and on his return, in a few months after, owned, that having conversed with the archbishop of Canterbury, the bishop of London, and with many other divines, both episcopal and dissenters in discipline, he observed not a few things, which made an increase to his stock of learning, and by which he was better qualified to act prudently on all future occasions. And the English, from that time, owned, that being thus better acquainted with Witsius, he ever after justly deserved their regard and applause.

The reputation of Witsius, thus spread all over the world, made the most illustrious overseers of the university of Leyden, with the Burgomasters, resolve to give a call to this great man, in 1698, in order to make up the loss which was apprehended from the decease of the great Spanhemius, which seemed to be drawing near. And this resolution was approved of by our gracious Stadtholder, William III. king of Great Britain, of immortal memory, from that constant piety he entertained towards God, and that equal fidelity and prudence he exercised towards our church and

university. Nor was there the least delay, either in determining or executing that call to the professorship of divinity, or in his accepting thereof. For, though the people of Utrecht could have wished otherwise, yet our Witsius had several weighty reasons why he thought it his duty to comply with the Leyden invitation; judging it was entirely for the interest of the church, equally as for his own, that hereafter exempted from the labours of the pulpit, he might, with the greater freedom, devote the rest of his aged life to the benefit of the university. But especially, as he was made acquainted with his majesty's pleasure, by the illustrious pensioner Heinsius. And when his majesty admitted him into his royal presence, he signified the satisfaction he had with his accepting the call to the chair of Leyden. He entered on his office the 16th of October, after delivering a very grave and elegant oration, in which he gave the character of the Modest Divine. And with what fidelity he discharged this office for the space of ten years; with what assiduity he laboured, with what wisdom and prudence he taught, with what elegance he spoke, with what alacrity he discoursed in disputations, with what piety he lived, with what sweetness of temper he demeaned himself, with what gracefulness he continued to write, with what lustre he adorned the university, are things so well known to all, as may supersede any particular enlargement.

But he had scarce passed a year at Leyden, when the high and mighty states of Holland and West Friesland did, on the recommendation of the overseers of the university, in the room of Mark Essius, the piously deceased inspector of their theological college, in which ingenious youths of the republic are reared for the service of the church, commit the superintendency thereof to our Witsius, as the mildest tutor they could employ for their pupils; without detriment to all the honour and dignity of his professorship, which he enjoyed in conjunction with the celebrated Anthony Hulsius. When he was installed in this new office, the illustrious president of the supreme court of Holland, and overseer of the university, Hubert Roosenboomius, lord of Sgrevelsrecht, did, in a most elegant Latin discourse, in the name of all the nobility, not only set forth the praise of the new inspector, but also exhorted all the members of that college to a due veneration for him, and to shew him all other becoming marks of respect. Witsius accepted, but with reluctance, this new province; for, had he not judged a submission to the will of the states, and his laying himself out for the service of the church, to be his duty, he would not have complied with it. However, he executed this great charge with the greatest fidelity and care, for the advantage of, and with an affection for his pupils, equally with that of his professorship in the university till, in the year 1707, on the 8th of February, on account of his advanced age, and growing infirmities, he, with great modesty, in the assembly of the Overseers and Burgomasters, notwithstanding all their remonstrances and entreaties to the contrary, both in public and private, and all the great emoluments arising therefrom to himself, resigned this other office being at the same time also discharged, at his own desire, from the public exercises of his professorship in the university; for executing which in the old manner his strength of body was scarce any longer sufficient; the vigour of his mind



continued still unaltered; but as he often declared, he had much rather desist from the work, than flag in it.

And it is not to be thought, that Witsius would have been equal to so many and great labours, and the church and university have enjoyed so many and so great benefits by him, had he not found at home the most powerful cordials and supports; particularly in the choicest and most beloved of wives, Aletta van Borkhorn, the daughter of Wesselvan Borkhorn, a citizen and merchant of good character, at Utrecht, and a worthy elder of the church, and of Martina van Ysen; whom he married in the middle of the summer of 1660, after three years spent in the sacred ministry. She was eminent for meekness, and every civil and religious virtue; she loved and honoured her husband, in a manner above the common; with whom he lived in the greatest harmony and complacency, about four and twenty years, in North Holland, Zealand, Friesland, and at Utrecht; at length, in the year 1684, after many great and long infirmities of body, was taken from him by a truly Christian death. He was no less happy in his offspring, especially in three surviving daughters, Martina, Johanna, and Petronella, who were endued with every accomplishment that can adorn the sex, but especially in their duty and affection to their father, which they shewed, not only before, but more especially after the death of their mother.

From what has been said, may sufficiently appear, the admirable endowments and virtues of this man. How great was the force of his genius, in apprehending, investigating and illustrating, even the most abstruse subjects; the accuracy of his judgment, in distinguishing, determining, and arranging them; the tenacity of his memory, in retaining and recollecting them; what readiness of the most charming eloquence, in explaining, inculcating, and urging them home; were well known to those whoever saw or heard him. Nor was his gracefulness in a Latin style, as is most apparent from all he wrote and said, less than his readiness in the Dutch; in which, discoursing from the pulpit, with a peculiar decency of gesture and voice, he ravished the minds of the faithful to a holy assent, and unbelievers and the vicious themselves he filled with astonishment, shame, and terror. And as none will be found, from reading his funeral discourse, to have with more dignity commended the deceased queen Mary, so his many sacred poems must have affected a mind so learned and so pious. There was no branch of learning, necessary to adorn a divine, in which he did not greatly excel! He so increased his knowledge of philosophy, when at the university, that none of the quirks or sophisms of infidels could ensnare him, nor any artifice induce him to make shipwreck of the faith, or embrace, or encourage any of the errors of the times. He was master of the whole compass of sacred philology, Greek and Hebrew: he was well acquainted with the elegances of profane literature, Latin, Greek, and Oriental; skillfully borrowing from thence whatever might serve to explain, in a becoming manner, the sacred scriptures; prudently avoiding every extreme. He was perfectly well skilled in history, both ancient and modern, ecclesiastical and civil, Jewish and Christian, domestic and foreign: and from it he always selected, with the greatest

care, what might principally be of present use. He thoroughly learned divinity in all its branches, being as expert in the confirmation and vindication of doctrines, and in shewing their connection, as in confuting errors, discovering their origin, and distinguishing their importance. Above all, he was in love with, revered, and commended the holy scriptures; as that from which alone, true wisdom is to be derived; and which, by long practice, he had rendered so very familiar to himself, as not only to have the original words, upon all occasions, very readily at command, but to be able directly, without hesitation, to explain the most difficult. Nor did he, in this case, rest on any man's authority; most rightly judging such a conduct to be inconsistent with the divine glory of the Christian faith, declaring and demeaning himself the most obsequious disciple of the holy Spirit alone. Hence he had neither a disdain for old, nor an itch for new things; nor an aversion to new, and a mad and indolent fondness for old things. He would neither be constrained by others, nor constrain any one himself; being taught neither to follow, nor to form a party. That golden saying pleased him much "Unanimity in things necessary; liberty in things not necessary; and in all things, prudence and charity;" which he professed was his common creed. Nor can we have the least doubt of his zeal for the *faith once delivered to the saints*, and for true piety towards God, which he expressed in his writings, when at Leovaarden and Franequer, against some dangerous opinions, then starting up both in divinity and philosophy; of which also he gave a proof at Utrecht and Leyden, when publicly testifying in writing, that he could not bear the authority of reason to be so extolled above scripture, as that this last should be entirely subject to its command, or be overturned by ludicrous interpretations. His zeal, in his latter days, was greatly inflamed, when he observed all ecclesiastical discipline against those, who would overthrow the Christian faith, and even right reason itself, publicly trampled upon under the most idle pretences, and everything almost given up to a depraved reason, to the subverting the foundations of Christianity; while some indeed, mourned in secret, but were forced to be silent, and therefore he declared his joy at his approaching dissolution, on account of the evils he foresaw were hanging over the church; and often called on those who should survive, to tremble when the adversary was triumphing over the doctrines of salvation, and all true piety, to the destruction both of church and state; and that by men, whom it least became, and who still artfully dissembled a regard for religion, and for ecclesiastical and civil constitutions; unless God, in his wonderful providence, averted the calamity, and more powerfully stirred up the zeal of our superiors against Atheism, Pelagianism, and the seeds of both. I do not speak of those smaller differences, observable for some time past, in the method of ranging theological matters, in some modes of expression. All are well apprized with what equity and moderation Witsius ever treated these differences in opinion, and if ever any was inclined to unanimity and concord with real brethren, he was the man who never did any thing to interrupt it, but everything either to establish or restore it, and to remove all seeds of dissension. This is what that genuine Christianity, he had imbibed, prompted him to; and what the singular meekness of his temper

inspired; by which he was ready to give way to the rashly angry, and either made no answer to injurious railers, or repaid them even with those ample encomiums, which, in other respects, they might deserve. Thus lived our venerable Witsius, giving uneasiness to none, but the greatest pleasure to all, with whom he had any connection, and was not easily exceeded by any in offices of humanity and brotherly love. There was at the same time in him a certain wonderful conjunction of religious and civil prudence, consummated and confirmed by long experience, with an unfeigned candour. Neither was any equal to him for diligence in the duties of his office, being always most ready to do everything, by which he could be serviceable to the flocks and pupils under his care, for the benefit of the church. He did not withdraw from them in old age itself, nor during his indisposition indulge himself too much. His modesty was quite singular, by which he not only always behaved with that deep concern intreating the holy scriptures and its mysteries; but also, by which he scarce ever pleased himself in the things he most happily wrote and said: and when his best friends justly commended his performances, he even suspected their sincerity. Nor could any under adversities, be more content with his lot, even publicly declaring at Utrecht, that he would not exchange his place in the university and church, either with the royal or imperial dignity. And to omit other virtues, or rather in the compass of one to comprize all; he was not in appearance, but in reality, *a true divine*, ever discovering his heavenly wisdom by a sincere piety towards God and his Saviour. For, he was constant in the public acts of worship, unwearied in the domestic exercises of piety, giving, in this, an example for the imitation of others in the fear of the Lord, incessantly taken up in heavenly meditation, and continued instant in prayer, both stated and ejaculatory; and shone in them, when under the dictates and impulses of the holy Spirit: In fine, his chief care was, by avoiding evil and doing good, to demean himself both towards God and man, as became one who had obtained redemption through Christ, and, by divine grace, the hope of a blessed eternity in heaven; which he constantly panted after, with the utmost contempt for the things in the world.

His writings are numerous, learned, and useful: In 1660, almost at his entrance on the ministry, he published his *Judaeus Christianizans* on the principles of faith, and on the Holy Trinity. When at Wormer, he put out in Low Dutch, 1665, *The Practice of Christianity*, with the spiritual characters of the unregenerate, with respect to what is commendable in them; and of the regenerate, as to what is blameable and wants correction. At Leovaarden, he gave also in Low Dutch, *The Lord's Controversy with his Vineyard*, and at the same time, briskly defended it against opponents. Of his Franequer labours, we have, besides smaller works, afterwards comprised in larger volumes, his *Oeconomia fœderum Dei cum hominibus*, translated into Low Dutch, by Harlingius; and his *Exercitationes Sacrae in Symbolum Apostolorum*, translated also into Low Dutch, by Costerus. At Utrecht, came out his *Exercitationes Sacrae in orationem dominicam*; his *Aegyptiaca* and *Decaphylon*, with a dissertation on the *Legio fulminatrix Christianorum*, and the first volume of his *Miscellania Sacra*, and a good

deal of the second; besides some smaller works also. And at Leyden, he published, at last, the second volume of his *Miscellania Sacra*, complete and at this last place he set on foot what he calls his *Meletemeta Leidensia*, to be occasionally enlarged with a number of select dissertations. Indeed, all these writings are justly in great repute, their style being polite, the subjects and the whole replenished with various branches of learning, and a beautiful strain of piety, all which may deservedly commend them to the latest posterity.

He had been often, formerly, afflicted with racking and painful diseases; whence sometimes arose the great apprehension of a far earlier departure by death. And nothing, under divine providence, but his vigour of mind, joined to his piety, could have preserved him so long to the world; and that with so perfect an use of his senses, that not long before his death, he could read, without hesitation, the smallest Greek characters by moonlight, which none besides himself could do. But with his advanced years, he sometimes had cruel fits of the gout, and stone in the kidneys; and once in the chair, in the midst of a lecture, a slight touch of an apoplexy. These disorders were, indeed, mitigated by the skill of the famous doctor Frederic Deckers; but now and then, by slight attacks, threatened a return for his wavering and languishing state of health, indicating the past disorders not to be entirely extirpated, gave apprehensions of a future fatal distemper; which was occasioned by the sudden attack of a fever on the evening of the 18th of October. This fever, though very soon removed, left his body exceeding weak, and his mind in a state of lethargy, an indication that his head was affected. The good man himself, considering these symptoms, with great constancy and calmness of mind, told the physician, and his other friends then present, that they could not fail to prove mortal. Nor did the slightness of the disease make any change in his opinion as to its fatal issue; while he foresaw that the consequences of an advanced age, and of the greatest weakness, could admit of no other event. Nor indeed without cause: for his senses were gradually weakened by repeated slumbers; however, about his last hour, he sensibly signified to Doctor Mark, who attended him, his blessed hope, and his heavenly desires, as he had frequently done before, and then about noon, on the 22d of October 1708, he sweetly departed this life, in the 73d year of his age, and entered into the joy of his Lord.

THE  
ECONOMY  
OF THE  
*DIVINE COVENANTS.*

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BOOK I.



CHAP. I. - *Of the Divine Covenants in general.*

I. WHOEVER attempts to discourse on the subject and design of the Divine Covenants, by which eternal salvation is adjudged to man, on certain conditions equally worthy of God and the rational creature, ought, above all things, to have a sacred and inviolable regard to the heavenly oracles, and neither through prejudice nor passion, intermix any thing which he is not firmly persuaded is contained in the records which hold forth these covenants to the world. For, if Zaleucus made it a condition to be observed by the contentious interpreters of his laws, That “each party should explain the meaning of the lawgiver, in the assembly of the thousand, with halters about their necks: and that what party the presence of the thousand, end their lives by the halter they wore:” as Polybius, a very grave author, relates in his history Book xii. c. 7. And if the Jews and Samaritans in Egypt, each disputing about their temple, were admitted to plead before the king and his courtiers on this condition only, That “the advocates of either party, foiled in the dispute, should be punished with death,” according to Josephus, in his Antiquities, Book xiii. c. 6. Certainly he must be in greater peril, and liable to sorer destruction, who shall dare to pervert, by rashly wresting the sacred mysteries of the Divine Covenants; our Lord himself openly declaring, that “whosoever shall break one of these least commandments and shall teach men so, he shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven,” Matt. v. 19. It is therefore, with a kind of sacred awe I undertake this work; praying God, that laying aside every prejudice, I may demean myself a tractable disciple of the holy scriptures, and, with modesty, impart to my brethren, what I think I have learned

from them: if happily this my poor performance may serve to lessen the number of disputes, and help to clear up the truth; than which nothing should be accounted more valuable.

II. As it is by words, especially the words of those languages, in which God was pleased to reveal his sacred mysteries to men, that we can, with hopes of success, come to the knowledge of things; it will be worth while, more accurately to enquire into the import both of the Hebrew word, ברית, and the Greek διαθηκη, which the holy Spirit makes use of on this subject. And first, we are to give the true etymology, and then the different significations of the Hebrew word. With respect to the former, the learned are not agreed: some derive it from ברא, which in Piel, signifies to *cut down*: because, as we shall presently observe, covenants were solemnly ratified by cutting or dividing animals asunder. It may also be derived from the same root in a very different signification; for, as ברא properly signifies to *create*; so, metaphorically, to *ordain*, or *dispose*, which is the meaning of διατιθεσθαι. And hence it is, that the Hellenist Jews make use of το κτιζειν. Certainly it is in this sense that Peter I Pet. ii. 13. calls εξουσια, *power appointed by men*, and for human purposes, ανθρωπινη κτισι, *the ordinance of man*; to which, I think, Grotius has learnedly observed on the title of the New Testament. Others had rather derive it from ברית, as שבת from שבת, signifying, besides other things, to *choose*. And in covenants, especially of friendship, there is a choice of persons between whom, of things about which, and of condition upon which, a covenant is entered into: nor is this improperly observed.

III. But ברית is variously taken in scripture: sometimes *improperly*, and sometimes *properly*. *Improperly*, it denotes the following things. 1<sup>st</sup>. An immutable ordinance made about a thing: In this sense God mentions his “covenant of the day, and his covenant of the night,” Jer. xxxiii. 20. That is, that fixed ordinance made about the uninterrupted vicissitude of day and night; which, chap. xxxi. 36, is called חק, that is, statute, limited, or fixed, which nothing is to be added to, or taken from. In this sense is included the notion of a testament, or

of a last irrevocable will. Thus God said, Numb. xviii. 19, “I have given thee, and thy sons, and thy daughters with thee, הוא לחק עולם ברית מלח עולם, by a statute for ever: it is a covenant of salt for ever.” This observation is of use, more fully to explain the nature of the covenant of grace, which the apostle proposes under the similitude of a testament, the execution of which depends upon the death of the testator, Heb. ix. 15, 16, 17. To which notion both the Hebrew ברית, and the Greek διαθηκη may lead us. 2ndly. A sure and stable *promise*, though not mutual, Exod. xxxiv. 10. “Behold I make a covenant; before all thy people I will do marvels.” Isa. lix. 21. “This is my covenant with them, my Spirit shall not depart from them.” 3rdly. It signifies a precept, Jer. xxxiv. 13, 14. “I made a covenant with your fathers – Saying, at the end of seven years, let ye go every man his brother.” Hence appears in what sense the Decalogue is called God’s covenant. But *properly*, it signifies a mutual agreement between parties, with respect to something. Such a covenant passed between Abraham, Mamre, Eschol, and Aner, who are called, *confederates with Abraham*, Gen. xiv. 13. Such also was that between Isaac and Abimelech, Gen. xxvi. 28, 29.: between Jonathan and David, 1 Sam. xviii. 3. And of this kind is likewise that which we are now to treat of between God and man.

IV. No less equivocal is the διαθηκη of the Greeks: which both singularly and plurally very often denotes a testament: as Budaeus shews, in his Comment. Ling. Graec. from Isocrates, Oeschines, Demosthenes, and others. In this sense, we hinted, it was used by the apostle, Heb. ix. 15. Sometimes also it denotes a *law*, which is a rule of life. For the Orphici and Pythagoreans denominated the rules of living prescribed to their pupils, according to Grotius. It also often signifies an *engagement* or *agreement*; wherefore Hesychius explains it by συνωμοσια, *confederacy*. There is none of these significations but will be of future use in the progress of this work.

V. Making a covenant, the Hebrews call, בריות ברית, to strike a covenant, in the same manner as the Greeks and Latins, *ferire, icere, percutere fœdus*. Which doubtless took its rise from the ancient

ceremony of slaying animals, by which covenants were ratified. Of which rite we observe very ancient traces, Gen. xv. 9, 10. This was either then first commanded by God, or borrowed from some extant custom. Emphatical is what Polybius, Book iv. page 398. relates of the Cynæthenses, “over the slaughtered victims they took a solemn oath, and plighted faith to each other:” a phrase plainly similar to what God uses, Psalm l. 5. “those that have made a covenant with me by sacrifice.” They also used to *pass in the middle* between the divided parts of the victim cut asunder, Jer. xxxiv. 18. Whoever wants to know more about this rite, may consult Grotius on Matt. xxvi. 28. and Bochart in his Heirozoicon, Book ii. c. xxxiii. p. 325. and Ouwens Theologum, Book iii. c. i. It was likewise a custom, that agreements and compacts were ratified by solemn feasts. Examples of which are obvious in scripture. Thus Isaac, having made a covenant with Abimelech, is said to have made a great feast, and to have eaten with them, Gen. xxvi. 30. In like manner acted his son Jacob, after having made a covenant with Laban, Gen. xxxi. 54. We read of a like federal feast, 2 Sam. iii. 20. where a relation is given of the feast which David made for Abner and his attendants, who came to make a covenant with him in the name of the people. It was also customary among the heathen, as the learned Stuckius shews in his Antiquitates Convivales, lib. I. c. xl.

VI. Nor were these rites without their significancy: The cutting the animals asunder, denoted, that, in the same manner, the perjured and covenant-breakers should be cut asunder, by the vengeance of God. And to this purpose is what God says, Jer. xxxiv. 18, 19, 20, “And I will give the men that have transgressed my covenant, which have not performed the words of the covenant, which they had made before me, when they cut the calf in twain, and passed between the parts thereof. I will even give them into the hands of their enemies and their dead bodies shall be for meat unto the fowls of the heaven, and to the beasts of the earth.” See 1 Sam. xi.7. An ancient form of these execrations is extant in Livy, Book i. “The Roman people do not among the first break these conditions; but if they should avowedly, and

through treachery, break them, do thou, O Jupiter, on that day, thus strike the Roman people, as I do now this hog; and be the stroke the heavier, as thy power is the greater.” By the ceremony of the confederates passing between the parts cut asunder, was signified; that being now united by the strictest ties of religion, and by a solemn oath, they formed but one body, as Vatablus has remarked on Gen. xv. 10. These feasts were tokens of a sincere and lasting friendship.

VII. But when God in the solemnities of his covenants with men, thought proper to use these, or the like rites, the significancy was still more noble and divine. They who made covenant with God by sacrifice, not only submitted to punishment, if impiously revolting from God, they slighted his covenant; but God likewise signified to them, that all the stability of the covenant of grace was founded on the sacrifice of Christ, and that the soul and body of Christ were one day to be violently separated asunder. All the promises of God in him are yea, and in him amen, 2 Cor. i. 20. His blood is the blood of the New Testament, Matt. xxvi. 28, in a far more excellent manner than that, with which Moses sprinkled both the altar and the people entered into covenant, Exod. xxiv. 8. Those sacred banquets, to which the covenanted were admitted before the Lord, especially that instituted by the Lord Jesus, under the new Testament, do most effectually seal or ratify that intimate communion and fellowship there is between Christ and believers.

VIII. There are learned men, who from this rite would explain that phrase, which we have, Numb. xviii. 19, and 2 Chron. xiv. 5, of “a covenant of salt,” that is, of a covenant of friendship, of a stable and perpetual nature. Which seems to be so denominated, because salt was usually made use of in sacrifices to signify that the covenant was made sure upon observing the customary rites, says Rivet on Genesis, Exercit. 136. Unless we would rather suppose, a regard to be here had to the firmness of salt, by which it resists putrefaction and corruption, and therefore prolongs the duration of things, and in a manner renders them everlasting. For that reason, Lot’s wife is thought to have been turned to a pillar of salt: not so much, as Augustine remarks, to be for a seasoning to us, as a lasting and perpetual

monument of the divine judgment. For all salt is not subject to melting: Pliny says, that some Arabs build walls and houses of blocks of salt, and cement them with water, Nat. Hist. L. xxxi. c. 7.

IX. Having premised these things in general about terms of art, let us now enquire into the thing itself, viz. the nature of the covenant of God with man; which I thus define: A covenant of God with man, is an agreement between God and man, about the way of obtaining consummate happiness; including a commination of eternal destruction, with which the contemner of the happiness, offered in that way, is to be punished.

X. The covenant does, on the part of God, comprise three things in general. 1<sup>st</sup>. *A promise* of consummate happiness in eternal life. 2<sup>ndly</sup>. *A designation and prescription* of the condition, by the performance of which, man acquires a right to the promise. 3<sup>rdly</sup>. *A penal sanction* against those, who do not come up to the prescribed condition. All these things regard the whole man, or *ολοκληρος*, in Paul’s phrase, as consisting of soul and body. God’s promise of happiness is to each part, he requires the sanctification of each, and threatens each with destruction. And so this covenant makes God appear glorious in the whole man.

XI. To engage in such a covenant with the rational creature, formed after the divine image, is entirely worthy of, and by no means unbecoming of God. For it was impossible but God should propose himself to the rational creature, as a pattern of holiness, in conformity to which he ought to frame himself and all his actions, carefully keeping, and always exerting the activity of that original righteousness, which he was, from his very origin, endowed with. God cannot but bind man to love, worship, and seek him, as the chief good; nor is it conceivable, how God should require man to love and seek him, and yet refuse to be found by man, loving, seeking, and esteeming him as his chief good, longing, hungering, and thirsting, after him alone. Who can conceive it to be worthy of God, that he should thus say to man, I am willing that thou seekest me only; but on

condition of never finding me: to be ardently longed for above every thing else, with the greatest hunger and thirst; but yet, never to be satisfied. And the justice of God no less requires, that man, upon rejecting the happiness, offered on the most equitable terms, should be punished with the privation of it, and likewise incur the severest indignation of God, whom he has despised. Whence it appears, that from the very consideration of the divine perfections, it may be fairly deduced, that he has prescribed a certain law to man, as the condition of enjoying happiness, which consists in the fruition of God; enforced with the threatening of a curse against the rebel. In which we have just now said, that the whole of the covenant consisted. But of each of these we shall have fuller scope to speak hereafter.

XII. Thus far, we have considered the one party of the covenant of God: man becomes the other, when he consents thereto, embracing the good promised by God, engaging to an exact observance of the condition required; and upon the violation thereof, voluntarily owning himself obnoxious to the threatened curse. This the scripture calls, *יהוה לעברך בברית*, “to enter into covenant with the Lord,” Deut. xxix. 12, “and to enter into a curse and an oath,” Neh. x. 29. In this curse (Paul calls it, 2 Cor. ix. 13, *ομολογια*, professed subjection) conscience presents itself a witness, that God’s stipulation or covenant it just, and that this method of coming to the enjoyment of God is highly becoming; and that there is no other way of obtaining the promise. And hence the evils which God threatens to the transgressors of the covenant, are called “the curses of the covenant,” Deut. xxix. 21, which man on consenting to the covenant, voluntarily makes himself obnoxious to. The effect of this curse on the man who stands not to the covenant, is called “the vengeance of the covenant,” Lev. xxvi. 25. The form of a stipulation, or acceptance, we have Psal. xxvii. 8, “When thou saidest, Seek ye my face, my heart said unto thee, Thy face, Lord, will I seek.” Where the voluntary stipulation or acceptance, answers to the stipulation or covenant, made in the name of God by conscience, his minister.

XIII. Man, upon the proposal of this covenant, could not without guilt, refuse giving this stipulation or acceptance. 1<sup>st</sup>. In virtue of the law, which universally binds him, humbly to accept every thing proposed by God: to whom it is the essential duty of every rational creature to be subject in every respect. 2<sup>dly</sup>. On account of the high sovereignty of God, who may dispose of his own benefits, and appoint the condition of enjoying them with a supreme authority, and without being accountable to any: and at the same time enjoin man, to strive for the attainment of the blessings offered, on the condition prescribed. And hence this covenant, as subsisting between parties infinitely unequal, assumes the nature of those, which the Greeks called *Injunctions*, or *covenants from commands*; of which Grotius speaks in his *Jus. Bell. and Pacis*, lib. ii. c. 15 & 6. Hence it is, that Paul translates the words of Moses, Exod. xxiv. 8, “behold the blood of the covenant which the Lord hath made with you,” thus, Heb. ix. 20.: “this is the blood of the testament which God hath enjoined unto you.” It is not left to man to accept or reject at pleasure God’s covenant. Not to desire the promises, is to refuse the goodness of God. To reject the precepts is to refuse the sovereignty and holiness of God; and not to submit to the sanction, is to deny God’s justice. And therefore the apostle affirms of the covenant of God, that it is *νενομοθετηται* reduced to the form of a law, Heb. viii. 6, by which man is obliged to an acceptance. 3<sup>dly</sup>. It follows from that love, which man naturally owes to himself, and by which he is carried to the chief good; for enjoying which there remains no method beside the condition prescribed by God. 4<sup>thly</sup>. Man’s very conscience dictates, that this covenant is in all its parts highly equitable. What can be framed even by thought itself more equitable, than that man, esteeming God as his chief good, should seek his happiness in him, and rejoice at the offer of that goodness? Should cheerfully receive the law, which is a transcript of the divine holiness, as the rule of his nature and actions? In fine, should submit his guilty head to the most just vengeance of heaven, should he happen to make light of this promise, and violate the law? From which it



follows, that man was not at liberty to reject God's covenant.

XIV. God, by this covenant, acquires no new right over man; which, if we duly consider the matter, neither is, nor can be founded on any benefit of God, or misdemeanor of man, as Arminius argues: nor in any thing without God; the principal or alone foundation of it being the sovereign majesty of the most High God. Because God is the blessed, and self-sufficient Being, therefore he is the only potentate, these two being joined together by Paul, 1 Tim. vi. 15. Nor can God's power and right over the creatures, be diminished or increased by any thing extrinsic to God. A thing which ought to be deemed unworthy of his sovereignty and independence: of which we shall soon treat more fully. Only God, in this covenant, shews what right he has over man. But man, upon his accepting the covenant, and performing the condition, does acquire some right to demand of God the promise; for God has, by his promises, made himself a debtor to man. Or, to speak in a manner more becoming God, he was pleased to make his performing his promises, a debt due to himself, to his goodness, justice and veracity. And to man in covenant, and continuing steadfast to it, he granted the right of expecting and requiring, that God should satisfy the demands of his goodness, justice, and truth, by the performance of the promises. And thus to man as stipulating, or consenting to the covenant, God says, that "he will be his God," Deut. xxvi. 17. That is, he will give him full liberty to glory in God, as his God, and to expect from him, that he will become to man, in covenant with him, what he is to himself, even a fountain of consummate happiness.

XV. In scripture, we find two covenants of God with man: The Covenant of Works, otherwise called the Covenant of Nature, or the Legal; and the Covenant of Grace. The apostle teacheth us this distinction, Rom. iii. 27, where he mentions the law of works, and the law of faith; by the law of works, understanding that doctrine which points out the way in which, by means of works, salvation is obtained; and by the law of faith, that doctrine which directs by faith to obtain salvation. The form of the covenant of works is, "the man which doth those

things shall live by them," Rom. x. 5. That of the covenant of grace is, "whosoever believeth in him, shall not be ashamed," ib. ver. 11. These covenants agree, 1<sup>st</sup>. That in both, the contracting parties are the same, God and man. 2dly. In both, the same promise of eternal life, consisting in the immediate fruition of God. 3dly. The condition of both is the same, viz. perfect obedience to the law. Nor would it have been worthy of God to admit man to a blessed communion with him, but in the way of unspotted holiness. 4thly. In both, *the same end*, the glory of the most unspotted goodness of God. But in these following particulars they differ. 1<sup>st</sup>. The character or relation of God and man, in the covenant of works, is different from what it is in the covenant of grace. In the former God treats as the supreme law-giver, and the chief good, rejoicing to make his innocent creature a partaker of his happiness. In the latter, as infinitely merciful, adjudging life to the elect sinner consistent with his wisdom and justice. 2dly. In the covenant of works there was no mediator: in that of grace there is the mediator Christ Jesus. 3dly. In the covenant of works, the condition of perfect obedience was required, to be performed by man himself, who had consented to it. In that of grace the same condition is proposed, as to be, or as already performed by a mediator. And in this substitution of the person, consists the principal and essential difference of the covenants. 4thly. In the covenant of works, man is considered as working, and the reward to be given as of debt; and therefore man's glorying is not excluded, but he may glory as a faithful servant may do upon the right discharge of his duty, and may claim the reward promised to his working. In the covenant of grace, man in himself ungodly is considered in the covenant, as believing; and eternal life is considered as the merit of the mediator, and as given to man out of free grace, which excludes all boasting, besides the glorying of the believing sinner in God, as his merciful Saviour. 5thly. In the covenant of works, something is required of man as a condition, which performed entitles him to the reward. The covenant of grace, with respect to us, consists of the absolute promises of God, in which the mediator, the life to be obtained by him, the faith by which we may be made partakers of him,

and of the benefits purchased by him, and the perseverance in that faith; in a word, the whole of salvation, and all the requisites to it, are absolutely promised. 6thly. The special end of the covenant of works, was the manifestation of the holiness, goodness, and justice of God, conspicuous in the most perfect law, most liberal promise, and in that recompense of reward, to be given to those who seek him with their whole heart. The special end of the covenant of grace is, the praise of the glory of his grace, Eph. i. 6, and the revelation of his unsearchable and manifold wisdom: which divine perfections shine forth with lustre in the gift of a mediator, by whom the sinner is admitted to complete salvation, without any dishonour to the holiness, justice and truth of God. There is also a demonstration of the all-sufficiency of God, by which not only man, but even a sinner, which is more surprising, may be restored to union and communion with God. But all this will be more fully explained in what follows.

## CHAP. II. - *Of the Contracting Parties in the Covenant of Works.*

I. **WE** begin with the consideration *of the covenant of works*, otherwise called, *of the law and of nature*; because prescribed *by the law*, requiring *works* as the condition, and founded upon, and coeval with *nature*. This covenant is an agreement between God and Adam, formed after the image of God, as the head and root, or representative of the whole human race; by which God promised eternal life and happiness to him, if he yielded obedience to all his commands; threatening him with death if he failed but in the least point: and Adam accepted this condition. To this purpose are these two sentences, afterwards inculcated, on the repetition of the law, Lev. xvii. 5. and Deut. xxvii. 26.

II. The better to understand this subject, these four things are to be explained. 1<sup>st</sup>. The contracting parties. 2dly. The condition prescribed. 3dly. The promises. 4thly. The threatening.

III. The contracting parties here, are God and Adam. God, as sovereign and supreme Lord, prescribing with absolute power, what he judges equitable: as goodness itself, or the chief good,

promising communion with himself, in which man's principal happiness lies, while obeying, and "doing what is well-pleasing to him:" as justice itself, or sovereignly just, threatening death to the rebel. Adam sustained a twofold relation. 1<sup>st</sup>. As man. 2dly. As head and root, or representative of mankind. In the former relation, he was a rational creature, and under the law to God, innocent, created after the divine image, and endued with sufficient powers to fulfill all righteousness. All these things are presupposed in man, to render him a fit object for God to enter into covenant with.

IV. Man therefore, just from the hands of his Maker, had a soul shining with rays of a divine light, and adorned with the brightest wisdom; whereby he was not only perfectly master of the nature of created things, but was delighted with the contemplation of the supreme and increated truth, the eyes of his understanding being constantly fixed on the perfections of his God; from the consideration of which he gathered, by the justest reasoning, what was equitable and just, what worthy of God and of himself. He also had the purest holiness of will, acquiescing in God as the supreme truth, revering him as the most dread majesty, loving him as the chief and only good; and, for the sake of God, holding dear whatever his mind, divinely taught, pointed out as grateful, and like to, and expressive of his perfections: in fine, whatever contributed to the acquiring an intimate and immediate union with him; delighting in the communion of his God; which was now allowed him, panting after further communion, raising himself thereto by the creatures, as so many scales or steps; and finally setting forth the praises of his most unspotted holiness as the most perfect pattern according to which he was to frame both himself and his actions to the utmost. This is, as Elihu significantly expresses it, Job xxxiv. 9. "delighting himself with God." This rectitude of the soul was accompanied with a most regular temperature of the whole body, all whose members, as instruments of righteousness, presented themselves ready and active at the first intimation of his holy will. Nor was it becoming God to form a rational creature for any other purpose than his own glory; which such a creature, unless wise and holy, could

neither perceive nor celebrate, as shining forth in the other works of God; destitute of this light, and deprived of this endowment, what could it prove but the reproach of his Creator, and every way unfit to answer the end of his creation. All these particulars the wisest of kings, Eccles. vii. 29, has thrown together with a striking simplicity, when he says; “Lo! this only have I found, that God hath made man upright.”

V. What I have just said of the wisdom of the first man, ought, I think, to be extended so far, as not to suppose him, in the state of innocence, ignorant of the mystery of the Trinity. For it is necessary above all things, for the perfection of the human understanding, to be well acquainted with what it ought to know and believe concerning its God. And it may justly be doubted, whether he does not worship a God entirely unknown, nay whether he at all worships the true God, who does not know and worship him, as subsisting in three persons. Whoever represents God to himself in any other light, represents not God, but an empty phantom, and an idol of his own brain. Epiphanius seems to have had this argument in view when, in his Panarius, p. 9, he thus writes of Adam: “He was no idolater, for he knew God the Father, Son and Holy Ghost: and he was a prophet, and knew that the Father said to the Son, Let us make man.”

VI. These last words furnish a new argument: for since God, in the work of the creation, manifested himself a Trinity, “the Father made the worlds by the Son,” Heb. i. 2, the Holy Ghost cherished the waters by brooding upon them; and the whole Trinity addressed themselves, by mutual consultation, to the creation of man; it is not therefore credible this mystery should be entirely unknown to the Protoplast or first parent; unless we can suppose Adam ignorant of his Creator, who was likewise the Son and Holy Ghost. It cannot certainly be without design, that the scripture, when speaking of man’s Creator, so often uses the plural number: as Is. liv. 5, בעליך עשיך, which literally signifies, *thy husbands, thy makers*, Psal. cxlix. 2, ישראל בעשיו ישמח, *Let Israel rejoice and his makers*. Nay requires man to attend to this, and engrave it on his mind, Eccl. xii. 1, וזכר את בוראיו, *remember thy creators*. It is

criminal when man neglects it; and says not Job xxxv. 10. איה אלוה עשי, *where is God my makers?* Which phrases, unless referred to a Trinity of persons, might appear to be dangerous. But it is absurd to suppose Adam ignorant concerning his Creator, of that which God does not suffer his posterity to be ignorant of at this time; especially as God created man to be the herald of his being and perfections in the new world. But it certainly tends to display the glory of God, that he should particularly celebrate, not only the divine perfections, but likewise how they subsist in the distinct persons of the Deity, and the manner and order of their operation. Admirably to this purpose speaks Basil of Seleucia, serm. 2. Take particular notice of that expression, *Let us make man*; again, this word used plurally, hints at the persons of the Godhead, and presents a Trinity to our knowledge. *This knowledge therefore is coeval with the creation*. Nor should it seem strange, that afterwards it should be taught: since it is one of those things, of which mention is made *in the very first creation*.

VII. I own Adam could not, from the bare contemplation of nature, without revelation, discover this mystery. But this I am fully persuaded of, that God revealed some things to man, not dictated by nature. For whence did he know the command about the Tree of Knowledge, and whence the meaning of the Tree of Life, but by God’s declaring it to him? whence such a knowledge of his wife’s creation, as to pronounce her flesh of his flesh, and bone of his bone, but from divine revelation? Seeing then God had revealed to man many things, and those indeed not of such moment, can we believe he would conceal from him a thing, the knowledge of which was so highly expedient to the perfection of man and the glory of God? That learned man therefore, was mistaken who insisted, that the knowledge of the Trinity *exceeded the happiness of Adam’s state, which was merely natural*. For it was not so merely natural, that Adam only knew what the alone consideration of nature could suggest. The contrary we have just shewn. And it must be deemed natural to that state, that innocent man, who had familiar intercourse with his God, should learn from his

own mouth what might render him fitter to celebrate his praises. The learned Zanchius observes in his book de Creat. Hom. l. 1. c. 1. § 12. that most of the fathers were of opinion, that Adam, seeing he was such, and so great a friend of God before his fall, had sometimes seen God in a bodily appearance, and heard him speak: and adds, “but this was always the Son of God.” And a little after, “Christ therefore is the Jehovah, who brought Adam and placed him in Paradise, and spoke with him.” Thus the ancients believed, that the Son of God did then also reveal himself to Adam, and conversed with him.

VIII. And it seems rather too bold to affirm, “that the economy subsisting between the three persons, is so principally taken up in procuring the salvation of mankind, that the knowledge thereof could not pertain to the state of innocence; in which there was no place either for salvation or redemption.” For Moses declares the economy of the divine persons at the very creation. And while the gospel explains that admirable economy, as taken up in procuring the salvation of mankind, it, at the same time, carries our thoughts up to that economy, manifested in the first creation of the world. If now it is so useful and pleasant to think, that the Son of God our Saviour, “is the beginning of the creation of God,” Rev. iii. 14. “By whom were created thrones and dominions, things visible and invisible; that he might have the preeminence in all things,” Col. 1. 16, 18. both of the works of nature and of grace: and that the holy Spirit, now fitting up a new world of grace in our hearts, did at first brood on the waters, and make them pregnant with so many noble creatures; and thus to ascend to the consideration of the same economy in the works of creation and nature, which is now revealed to us in the works of salvation and grace. Who then can refuse that Adam in innocence had the same knowledge of God in three persons, though ignorant what each person, in his order, was to perform in saving sinners? Add to this, that though in that state of Adam, there was no room for redemption, yet there was for salvation and life eternal. The symbol of which was the Tree of Life, which even then bore the image of the Son of God: see Rev. ii. 7. For *in him was life*, John i. 4. which symbol had been in vain, if the meaning thereof had been unknown to Adam.

IX. In this rectitude of man principally consists that image of God, which the scripture so often recommends; and which Paul expressly places *in knowledge*, Col. iii. 10. *in righteousness and true holiness*, Eph. iv. 24. In which places he so describes the image of God, which is renewed in us by the Spirit of grace, as at the same time to hint, that it is the same with which man was originally created: neither can there be different images of God. For as God cannot but be wise and holy, and as such, be a pattern to the rational creature, it follows, that a creature wise and holy, is, as such, the expression or resemblance of God. And it is a thing quite impossible, but God must own his own likeness to consist in this rectitude of the whole man; or that he should ever acknowledge a foolish and perverse creature to be like him: which would be an open denial of his perfections. It is finely observed by a learned man, that *true holiness* is not only opposed to *hypocrisy* or *simulation*, or to *typical purity*, but that it denotes a *holy study of truth*, proceeding from the love of God. For οἰσος, to which answers the Hebrew חַמִּיר, signifies in scripture, *one studious in, and eager after good*. This *true holiness*, therefore, denotes such a desire of pleasing God, as is agreeable to the truth known of, and in him, and loved for him.

X. But I see not, why the same learned person would have the *righteousness*, mentioned by Paul, Eph. iv. 24. to be a privilege peculiar to the covenant of grace, which we obtain in Christ, and which Adam was without; meaning by the word *righteousness*, a title or right to eternal life; which, it is owned, Adam had not, as his state of probation was not yet at an end. In opposition to this assertion, I offer these following considerations. 1<sup>st</sup>. There is no necessity, by *righteousness* to understand a right to eternal life. For that term often denotes a virtue, a constant resolution of giving every one his due, as Eph. v. 9. Where the apostle, treating of sanctification, writes, *for the fruit of the Spirit is in all goodness, righteousness, and truth*. The learned person himself was aware of this, who elsewhere speaks thus, (on Gen. v. § 9.) “Righteousness is, first, the rectitude of actions, whether of the soul, or of the members;

and their agreement with sound reason; namely, that they may easily avoid condemnation or blame, and obtain commendation and praise.” So Tit. iii. 5. “Works of righteousness.” And hence the denomination of just or righteous, denotes a blameless or a praiseworthy person.” Since then that word signifies elsewhere such a rectitude, why not here too? Especially as it is indisputable, that such righteousness belonged to the image of God in Adam. 2dly. It ought not to be urged, that here *righteousness* is joined with *holiness*, and therefore thus to be distinguished from it; as that the latter shall denote an inherent good quality, and the former a right to life. For it may be answered, *first*, that it is no unusual thing with the holy Spirit, to express the same thing by different words. “It is to be observed,” says Ursinius, Quest. 18. Catech. “that righteousness and holiness were in us the same thing before the fall; namely, an inherent conformity to God and the law.” Nor does the celebrated Cocceius himself speak otherwise on Psal. xv. § 2. “But צַדִּיק, *righteousness*, if you consider the law of works, signifies, in the largest sense, everything that is honest, everything that is true, everything that is holy.” Secondly, suppose we should distinguish righteousness from holiness, it follows not, that it is to be distinguished in this manner; for there are testimonies, in which no such distinction can take place: as Luke i. 74,75. – *Serve him in holiness and righteousness before him:* and 1 Thess. ii. 10. *Ye are witnesses and God also, how holily, and justly and unblamely, we behaved ourselves among you that believe.* And 1 Kings iii. 6. – *he walked before thee in truth and in righteousness, and in uprightness of heart.* Where *righteousness*, though added to holiness, can signify nothing but a virtue of the soul, and the exercise of it. Thirdly, but if we must absolutely distinguish these two things, it may be done many ways. 1<sup>st</sup>. So as to refer to holiness to God; righteousness to men. Thus Philo concerning Abraham, says, holiness is considered as towards God; righteousness as towards men: and the emperor Antonine, Book 7. § 66. says of Socrates, in human things, just in divine, holy. 2dly. Or so as to say, that both words denote universal virtue, (for even righteousness is said of the worship of God, Luke i. 75. and holiness referred to men; Maximus Tyrius, Dissert. 26. says of the same Socrates, pious towards

God, holy towards men,) but in a different respect: so as holiness shall denote virtue, as it is the love and expression of divine purity; as Plato explains holiness by the love of God: righteousness, indeed, may signify the same virtue, as it is a conformity to the prescribed rule, and an obedience to the commands of God. Whether it be δικαιοσύνη, right, righteous to hearken unto God, Acts iv. 19. 3dly. Ursinius, quest. 6. Catech. speaks somewhat differently, saying, “that righteousness and holiness, may, in the text of Paul, and in the catechism, be taken for one and the same, or be distinguished; for *righteousness* may be understood of the qualities of them.” So that there is nothing to constrain us to explain righteousness here of a right to life; but there are many things to persuade us to the contrary. For, 1<sup>st</sup>. That image of God, which is renewed in us by regeneration, consists in *absolute qualities* inherent in the soul, which are as so many resemblances of the perfections of God: but a right or title to life is mere *relation*. 2dly. The image of God consists in something, which is produced in *man himself*, either by the first, or the new creation: but the right to life rests wholly on the righteousness and merits of Christ; things entirely *without us*, Phil. iii. 9. *Not having my own righteousness.* 3dly. The apostle in the place before us is not treating of *justification*, where this right should have been mentioned; but of *sanctification*, and the rule thereof; where it would be improper to speak of any such thing. 4thly. They who adhere to this new explanation of righteousness, appear without any just cause to contradict the Catechism, quest. 6. and with less force to oppose the Socinians, who maintain, that the image of God, after which we are regenerated in Christ, is not the same with that, after which Adam was created. And yet these learned men equally detest his error with ourselves. These considerations make us judge it safer to explain righteousness, so as to make it a part of the image of God, after which Adam was created.

XI. But if we take in the whole extent of the image of God, we say, it is made up of these three parts. 1<sup>st</sup>. *Antecedently*, that it consists in the spiritual and immortal nature of the soul, and in the faculties of understanding and will. 2dly. *Formally*

and principally, in these enduments, or qualities of the soul, viz. righteousness, and holiness. 3dly. *Consequentially*, in the immortality of the whole man, and his dominion over the creatures. The first of these was, as one elegantly expresses it, as precious ground on which the image of God might be drawn and formed: the second, that very image itself, and the resemblance of the divinity: the third, the lustre of that image widely spreading its glory; and as rays, not only adorning the soul, but the whole man, even his very body; and rendering him the lord and head of the world, and at the same time immortal, as being the friend and confederate of the eternal God.

XII. The principal strokes of this image, Plato certainly knew; who defines happiness to be ομοιωσιν τω Θεω, the resemblance of God: and this resemblance he places in piety, justice, and prudence; this last to temper and regulate the two former: his words are excellent, and deserve to be here transcribed: την δε δνητην φυσιν, και τονδε τον τοπον το κακον περιπολει εξ αναγκης διοκαι πειρασθαι χρη ενθενδε εκε ισι φευγειν οτι τυχιζα φυγη δε ομοιωσις Θεω κατα το δυνατον Ομοιωσις δε δικαιον και οσιον μετα φρονησεως γενεσθαι. “This mortal nature, and this place of abode, are necessarily encompassed with evil. We are therefore, with the utmost expedition, to fly from it: this flight is an assimilation to God as far as may be: and this assimilation is justice and piety, accompanied with prudence.” Vid. Lipsii Manduct. ad. stoicam philosophiam, lib. 2. Dissert. 13.

XIII. God gave to man the charge of this his image, as the most excellent deposit of heaven, and, if kept pure and inviolate, the earnest of a greater good; for that end he endued him with sufficient powers from his very formation, so as to stand in need of no other habitual grace. It was only requisite, that God, by the continual influx of his providence, should preserve those powers, and excite them to all and each of their acts. For, there can be no state conceived, in which the creature can act independently of the Creator; not excepting the angels themselves, though now confirmed in holiness and happiness.

XIV. And thus, indeed, Adam was in covenant with God, as a *man*, created after the image of God, and furnished with sufficient abilities to preserve that image. But there is another relation, in which he was considered as the head and representative of mankind, both *federal* and *natural*. So that God said to Adam, as once to the Israelites, Deut. xxix. 14,15. “neither with you only do I make this covenant, and this oath; but also with him that is not here with us this day.” The whole history of the first man proves, that he is not to be looked upon as an individual person, but that the whole human nature is considered as in him. For it was not said to our first parents only, *increase and multiply*; by virtue of which word, the propagation of mankind is still continued: nor is it true of Adam only; *it is not good that the man should be alone*: which Christ still urges, Matt. xix. 5.: nor did the penalty, threatened by God upon Adam’s sinning, *thou shalt surely die*, affect him alone, but *death passed upon all men*, according to the apostle’s observation, Rom. v. 12. All which loudly proclaim, that Adam was here considered as the *head* of mankind.

XV. This also appears from that beautiful opposition of the first and second Adam, which Paul pursues at large, Rom. v. 15, &c. For, as the second Adam does, in the Covenant of Grace, represent all the elect, in such a manner that they are accounted to have done and suffered themselves, what he did and suffered, in their name and stead: so likewise the first Adam was the representative of all that were to descend from him.

XVI. And that God was righteous in this constitution, is by no means to be disputed. Nor does it become us to entertain doubts about the right of God, nor enquire too curiously into it; much less to measure it by the standard of any right established amongst us despicable mortals, when the matter of fact is evident and undisputed. We are always to speak in vindication of God; “that thou mightest be justified when thou speakest, and be clear when thou judgest,” Psal. li. 4. He must, surely, be utterly unacquainted with the majesty of the Supreme Being, with his most

pure and unspotted holiness, which in every respect is most consistent with himself, who presumes to scan his actions, and call his equity to account. A freedom this, no earthly father would bear a son, no king in a subject, nor master in a servant. And do we, mean worms of the earth, take upon us to use such freedom with the Judge of the whole universe! As often as our murmuring flesh dares to repine and cry out, *the ways of the Lord are not equal*; so often let us oppose thereto, *are not thy ways unequal*? Ezek. xviii. 25.

XVII. However, it generally holds that we more calmly acquiesce in the determinations of God, when we understand the reasons of them. Let us therefore see, whether here also we cannot demonstrate the equity of the divine right. For what if we should consider the matter thus? If Adam had, in his own, and in our name, stood to the conditions of the covenant; if, after a course of probation, he had been confirmed in happiness, and we, his posterity, in him, if fully satisfied with the delights of animal life, we had, together with him, been translated to the joys of heaven; none certainly would then repine that he was included in the head of mankind: every one would have commended both the wisdom and goodness of God: not the least suspicion of injustice would have arisen on account of God's putting the first man into a state of probation in the room of all, and not every individual for himself. How should that, which in this event would have been deemed just, be unjust on a contrary event? For, neither is the justice nor injustice of actions to be judged of by the event.

XVIII. Besides, what mortal now can flatter himself, that, placed in the same circumstances with Adam, he would have better consulted his own interest? Adam was neither without wisdom, nor holiness, nor a desire after true happiness, nor an aversion to the miseries denounced by God against the sinner; nor, in fine, without any of those things, by which he might expect to keep upon his guard against all sin: and yet he suffered himself to be drawn aside by the craft of a flattering seducer. And dost thou, iniquitous censurer of the ways of the Lord, presume thou wouldst have better used thy free will? Nay, on the contrary, all thy actions cry aloud,

that thou approvest, that thou art highly pleased with, and always takest example from that deed of thy first parent, about which thou so unjustly complainest. For, when thou transgressest the commands of God, when thou settest less by the will of the Supreme Being than by thy lusts, when thou preferrest earthly to heavenly things, present to future, when, by thine own choice, thou seekest after happiness, but not that which is true; and, instead of taking the right way, goest into bypaths; is not that the very same as if thou didst so often eat of the forbidden tree? Why then dost thou presume to blame God for taking a compendious way, including all in one; well knowing that the case of each in particular, when put to the test, would have proved the same.

### CHAP. III. - *Of the Law, or Condition, of the Covenant of Works.*

I. **H**ITHERTO we have treated of *the Contracting Parties*: let us now take a view of the condition prescribed by this covenant. Where first we are to consider *the Law of the Covenant*, then *the Observance* of that law. The law of the covenant is two fold. 1st. *The law of nature*, implanted in Adam at his creation. 2dly. *The symbolical law*, concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil.

II. The law of nature is the rule of good and evil, inscribed by God on man's conscience, even at his creation, and therefore binding upon him by divine authority. That such a law was connate with, and as it were implanted in the man, appears from the reliques, which, like the ruins of some noble building, are still extant in every man; namely, from those common notions, by which the heathens themselves distinguished right from wrong, and by which "they were a law to themselves, which shews the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness," Rom. ii. 14, 15. From which we gather, that all these things were complete in man, when newly formed after the image of God.

III. The conscience of man dictates to be virtuous, or otherwise, it does so in the name of God, whose vicegerent it is, in man, and the depositary of his commands. This, if I mistake not, is David's meaning, Psal. xxvii. 8. **לך אמר לבי**,

to thee, that is, for thee, in thy stead, my heart says, or my conscience. This conscience therefore was also called a God by the heathen as in this, Iambic, Βροτοις απασιν η συνειδησις Θεος, *In all men conscience is a God*. Plato in Philebus, calls reason *a God dwelling in us*. And hence we are not to think that the supreme rule in the law of nature is its agreement or disagreement with the rational nature, but that it is the divine wisdom manifested to, or the notion of good and evil engraven by God, on the conscience. It is finely said by the author of the book de Mundo, c. 11. “God is to us a law, tending on all sides to a just equilibrium, requiring no correction, admitting no variation.” With this Cicero agrees, de Legibus, lib. “The true and leading law, which is proper both to command and to forbid, is the right reason of the Supreme Being.”

IV. That author appears not to have expressed himself with accuracy, who said, We here call the law, the knowledge of right and wrong, binding to do what is right, and to avoid what is wrong. For law properly is not any knowledge, but the object of knowledge. This law, we say, is naturally known to man, but it would be absurd to say, knowledge is naturally known. Knowledge is our act, and is indeed to be squared by the rule of the law. The law is a rule prescribed by God for all our actions.

V. That other author is far less accurate, who thus determines: “Prior to the fall there was properly no law: for then the love of God prevailed, which requires no law. There (as the same author elsewhere explains himself) a state of friendship and love obtained, such as is the natural state of a son with respect to a parent, and which is what nature affects. But when that love is violated, then a precept comes to be superadded: and that love, which before was voluntary, (as best agreeing with its nature; for, that can scarcely be called love, unless voluntary) falls under a precept, and passes into a law, to be enforced then with commination and coercion; which rigour of coercion properly constitutes a law.

VI. But this way of reasoning is far from being the effect of thought and attention. For, 1st. It is not the rigour of the enforcement properly, that constitutes a law, but the obligatory virtue of what is enjoined, proceeding both from the power of the lawgiver, and from the equity of the thing commanded, which is

here founded on the holiness of the divine nature, so far as imitable by man. The apostle James, i. 25. commends “the perfect law of liberty.” 2dly. Nor is there any absurdity to affirm, that the natural state of a son with respect to a parent, is regulated by laws. It is certain, Plato de Legib. lib. 3. says, that *the first mortals practised the customs and laws of their fathers*, quoting that sentence of Homer, θεμισσει δε εκασος παιδων, *every one makes laws for his children*. 3dly. Nor, is it repugnant to do a thing by nature, and at the same time by a law. Philo Judeus de Migratione, explaining that celebrated old saying of the philosophers, says, that to live agreeably to nature, is done when the mind follows God, remembering his precepts. Crysippus in like manner, as commended by Laertius, lib. 7. on Zeno, says, that person lives agreeably to nature, who does nothing prohibited by the common law, which is right reason. In a sublimer strain almost than one could well expect from a heathen, is what Hierocles says on Pythagoras’ golden verses: “To obey right reason and God is one and the same thing. For the rational nature being illuminated, readily embraces what the divine law prescribes. A soul which is conformed to God, never dissents from the will of God, but being attentive to the divinity and brightness, with which it is enlightened, does which it does.” 4thly. Nor can it be affirmed, that after the breach of love, or, which is the same thing, after the entrance of sin, that then it was the law was superadded; seeing sin itself is anomia the transgression of the law. 5thly. Nor is love rendered less voluntary by the precept. For, the law enjoins love to be every way perfect, and therefore to be most voluntary, not extorted by the servile fear of the threatening, I John iv. 18. Nor does he give satisfaction, when he says, that what is called love, scarce deserves that name, unless voluntary; he ought to say, is by no means charity, unless voluntary. For love is the most delightful union of our will with the thing beloved; which cannot be so much as conceived, without the plainest contradiction, any other than voluntary. If therefore, by the superadded law, love is rendered involuntary and forced, the whole nature of love is destroyed, and a divine law set up, which ruins love. 6thly. In fine, the law of nature itself was not



without a threatening, and that of eternal death. I shall conclude in the most accurate words of Chrysostom, Homil. 12. to the people of Antioch; “when God formed man at first, he gave him a natural law. And what then is this natural law? He rectified our conscience, and made us have the knowledge of good and evil, without any other teaching than our own.”

VII. It is, moreover, to be observed, that this law of nature is the same in substance with the decalogue; being what the apostle calls, *την εντολην την εισζωην*, a *commandment which was ordained to life*, Rom. vii. 10. that is, that law by the performance of which, life was formerly obtainable. And indeed, the decalogue contains such precepts, “which if a man do he shall live in them,” Lev. xviii. 5. But those precepts are undoubtedly the law proposed to Adam, upon which the covenant of works was built. Add to this, what the apostle says, that that law, which still continues to be the rule of our actions, and whose righteousness ought to be fulfilled in us, was made weak through the flesh, that is, through sin, and that it was become impossible for it to bring us to life, Rom. viii. 3, 4. The same law therefore was in force before the entrance of sin, and, if duly observed, had the power of giving life. Besides, God in the second creation inscribes the same law on the heart, which in the first creation he had engraven on the soul. For, what is regeneration, but the restitution of the same image of God in which man was at first created? In fine, the law of nature could be nothing but a precept of conformity to God, and of perfect love; which is the same in the decalogue.

VIII. This law is deduced by infallible consequence from the very *nature of God and man*, which I thus explain and prove. I presuppose, as a self-evident truth, and clear from the very meaning of the words, that the great God has a sovereign and uncontrolable power and dominion over all his creatures. This authority is founded primarily and radically, not on creation, nor on any contract entered into with the creature, nor on the sin of the creature, as some less solidly maintain; but on the majesty, supremacy, sovereignty, and eminence of God, which are his essential attributes, and would have been in God, though no creature had actually

existed; though we now conceive them as having a certain respect to creatures that do or at least might exist. From this majesty of the divine nature the prophet Jeremiah, x. 6, 7. infers the duty of the creature. “For as much as there is none like unto thee, O Lord, thou art great, and thy name is great in might, who would not fear thee, O king of nations, for to thee doth it appertain.” For if God is the prime, the supreme, the supereminent; it necessarily follows that all creatures do in every respect depend on that prime, supreme, and the supereminent God, for existence, power, and operation. This is of the essence of creatures, which if not entirely dependent, were not possible to be conceived without the most evident contradiction. But the more degrees of entity there are in any creature, the more degrees also of dependence on the Supreme Being are to be attributed to it. In the rational creature, besides a metaphysical and physical entity, which it has in common with the rest of the creatures, there is a certain more perfect degree of entity, namely, rationality. As, therefore in quality of a being it depends on God, as the Supreme Being; so also as rational, on God, as the supreme reason, which it is bound to express, and be conformable to. And as God, as long as he wills any creature to exist, he necessarily wills it to be dependent on his real providence (otherwise he would renounce his own supremacy by transferring it to the creature;) so, likewise, if he wills any rational creature to exist, he necessarily wills it to be dependent on his moral providence; otherwise he would deny himself to be the supreme reason, to whose pattern and idea every dependent reason ought to conform. And thus a rational creature would be to itself the prime reason, that is, really God; which is an evident contradiction.

IX. It is in vain therefore, that frantic enthusiasts insist, that the utmost pitch of holiness consists in being without law; wresting the saying of the apostle, 1 Tim. i. 9. *the law is not made for a righteous man, but for the lawless and disobedient*. Certainly that passage does not destroy our assertion, by which we evinced that the human nature cannot be without the divine law; but highly confirms it. For, since the ungodly are here described as *lawless*, who would fain live as

without law; and *disobedient* who will not be in subjection: it follows that the acknowledging the divine law, and the subjection of the understanding and will to it, is the character of the righteous and the godly. In the law of God, since the entrance of sin, we are to consider two things. 1<sup>st</sup>. The rule and direction to submission. 2<sup>dly</sup>. The power of bridling and restraining by terror and fear, and lastly, of justly condemning. When therefore the apostle declares, that the law was not made for a righteous man, he does not understand it of the primary and principal work of the law, which is essential to it, but of that other accidental work, which was added to it on account of, and since the entrance of sin, and from which the righteous are freed by Christ.

X. Nor does it only follow from the nature of God and of man, that some law is to be prescribed by God to man in common, but even such law, as may be not only the rule and guide of human actions, but of human nature itself, considered as rational. For, since God himself is in his nature infinitely holy, and manifests this his holiness in all his works; it hence follows, that to man, who ought to be conformed to the likeness of the divine holiness, there should be prescribed a law, requiring not only the righteousness of his works, but the holiness of his nature; so that the righteousness of his works is no other than the expression of his inward righteousness. Indeed the apostle calls that piety and holiness, which he recommends, and which undoubtedly the law enjoins, *the image of God*, Col. iii. 10. But the image should resemble its original. Seeing God therefore is holy in his nature, on that very account it follows, that men should be so too.

XI. A certain author therefore has advanced with mores subtlety than truth: that *the law obliges the person only to active righteousness, but not the nature itself to intrinsic rectitude*; and consequently, that *original righteousness is approved indeed, but not commanded by the law: and on the contrary also, that original unrighteousness is condemned, but not forbidden by the law*. For the law approves of nothing which it did not command, condemns nothing which it did not forbid. The law is **תורה**, the doctrine of right and wrong. What it teaches to be evil, that it forbids; what to be good, it commands. And therefore it is deservedly called *the law of*

*nature*; not only because nature can make it known; but also because it is *the rule of nature itself*.

XII. To conclude, we are to observe of this law of nature, that at least its principal and most universal precepts are founded not in the mere arbitrary good will and pleasure of God, but in his unspotted nature. For if it is necessary that God should therefore prescribe a law for man, because himself is the original holiness; no less necessary is it, he should prescribe a law, which shall be the copy of that original. So that the difference between good and evil, ought to be derived not from any positive law, or arbitrary constitution of the divine will, but from the most holy nature of God himself; which I thus prove:

XIII. Let us take the summary *of the first table*; Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, &c. Should this command be said to be founded in the arbitrary good pleasure of the divine will, and not in the very nature of God; it may with equal propriety be said, that God might dispense with the necessity of loving himself. A thing entirely impossible, as appears hence : it is natural to God to be the chief good: it is included in the notion of God, that he is the very best. Now it is natural to the chief good, to be supremely amiable; it is natural also to reason and will to be unable, without a crime, not to love what is proposed as worthy of the highest affection. Whoever therefore shall affirm, that the necessity of loving God, flows not from the very nature of God, advances the following contradiction: God is in his nature the chief good, and yet in his nature not supremely amiable. Or this other; God is worthy of the highest love; and yet it is possible, that he who loves him not does nothing unworthy of God.

XIV. But to proceed: if the command to love God is founded, not in his nature, but in his arbitrary good pleasure; he might have enjoined the hatred of himself. For, in things in their own nature indifferent, whoever has the right of commanding, has also that of forbidding, and of requiring the contrary. To assert, that God can command the hatred of himself, not only conveys a sound, grating on the ear, but labours under a manifest contradiction; as will appear from a

proper explication of the terms. God, the chief good, supremely amiable, are terms equivalent; at least, the last is an explication of the preceding. To hate, is to esteem a thing not the chief good, nay, not so much as any good at all, and therefore so far from loving it, we are averse from it. Would it not therefore be a manifest contradiction, should any one suppose the great and good God thus speaking to his creature: I am really the chief good, but my will is, not to be esteemed a good in any respect: I, indeed, am worthy of the highest love, but it is my will, that you deem me worthy of your hatred. A man must be blind who sees not a contradiction here.

XV. Moreover, I would ask those, if any are otherwise minded, whether it is not naturally good, even antecedently to any free determination of the divine will, to obey God when he commands any thing. If they own this, we have gained our point: if not, I ask further, whence then the obligation to obey? They cannot say, it is from any command. For, the question is, What binds me to obey that command? Here we must necessarily come to that sovereign majesty and supreme authority of God, to whom it is a crime in nature to refuse obedience. Again if not to obey God is good in nature, then, it follows, God can command, that none may obey him. A proposition not only inconsiderate, but also contradictory. For, to command, is to bind one to obedience. To say, Obey not, is to dispense with the bond of obligation. It is therefore most contradictory to say, I command, but do not obey.

XVI. What we have proved concerning *the love* of God, the summary of the *first table* of the law; namely, that it is good in nature, might be also proved from the summary of the *second table*, the love of our neighbour. For, he who loves God, cannot but love his image too, in which he clearly views *express characters* of the Deity, and not a small degree of the *brightness of his glory*. Again, whoever loves God, will, by virtue of that love, seriously wish, desire, study, and as much as in him lies, be careful, that his neighbour, as well as himself, be under God, in God, and for God, and all he has, be for his glory. Again, whoever loves God, will make it his business, that God may appear every way admirable and glorious; and as he appears such most eminently in the sanctification and happiness of

men, 2 Thess. i. 10. he will exert himself to the utmost, that his neighbour make advances to holiness and happiness. Finally, whoever sincerely loves God, will never think he loves and glorifies him enough; such excellencies he discovers in him, sees his name so illustrious, and so exalted above all praise, as to long, that all mankind, nay, all creatures, should join him in loving and celebrating the infinite perfections of God. But this is the most faithful and pure love of our neighbour, to seek that God may be glorified in him, and he himself be for the glory of God. Hence it appears, that the love of our neighbour is inseparably connected with that of God. If therefore it flows from the nature of God, to enjoin us the love of himself, as was just proved; it must likewise flow from the nature of God to enjoin us the love of our neighbour.

XVII. To conclude, if we conceive all holiness to be founded on the arbitrary will of God, this greatest of all absurdities will follow, that God our lawgiver can, by commanding the contrary of what he had done before, without any regeneration or renovation of the inward man, make of the wicked and disobedient, for whom the law is made to condemnation, persons holy and righteous: a shocking position!

XVIII. From what has been said, it is astonishing, that a certain learned person should approve of the following assertion; namely, that “on the will of God not only things themselves depend, but also every mode of a thing, the truth, order, law, goodness; nor can any goodness of the object either move the divine will, or put a stop to it.” It is indeed certain, that no bounds or rules can be set to the will of God, by any thing out of God himself; that being repugnant to his sovereign pre-eminence. Yet something may, and ought to be conceived, flowing from God himself, and his intrinsic perfections, which hinders the act of the divine will, and this is not therefore good, because God wills it; but God wills it, because it is good; for instance, the love of God, as the chief good. And they do not consider things regularly, who make the holiness of God to consist only in the exact conformity of his actions with his will. *Which will, say they, is the rule of all holiness, and*

so of the divine. On the contrary, as the natural holiness of God ought to be conceived prior to his will, so it is rather the rule of the will, than to be ruled by it. For, this holiness of God is the most shining purity of the divine perfections, according to which, agreeably to the most perfect reason, he always wills and acts. By this opinion, which we are now confuting, every distinction between what are called moral and positive precepts, is destroyed, and Archelaus' exploded paradox brought up anew; namely, το δικαιοον και το αισχροον ου φυσει, αλλα νομω. "The distinction of good and evil was not from nature, but of positive institution;" adopted by Aristippus, and Theodorus, surnamed the Atheist. "Than which opinion," says Cocceius, in his *Summa Theolog.* c. xxiv. § 6. "none can be devised more pernicious, and none more effectual for undermining all religion, striking at the very root of the divine justice, and the necessity of a Saviour, cutting out the vitals of piety."

XIX. And thus we have proved these three things concerning the law of nature, on which the covenant of works is founded: namely, 1st. That it flows from the nature of God and man, that some law be prescribed to man. 2dly. Such a law, as to be the rule and standard, not only of our actions, but also of our nature. 3dly. That the most universal precepts thereof at least are founded on the nature of God. Let us now consider the other, the *symbolical law*.

XX. We find this law, Gen. ii. 16, 17. "And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat; but of the tree of knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." Concerning this tree, three things are chiefly to be taken notice of. 1st. That it is not quite certain, whether it was a single tree; since a whole species of trees might be forbidden to man: we shall afterwards repeat this remark, when we speak of the Tree of Life. 2dly. There seems to be a two-fold reason for this appellation. 1. In respect to God, who, by that tree would try and know, whether man would continue good and happy by persevering in obedience, or swerve to evil by disobedience. In which sense God is said to have tried Hezekiah, 2 Chron. xxxii. 31. "that he might know all that was in his heart." 2. In respect of *man*, because, if from love

to God he obeyed this law of probation, he was to come to the fruition of that beatific good, which is never perfectly known, but by the enjoyment: on the contrary, if disobedient, he was to know by sad experience, into what plunge and abyss of evils he had brought himself.

XXI. 3dly. The tendency of such a divine precept is to be considered. Man was thereby taught, 1. That God is lord of all things; and that it is unlawful for man, even to desire an apple, but with his leave. In all things therefore, from the greatest to the least, the mouth of the Lord is to be consulted, as to what he would, or would not have done by us. 2. That man's true happiness is placed in God alone, and nothing to be desired, but with submission to God, and in order to employ it for him. So that it is HE only, on whose account all other things appear good and desirable to man. 3. Readily to be satisfied without even the most delightful, and desirable things, if God so command: and to think, there is much more good in obedience to the divine precept, than in the enjoyment of the most delightful thing in the world. 4. That man was not yet arrived at the utmost pitch of happiness, but to expect a still greater good, after his course of obedience was over. This was hinted by the prohibition of the most delightful tree, whose fruit was, of any other, greatly to be desired; and this argued some degree of imperfection in that state, in which man was forbid the enjoyment of some good. See what follows, chap. vi. § XIX.

XXII. Thus far of *the Laws of the Covenant*, both that of nature, and of this other symbolical and probatory one. It now follows, that according to what we proposed, § I. of this chapter, we consider the observation of those laws. Accordingly, a most perfect obedience to all the commands of God is required; agreeable to that stated rule, Lev. xviii. 5. "which if a man do, he shall live in them." And as life was likewise promised upon obedience to the symbolical law about the Tree of Knowledge, which doubtless was a positive institution; so, to observe by the way, it appears, that by this representation, moral precepts, as they are called, cannot be so distinguished from positive, as if to

the former alone this sentence belonged, *which if a man do, he shall live in them*, and not to the latter.

XXIII. This obedience does in the first place, suppose the most exact preservation of that *original* and primitive *holiness*, in which man was created. For, as we have already said, God by his law does above all things require the integrity and rectitude of man's nature to be cherished and preserved, as his principal duty, flowing from the benefit he has received. In the second place, from that good principle, *good works* ought to be produced: "Charity, out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience," I Tim. i. 5. In the third place, there ought to be a certain ready alacrity to perform whatever God shall reveal to man as his good pleasure and appointment, that in all things he may be ready to say, *Speak, Lord, for thy servant heareth*.

XXIV. A threefold *perfection* is required. 1st. *Of Parts*, both with respect to *the subject*, as that the whole man shall, in soul and body, and all the faculties of both, employ himself in the service of God, 1 Thess. v. 23. (for man is then *perfect*, when the outward man corresponds with the inward, the actions with the thoughts, the tongue and hands with the heart, Psal. xvi. 3, 4. and Psal. xxxvii. 30, 31.) and with respect to *the object*, as that all and each of the precepts are observed, without any sin of commission or omission, Gal. iii. 10. Jam. ii. 10. 2dly. *Of Degrees*, which to make obedience truly valuable, excludes all *επιεικειαν* pardon and connivance, strictly requiring obedience to be performed "with all the heart, with all the soul, with all the mind," Matt. xxii. 37. "With all our might," Deut. vi. 5. "Thou hast commanded us to keep thy precepts diligently," Psal. cxix. 4. In the third place, *Of Perseverance*, without interruption or period. God insists upon this with rigour, Ezek. xviii. 24. pronouncing, that "all his righteousness that he had done, shall not be remembered, when the righteous turneth away from his righteousness," which was fulfilled in Adam. This is emphatically expressed, Deut. xxvii. '26. "Cursed be that confirmeth not all the words of this law to do them."

XXV. Such a perfect observance of the laws of the covenant, quite to the period which God had fixed for probation, had given man a right to the reward. Not from any intrinsic proportion of the work to the

reward, as the grosser Papists proudly boast; but from God's covenant, and engagement, which was no ways unbecoming him to enter into. Nor had man, before the consummation of his obedience, even in the state of innocence, a right to life. He was only in a state of acquiring a right; which would at length be actually acquired, when he could say, I have fulfilled the conditions of the covenant, I have constantly and perfectly done what was commanded; now I claim and expect that thou my God will grant the promised happiness.

XXVI. How absurdly again do the Papists assert, that Adam, as he came from the hands of his Creator, had a right, as the adopted son of God, to supernatural happiness, as to his paternal inheritance, which, according to Bellarmine, *de Justificat* lib. v. c. 17. "is due to the adopted son of God, in right of adoption, previous to all good works." But this is truly a preposterous way of reasoning. For, the right of adoption belongs to the covenant of grace in Christ Jesus: "the adoption of children is by Jesus Christ," Eph. i. 5. Besides, was this opinion true, good works could not be required, as the condition of acquiring a right to eternal life; but could only serve to prevent the forfeiture of the right of a son: by this means, the whole design of the covenant of works, and all the righteousness which is by the law, are quite destroyed. In fine, what can be more absurd, than the trifling manner in which these sophisters talk of the grace of adoption, as giving Adam a right to enter upon an heavenly inheritance, in a legal covenant: when on the other hand, they so stiffly contend for the merits of works, under a covenant of grace. It is only there (to wit, under the covenant of grace,) that we are to apply the above sentiment, that the inheritance is due to an adopted son of God, in right of adoption, previous to all good works.

#### CHAP. IV. - *Of the Promises Of the Covenant of Works.*

I. **H**AVING thus considered the condition of the Covenant of Works; let us now enquire into *the Promises* of that covenant. And here first, the *Socinians* come under our notice, who obstinately

deny all promises. For, thus *Volkelius, de Vera Religione*, lib. ii. c. 8. says, *Scarce, if at all, was any general promise made to the men of that age: but rather threatenings and terrors were them set before them. Nor do we see God promising, upon Adam's abstaining from the fruit of that tree, any reward of obedience; but only denouncing destruction, if he did not obey*, Gen. ii. 17. For this he assigns the following reason: *Moreover, the reason why God at that time would be obeyed, without proposing almost any general reward, seems to be this; because, at the very beginning of the world, he would shew to all that he owed nothing to any, but was himself the most absolute lord of all.*

II. To this I answer, as follows: 1st. Man's natural conscience teaches him, that God desires not to be served in vain, nor that obedience to his commands will go unrewarded and for nought. The very Heathens were also apprized of this. Arian, in his *Dissert.* lib. i. c. 12. introduces Epictetus speaking thus: "If there are no Gods, how can it be the end of man to obey the Gods? But if there are, and they be yet regardless of every thing; how is the matter mended? But if they both are, and take care of human affairs; but men have no recompense to expect from them, and have as little; the case is still worse." Let us add, Seneca, *Epist.* xcvi. "God does not want servants. Why so? He ministers himself to mankind; being every where present and at hand. Whoever conceives not of God as he ought, dealing all things, bestowing his benefits freely, will never make the proper proficiency. Why are the Gods so beneficent? It is owing to their nature. The first article of the worship of the Gods, is to believe that they are: then to render them the honour of their majesty, and of their goodness, without which there is no majesty: to know, that they preside over the world, govern all things by their power, take special care of mankind, without neglecting individuals." In like manner, we find it among the articles of the Jewish faith, as a thing naturally known, that *there are rewards as well as punishments with God*; according to that common saying, *God defrauds no creature of its reward*. The worship of God presupposes the belief of this: *For he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him*, Heb. xi. 6.

III. 2dly. Besides this faith is not merely a certain persuasion of the mind, arising from reasoning, and the consideration of the goodness of God: but to render it a genuine faith, it must rest on the word and promise of God: *faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God*, Rom. x. 17. 3dly. This was the intent of the tree of life, which the *Socinians* themselves, in *Compend. Socinian.* c. 2. § 5. allow to have been a kind of symbol, though obscure of eternal life. But that symbol, proposed to Adam, could have been of no use, unless he understood it, and considered it as a seal of the promise made by God. It had been mere farce to have prohibited man from access to, and eating of this tree after the fall; unless thereby, God had given him to understand, that he would forfeit the thing promised, and consequently become unworthy of the use of that symbol and sacrament. 4thly. If no promise had been made, they might have lived without hope. For the hope which maketh not ashamed, is founded on the promises. But this is the character of the woeful calamity of those *who are without God in the world, that they have no hope*, Eph. ii. 12. 5thly. God represents to Cain a thing known long before, even by nature, much more by paternal instruction; *If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted?* Gen. iv. 7. But did this maxim begin to be true, and to be known only after the fall? 6thly. The very threatening infers a promise. The language of which at least is, that he was to be deprived of that happiness, which otherwise he would continue to enjoy; we may, therefore, most certainly infer, that man had no occasion to be afraid of losing that happiness, as long as he kept himself from sin. 7thly. By this assertion of our adversaries, according to their own hypotheses, all the religion of the first man is destroyed. Seeing, as our author writes at the beginning of that chapter, "the promise of rewards, for well-doing, is closely interwoven with religion." 8thly. The reason he gives for this assertion, is foolish and to no purpose. For, do these many and liberal promises of eternal life which God hath given us in Christ, make it now less evident, that God is indebted to none, and is the most absolute lord of all things? Does the supreme Being, by his gracious promises, derogate any thing from his most absolute dominion? Must

it not be known in all ages, that God owes nothing to any? How then comes it, that God did not always equally forbear promising?

IV. Let this therefore be a settled point, that this covenant was not established without promises. We now enquire what sort of promises God made to Adam. Accordingly, we believe God promised Adam life eternal, that is, the most perfect fruition of himself, and that forever, after finishing his course of obedience; our arguments are these:

V. 1st. The apostle declares that God, by sending his Son in the flesh, did what the law could not do, “in that it was weak through the flesh,” Rom. viii. 3. But it is certain Christ procured for his own people a right to eternal life, to be enjoyed in heaven in its due time. This the apostle declares the law could not now do, not of itself, or, because it has no such promises, but because it was weak through the flesh. Had it not therefore been for sin, the law had brought men to that eternal life, which Christ promises to and freely bestows on his own people. This appears to me a conclusive argument.

VI. 2dly. It is universally allowed, that Paul, in his epistles to the Romans and Galatians, where he treats on justification, does under that name comprise the adjudging to eternal life: he in many places proves that a sinner cannot be justified that is, lay claim to eternal life, by the works of the law but never by this argument, because the law had no promises of eternal life; but because man is by the law brought to the acknowledgment of sin, and the confession of deserved damnation, Rom. iii. 19, 20. He insists on this point with great labour and pains, though otherwise he might have very easily cut short the whole dispute, by just saying, that a title to eternal life was to be sought for by faith in Christ; that it is in vain to rest upon any law, though kept ever so perfectly, in regard it has no promises of eternal life annexed to it. On the contrary, the apostle teaches, that the commandment, considered in itself, was ordained to life, Rom. vii. 10. that is, was such as by the observance thereof life might have once been obtained; which if the law could still bestow on the sinner, “verily righteousness should have been by the law,” Gal. iii. 21. that is, the right to that same happiness which now comes from faith in Christ. For

the dispute was concerning κληρονομια, the inheritance of eternal life, which was to be entered upon; whether now, by means of the law, or by the promise of the gospel, v. 18. And he owns, it would be by the law, could the law ζωοποιησαι *make alive*. And this could be done by that law which was ordained to life, Rom. vii. 10. But when? In innocence before it was made weak by the flesh. If Adam therefore had persevered in obedience, the law would have brought him to that same inheritance, which now in Christ is allotted not to him that worketh, but to him that believeth. And this argument, if I mistake not, is plain to any person of thought and attention.

VII. 3dly. We are above all to observe how the apostle distinguishes the righteousness, which is of the law, from the evangelical. Of the first he thus speaks, Rom. x. 5. “Moses describeth the righteousness which is of the law; that the man which doth those things shall live by them.” Of the second, he writes as follows, Rom. i. 17. “The just shall live by faith.” On both sides, the promise of life is the same, and proposed in the very same words. Nor does the apostle in the least hint that one kind of life is promised by the law, another by the gospel. Which, if true, ought for once at least to be hinted; as the doing this would have ended the whole dispute. For, in vain would any seek for eternal life by the law, if never promised in it. But the apostle places the whole difference, not in the thing promised, but in the condition of obtaining the promise; while he says, Gal. iii. 11, 12. “But that no man is justified by the law in the sight of God, it is evident; for the just shall live by faith. And the law is not of faith: but the man that doth them, shall live in them.” That very life therefore is promised by the law to the man that worketh, which he now receives through the faith of Christ. But to what man, thus working, were the promises made? Was it to the sinner? Was it not to man in a state of innocence? And was it not then, when it might truly be said if thou continuest to do well, thou shalt be heir of that life upon that condition? And this could be said to none but to innocent Adam. Was it not then, when the promise was actually made? For after sin, there is not so much a promise as a denunciation of wrath, and an

intimation of a curse, proposing that as the condition of obtaining life, which is now evidently impossible to be performed. I therefore conclude, that to Adam, in the covenant of works, was promised the same eternal life, to be obtained by the righteousness which is of the law, of which believers are made partakers through Christ. But let none object, that all these arguments are fetched, not from the history of man in innocence, but from Paul's reasoning. For it is no matter whence arguments are taken, if they contain a demonstration to the conscience, which I think is here evident. Undoubtedly Adam knew a great deal more than is contained in that very short account of him by Moses. Nor does it appear to be without a mystery, that Moses is more sparing on most of the particulars of that covenant, and throws so little light on the shadow of a transient image, to denote that it was to vanish.

VIII. Once more, 4thly. It was entirely agreeable, that God should promise Adam, by covenant, something greater and better to be obtained after finishing his course of obedience than what he was already possessed of. What kind of covenant would it have been to have added no reward to his obedience, and his faithful compliance with the conditions of the covenant, but only a continuation of those blessings which he actually enjoyed already, and which it was not becoming God to refuse to man whom he had created? Now, Adam enjoyed in paradise all imaginable, natural, and animal happiness, as it is called. A greater, therefore, and a more exalted felicity still awaited him; in the fruition of which, he would most plainly see, that *in keeping the divine commands, there is צרב קב* *μιοθαπαδοσναι μεγαλην great reward*, Psal. xix. 11. Let none object the case of the angels, to whom he may pretend nothing was promised by God, but the continuance of that happy state, in which they were created. We are here to keep to the apostle's advice, in Col. ii. 18. "not to intrude into these things we have not seen." Who shall declare unto us those things which are not revealed concerning the angels? But if we may form probable conjectures, it appears to me very likely that some superior degree of happiness was conferred on the angels after they were actually confirmed, and something more excellent than that in which they were at first

created: as the joy of the angels received a considerable addition, upon beholding the divine perfections so resplendent in the illustrious work of redemption; and at the consummation of all things, the happiness of all the elect, both angels and men, will be complete; when Christ's whole body shall appear glorious, and God be glorified and admired in all his saints.

IX. It still remains doubtful, whether the life promised to Adam upon his perseverance was to be enjoyed in *paradise*, or in *heaven*. The latter appears more probable. 1st. Because paradise is in scripture represented as a type of heaven. and heaven itself is called paradise, Luke xxiii 43. by that exchange of names which is very common between a sacrament, or sign, and the thing signified thereby. But is it in the least probable, that paradise should be made a sacrament after man's ejection? 2dly. Is it fit that man when raised to consummate happiness should reside there, where God does most brightly display the rays of his glorious majesty; which doubtless he does in heaven, where he has fixed his throne, Isa. lxvi. 1. 3dly. As the earthly paradise was furnished with all the delights and pleasures appertaining to this animal life, of which there is no necessity in that most perfect and immediate fruition of God, all that external entertainment being in the highest degree excluded thence; heaven ought to be deemed a much more suitable habitation for glorified man than the earthly paradise. However, we would not deny, that happiness does not depend on place; and there being scarce anything to demonstrate this in scripture; therefore we ought not to contend strenuously about such a question.

X. This therefore is settled; God promised to Adam eternal life. But here it may be and is usually asked whence this promise flows, whether from the mere good pleasure of the divine will, so that God would have acted nowise unworthy of himself, had he made no such promise to man: or, whether God's making the covenant with man in this manner was from the divine nature, and from what was suitable to it? Here indeed, I think, we are to be modest; I shall therefore propose, what I imagine I know, or may reasonably think or believe concerning my God, with fear and



trembling. Or my God, grant that what I shall speak on this point may be managed with a holy awe, and in a manner becoming thy majesty!

XI. And first, I lay this down as an acknowledged truth, that God owes nothing to his creature. By no claim, no law is he bound to reward it. For all that the creature is, it owes entirely to God; both because he created it, and also, because he is infinitely exalted above it. But where there is so great a disparity, there is no common standard of right, by which the superior in dignity, can become under an obligation to give any reward, Rom. xi. 35, 36.

XII. I approve on this subject of Durandus' reasoning, which Bellarmine was unable to refute. "What we are, and what we have, whether good acts, or good habits, or practices, are all from the divine bounty, who hath given freely and preserves them. And because none, after having given freely, is obliged to give more, but rather the receiver is the more obliged to the giver; therefore, from good habits, and good acts or practices, given us by God, God is not bound by any debt of justice, to give anything more; so as not giving, to become unjust, but rather we are bound to God."

XIII. Whatever then is promised to the creature by God, ought all to be ascribed to the immense goodness of the Deity. Finely to this purpose speaks Augustine, serm. xvi. on the words of the apostle, "God became our debtor, not by receiving anything, but by promising what he pleased. For, it was of his own bounty that he vouchsafed to make himself a debtor." But as this goodness is natural to God, no less than holiness and justice; and equally becoming God to act, agreeably to his goodness, with a holy and innocent creature; so, from this consideration of the divine goodness, I imagine the following things may be very plainly inferred.

XIV. 1st. That it is unbecoming the goodness, I had almost ventured to add, and the justice of God, to adjudge an innocent creature to hell torments. A paradox which not only some scholastic divines, but, which I am very sorry to say a great divine of our own, with a few followers, scrupled not to maintain. Be it far from us, to presume to circumscribe the extensive power of God over his creatures, by the

limits of a right prescribed to us, or by the fallacious reasoning of a narrow understanding. But be it also far from us, to ascribe anything to him which is unbecoming his immense goodness and unspotted justice. Elihu, with great propriety joins these together, Job xxxvii. 22, 23. "With God is terrible majesty. Touching the Almighty we cannot find him out: he is excellent in power and in judgment, and in plenty of justice: he will not afflict." For, if God could thus afflict an innocent creature, he would shew he was not pleased with the holiness of his creature; since he would not only deprive him of communion with himself, but also give him to the cruel will of his enemies. When he destroys the wicked, he makes it plainly appear, he is not delighted with wickedness, nay, in scripture phrase, Psal. v. 5. hates it. Should he therefore, in the same manner, torment the pious, he would testify by this that he did not delight in piety, but rather hated it. Which, none without blasphemy can conceive of God. And what else are pains of hell? Are they not a privation of divine love? A sense of divine hatred? The worm of conscience? Despair of recovering God's favour? But how is it possible, without a manifest contradiction, to conceive this ever to be the case of an innocent creature? And I own, I was struck with horror, when I observed the most subtle Twiss, in order to defend this paradox, choose rather to maintain, it were better to be eternally miserable, and endure the torments of hell, than not to exist at all: and when he objected to himself the authority of our Saviour, plainly affirming of Judas; "it had been good for that man, if he had not been born," Matth. xxvi. 24. that he did not blush to answer, "that many things are said in Scripture in a figurative and hyperbolical manner, nay, a great deal accommodated to the sense of the vulgar, and even to human judgment, though erroneous;" all which he applies to this sentence of our Saviour, de Elect. P. 2. l. 1. § 4. p. 178, 179. To what length is not even the most prudent hurried, when he gives too much way to his own speculations? I, for my part, think Sophocles formed a sounder judgment than the very acute Twiss, when he said, "better not be, than to live miserable;" and Oeschylus, in Ixion, "I think it had been better for that man who suffers great pains

never to have been born, than to have existed.” Bernard speaks excellently to the same purpose, ad Eugen. de Consider. lib. 5. “It is not to be doubted, but it will be much worse with those who will be in such a state [of misery] than with those who will have no existence.” For, as he says in his sermon, 35, on Solomon’s Song, “the soul, placed in that state, loses its happiness with out losing its being: whereby it is always constrained to suffer death without dying, failure without failing, and an end without a period.”

XV. 2dly. Nor can God on account of this his goodness, refuse to communicate himself to, or give the enjoyment of himself to, an innocent, an holy creature, or to love and favour it, in the most tender manner, while it has a being, and continues pure according to its condition. For, a holy creature is God’s very image. But God loves himself in the most ardent manner, as being the chief good: which he would not be, unless he loved himself above all. It therefore follows, he must also love his own image, in which he has expressed, to the life, himself, and what is most amiable in him, his own holiness. With what shew of decency could he command the other creatures to love such as are holy, did he himself not judge them amiable? Or, if he judged them so, how is it possible, he should not love them himself?

XVI. Further, God does not love in vain. It is the character of a lover, to wish well to, and to do all the good in his power to the object of his love. But in the good will of God, consists both the soul’s life and welfare. And as nothing can hinder his actually doing well by those whom he wishes well to: it follows that a holy creature, which he necessarily loves from the goodness of his nature, must also enjoy the fruits and effects of that divine love.

XVII. Besides, it is the nature of love to seek union and communion with the beloved. He does not love in reality, who desires not to communicate himself to the object of his affection. But, everyone communicates himself such as he is. God, therefore, being undoubtedly happy, makes the creature, whom he loves and honours with the communion of himself, a partaker of his happiness. I say, he makes the creature happy, in proportion to the state in which he would have it to be. All these things follow

from that love which we have shewn God does in consequence of his infinite goodness, necessarily bear to the creature who is innocent and holy.

XVIII. The same thing may be demonstrated in another manner, and if I mistake not, incontestably as follows: The sum of the divine commands is thus; love me above all things: that is, look upon me as thy only chief good: hunger and thirst after me: place the whole of thy happiness in me alone: seek me above all: and nothing besides me; but so far as it has a relation to me. But how is it conceivable, that God should thus speak to the soul, and the soul should religiously attend to, and diligently perform this, and yet never enjoy God? Is it becoming the most holy and excellent Being, to say to his pure unspotted creature, (such as we now suppose it) look upon me as thy chief good; but know, I neither am nor ever shall be such to thee. Long after me, but on condition, never of obtaining thy desire: hunger and thirst after me; but only to be forever disappointed, and never satisfied: seek me above all things; but seek me in vain, who am never to be found. He does not know God, who can imagine that such things are worthy of him.

XIX. After all, if it cannot be inferred from the very nature of the divine goodness, that God gives himself to be enjoyed by a holy creature, proportionable to its state; it is possible, notwithstanding the goodness of God, that the more holy a creature is, the more miserable. Which I prove thus: the more holy anyone is, he loves God with the greater intenseness of all his powers: the more he loves, the more he longs, hungers, and thirsts, after him: the more intense the hunger and thirst, the more intolerable the pain, unless he finds wherewith to be satisfied. If therefore, this thirst be great to the highest degree, the want of what is so ardently desired, will cause an incredible pain. Whence I infer, that God cannot, consistent with his goodness, refuse to grant to his holy creature the communion of himself. Unless we yield this, it will follow, that, notwithstanding the goodness of God, it is possible for the highest degree of holiness to become the highest pitch of misery.

XX. But let it be again observed here, (of which we gave a hint, § VIII.) that this communion of God, of which we are speaking, which the goodness of the supreme Being requires to be granted to a holy creature, is not all the promise of the covenant here; which is at length to be given, upon fulfilling the condition. For it is not to be reckoned among the promises of the covenant, what God gives his creature now, before he has confirmed the conditions of the covenant. Another and a far greater thing is promised, after the constancy of his obedience is tried, to which the creature acquires some right, not simply because it is holy, (for such it came out of the hands of its Creator) but because it has now added constancy to holiness, being sufficiently tried to the satisfaction of its Lord. The promises therefore of the covenant contain greater things than this communion and fruition of God, of whatsoever kind it be, which Adam already enjoyed whilst still in the state of trial. A farther degree of happiness, consisting in the full and immediate enjoyment of God and in a more spiritual state, to last forever, was proposed to him, which the scripture usually sets forth under the title of eternal life.

XXI. And this is the proper question; whether the promise of eternal life, to be entered upon by all after a complete course of obedience, flows from the natural goodness of God, or, whether it is of free and liberal good pleasure? Indeed, I know not, whether the safest course be not to suspend the decision of this, till coming to see God face to face, we shall attain to a fuller knowledge of all his perfections, and more clearly discern what is worthy of them. For, on the one hand, it appears to me hard to affirm, and somewhat too bold, for anyone obstinately to insist, that it would have been unbecoming God and his perfections, to enter into covenant with man in this manner: namely, if thou keepest my commands thou shalt certainly have my favour and most endearing love, I will not only save thee from all uneasiness, but also load thee with every benefit, and even bless thee with the communion of myself; till having performed thy part, and being amply enough rewarded, I shall at length say, Now return to that nothing out of which thou wast created, and my will is, that this my last command be no less cheerfully obeyed than the others, lest thou shouldst forfeit by

this last act of disobedience, all the praise of thy former obedience. Has the creature any cause to complain of such a stipulation? Nay, rather, may it not give him joy, since it is far better to have existed for a few ages in a state of holiness and happiness, than never to have existed at all.

XXII. On the other hand, I can scarce satisfy myself in my attempts to remove some difficulties. For since (as we before proved) God does, by virtue of his natural goodness, most ardently love a holy creature, as the lively image of himself, how can this his goodness destroy that image, and undo his own work? *Is it good unto thee that thou shouldst despise the work of thine hands* without deserving such treatment? Job x. 3. If it was good, and for the glory of God, to have made a creature to glorify himself; will it be good, and for the glory of God, to annihilate that creature, who thus glorifies him? And thus in fact to say, thou shalt not glorify me forever? Besides, as God himself has created the most intense desire of eternity in the soul, and at the same time, has commanded it to be carried out towards himself, as its eternal good; is it becoming God to frustrate such a desire, commanded and excited by himself? Further, we have said, it was a contradiction, to suppose God addressing himself to a holy soul in the manner following: hunger after me, but thou shalt not enjoy me. Yet in the moment we conceive the holy creature just sinking into annihilation, it would in consequence of that divine command hunger and thirst after God, without any hope of ever enjoying him again. Unless we would choose to affirm, that God at length should say to that soul, Cease longing for me any more, acquiesce in this instance of my supreme dominion, by which I order thee to return to nothing. But I own it surpasses my comprehension, how it is possible a holy creature should not be bound to consider God as its supreme good, and consequently pant after the enjoyment of him.

XXIII. O Lord Jehovah, how little do we poor miserable mortals know of thy Supreme Deity, and incomprehensible perfections! how far short do our thoughts come about thee, who art infinite or immense in thy being, thy attributes, thy sovereignty over the creatures! what mortal can

take upon him to set bounds to this thy sovereignty, where thou dost not lead the way! Lord, we know that thou art indebted to none, and that there is none who can say to thee, what dost thou, or why dost thou so? That thou art also holy, and infinitely good, and therefore a lover and rewarder of holiness. May the consciousness of our ignorance in other things kindle in our hearts an ineffable desire of that beatific vision, by which, knowing as we are known, we may in the abyss of thy infinity behold those things which no thought of ours at present can reach.

#### CHAP. V. - *Of the Penal Sanction.*

I. IT remains that we consider *the Penal Sanction*, expressed by God in these terms, Gen. ii. 17. “for in the day that thou eatest thereof (the tree of knowledge of good and evil) thou shalt surely die.”

II. Several things are here to be distinctly noted. 1st. That all that God here threatens is the consequence and punishment of sin, to be only inflicted on the rebellious and disobedient: and therefore Socinus and his followers most absurdly make the death mentioned in the threatening, a consequence not so much of sin, as of nature; but God’s words are plain to any man’s conscience, that death flows from eating of the forbidden tree. 2dly; That the sin here expressed is a violation not of the natural, but of the symbolical law, given to man for the trial of his most perfect obedience. But even from this he might easily gather, that if the transgression of a precept, whose universal goodness depends only on the good pleasure of God, is thus to be punished, the transgression of that law which is the transcript of the most holy nature of God, deserves much greater. 3dly. That it is altogether agreeable to God’s authority and most righteous will, that there be a certain connection between the sin and the punishment, denounced by these words. This also is indicated by the ingemination in the original, *Dying thou shalt die*; that is, thou shalt most certainly die. So that, it is not possible for the sinner to escape death, unless perhaps a proper sponsor (of which this is not the proper place) should undergo it in his stead. 4thly. That the words of the threatening are general, and therefore by the term *death*, we ought here to understand, whatever the scripture any where signifies by that name. For who will presume

to have a right of limiting the extent of the divine threatening? Nay, the words are not only general, but ingeminated too, plainly teaching us, that they are to be taken in their full emphasis or signification. 5thly. That they are spoken to Adam in such a manner as also to relate to his posterity: a certain evidence, that Adam was the representative of all. 6thly. That on the very day the sin should be committed, punishment should be inflicted on man: justice required this, and it has been verified by the event. For in the very moment when man sinned, he became obnoxious to death, and immediately upon finishing his sin, felt *the beginnings* both of corporal and spiritual death. These things are here expressed with far greater simplicity than in the fictions of the Jewish doctors, according to Ben Jacchi, on Dan. vii. 25. where he speaks thus: “A thousand years are as one time, and one day, in the sight of the holy and blessed God, according to Psal. xc. 4. For a thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday;” and our doctors of blessed memory, said, “Gen. ii. 17. for in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die, is to be understood of the day of the holy and blessed; that therefore the first man did not complete his day, (not arrive at his thousandth year;) that of that day he wanted seventy years.” But this is far fetched, and savours of rabbinical dotage.

III. It will be far more useful a little more accurately to examine what is here meant by the word *death*. And, first, it is most obvious, that by that term is denoted that bad disposition of the body, now unfit for the soul’s constant residence, and by which the soul is constrained to a separation from it. By this separation the good things of the body, which are unhappily doted on, the fruits of sin, and the sinner’s ill-grounded hope, are snatched away at once. God intimates this, Gen. iii. 19. “till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return.” That is, thy body which was formed out of the earth shall return to its principles, and be reduced to earth again, unto which by its nature it is resolvable, as being taken out of it. And the reason why it is actually to be resolved unto earth is, because it really is what God said, *thou art dust*, now corrupted with earthly

desires, a slave to a body prone to sin, and taken from dust. In this sense Abraham confesses himself *to be dust and ashes*, Gen. xviii. 27. that is, a mortal sinner. And David says, Psal. ciii. 14. *he knoweth our frame*, (called, Gen. viii. 21. *an evil frame*, which passage Kimchi directs to be compared with this,) *he remembereth that we are dust*, attached to the ground, and viciously inclined to the good things of the earth. From this consideration, the prophet amplifies the mercy of God, in exercising it towards sinners, in whom he finds nothing to deserve his love. And by *dust* is clearly signified, Isa. lxxv. 25. the sinful body. Where it is said of the serpent, the devil, now overcome by the kingdom of the Messiah, *dust shall be his food*, he shall only have the pleasure to destroy the body, and men of carnal dispositions. Whereas then, after Adam sinned, God condemned him to the death of the body for his sin, it is not to be doubted, but he also comprised this death in the commination. Unless we will venture to affirm, that God has inflicted greater punishment on the sinner, than he threatened before the commission of sin.

IV. There is nothing so surprising but what may be devised by a luxuriant fancy. There is a certain learned man, who, in the words of Moses above explained, can find an extraordinary promise, and even clearer and more pregnant with consolation, than the prophecy concerning the seed of the woman. He thinks here is pointed out the period and boundary of toils; that the meaning is, *till thou shalt return to this land*, paradise, the state of happy souls, from which לקחת, *thou wast carried captive*. For, thus Solomon לקיס למות, *captivated to death*, and Jeremiah לקחה, *Thy children carried unto captivity*. And he thinks, that the opinions of the Jews concerning the gathering of the souls into paradise, has no other passage or foundation to support it. But this is nothing but the sally of a wanton imagination. Whereas, for our part, we take pleasure only in what is sound and sober, and yields satisfaction to the conscience. But to return to our subject.

V. It is no ways strange, that the Socinians, whose practice it is to wrest the scriptures, should contradict this truth, and deny that the death of the body is the punishment of sin. Their other perverse hypotheses make this necessary. For, by denying this, they imagine they can more easily answer our arguments

for original sin, taken from the death of infants, and for the satisfaction of the Lord Christ, from his death. And as they impiously deny the true Godhead of Christ, they allege as the most excellent sign of his fictitious divinity, that he was the first preacher, author, and bestower of immortality; but their blasphemies have been largely and solidly refuted by others. But I am sorry that any learned person of our own should deny, that by the death denounced, Gen. ii. 17. the death of the body ought to be understood; and who thinks he grants a great deal when he writes as follows: “From which place, if any insist they can prove a manifold death, eternal, spiritual, and corporal, and other afflictions, I can easily bear their fighting with these weapons against the enemies, so they can extort from them what they want.” These are none of the best expressions. Why, without necessity, grant so much to our adversaries? Is it at all commendable for us to weaken those arguments which have been happily made use of in defence of the truth? This learned person owns, that death is the punishment of sin, and that it may be evidently proved from the sentence pronounced upon Adam, Gen. iii. 19. What reason is there then not to believe, that the same death was proposed to man in the preceding threatening? Are not the words general, and ingeminated, to give them the greater emphasis? Is not the death of the body expressly set forth by the very same phrase, 1 Kings ii. 37. where Solomon tells Shimei, *thou shalt die the death*? Is not the very sound of the words such as a man cannot but have this death of the body come into his mind, unless a prejudiced person should refuse to understand here by death, what every one else does when death is spoken of? Is it not also highly becoming the divine goodness and justice, to inflict nothing by a condemnatory sentence on man, which was not previously threatened against sin; lest haply man should plead in excuse, he did not know that God would so highly resent, and so severely punish sin? And seeing this learned person would have death eternal here meant, does not that include the death of the body? Is the former ever inflicted on man, but after the latter, by raising him from that death, that the whole man, soul and body, may be eternally miserable? Why

are thus suspicions entertained, of which, alas! we have but too many? I could wish we all spoke with caution, *with fear and trembling!* This learned person will, it is hoped, not take amiss, if I here suggest to him the very prudent advice of Cocceius, which in a like case he inculcates, on Gen. iii. § 190. “Those of our party, says he, want we should employ stronger arguments against the Jews. And certainly, that admonition is good; namely, when we have to do with infidels we are to make use of cogent arguments; lest we become the derision of infidels, and confirm them in error. But as to the inculcating that rule, it is neither safe nor prudent, readily and frequently to oppose it to the arguments of Ecclesiastics. For, if thereby we refute them, N. B. we then go over to the party of the adversaries, and we arm them, and teach them to cavil. But if we do not refute them, but only inculcate that admonition; an injury is certainly done both to the disputant and the hearer, and we seem to give our own opinion as an argument. Let every one therefore argue with the utmost solidity: and if any manifestly abuses scripture, let him be corrected in a brotherly manner, upon pointing out his fault. As for the rest, let the arguments of believers be thoroughly tried, and not hissed off the stage.”

VI. Secondly. By death is here understood, all that lasting and hard labour, that great sorrow, all the tedious miseries of this life, by which life ceases to be life, and which are the sad harbingers of certain death. To these things man is condemned, Gen. iii. 16, 17, 18, 19. The whole of that sentence is founded on the antecedent threatening: such miseries Pharaoh himself called by the name, Death, Exod. x. 17. And David. Psal. cxvi. 3. calls his pain and anguish, *הבלימות* *the bands (sorrows) of death*; by these death binds and fastens men that he may thrust them into and confine them in his dungeon. Thus also Paul, 2 Cor. xi. 23. “In deaths often,” and 2 Cor. iv. 11. “are always delivered unto death;” ib. v. 12. “Death worketh in us.” As life is not barely to live, but to be happy; so death is not to depart this life in a moment, but rather to languish in a long expectation, dread, and foresight, of certain death, without knowing the time which God has foreordained. Finely to this purpose, says Picus Mirandula, in his treatise de Eute and uno. “For, we begin, should you haply not know it, to die then, when we begin first to

live; and death runs parallel with life: and we then first cease to die when set free from this mortal body by the death of the flesh.”

VII. Thirdly. Death signifies spiritual death, or the separation of the soul from God. Elegantly has Isidorus, Pelusiota iii. 232. defined it; “The death of the immortal soul is the departure of the holy Spirit from it.” This is what the Apostle calls, Eph. iv. 18. “being alienated from the life of God,” which illuminates, sanctifies, and exhilarates the soul. For, the life of the soul consists in wisdom, in pure love, and to have the rejoicing of a good conscience. The death of the soul consists in folly, and, through concupiscence, in a separation from God, and the tormenting rackings of an evil conscience. Hence the apostle says, Eph. ii. 1. “We are dead in trespasses and sins.”

VIII. But I would more fully explain the nature of this death, not indeed in my own, but in the words of another, because I despaired to find any more emphatical. Both living and dead bodies have motion. But a living body moves by vegetation, while it is nourished, has the use of its senses, is delighted, and acts with pleasure. Whereas, the dead body moves by putrefaction to a state of dissolution, and to the production of lothesome animals. And so in the soul, spiritually alive, there is motion, while it is fed, repasted, and fattened with divine delights, while it takes pleasure in God and true wisdom, while, by the strength of its love, it is carried to, and fixed on that which can sustain the soul, and give it a sweet repose. But a dead soul has no feeling; that is, it neither understands truth, nor loves righteousness, wallows, and is spent and tired out, in the sink of concupiscence, breeds and brings forth the worms of impure and abominable thoughts, reasonings, and affections. Men therefore alienated from that spiritual life, which consists in the light of wisdom, and the activity of love, who delight in their own present happiness, are no better than living carcasses, 1 Tim. v. 6. dead whilst living: and hence in scripture are said to be spiritually dead.

IX. The word, *נבל*, *αφρων*, which the scripture applies to such, is both emphatical and of a very fertile signification. For, it denotes, 1st. A fool, corrupt in all the faculties of the soul, void of that

spiritual wisdom, the beginning of which is the fear of the Lord. “Nabal is his name, and folly is with him,” is Abigail’s character of her husband, 1 Sam. xxv. 25. This נבל, is opposed to חכם, wise, Deut. xxxii. 6. “O foolish people and unwise.” 2dly. It also denotes a wicked person, Psal. lxxiv. 18. “the foolish people have blasphemed thy name.” 3dly, and lastly. It signifies one in a dead and withered state; the root נבל denoting “to wither and die away,” Isa. xl. 7. “the flower fadeth:” נבלת is a dead body, Isa. xxvi. 19. “thy dead men shall live.” All which conjointly denote a man devoid of the wisdom of God, overwhelmed with sin, and destitute of the life of God; in a word, faded and breeding worms, like a dead body. In all which spiritual death consists.

X. This spiritual death, is both sin and the natural consequence of the first sin, being at the same time threatened as the punishment of sin. For, as it renders man vile, and entirely incapable to perform those works which alone are worthy of him, as it makes him like the brute creatures, nay, and even like the devil himself, and unlike God, the only blessed being, and consequently renders him highly miserable, so it must be an exceeding great punishment of sin.

XI. Fourthly, and lastly. Eternal death is also here intended. The preludes of which, in this life, are the terrors and anguish of an evil conscience, the abandoning of the soul, deprived of all divine consolation, and the sense of the divine wrath, under which it is miserably pressed down. There will ensue upon this the translation of the soul to a place of torments, Luke xvi. 23—25. Where shall be the hiding of God’s face, the want of his glorious presence, and a most intense feeling of the wrath of God, forever and ever, together with horrible despair, Rev. xiv. 11. At last will succeed, after the end of the world, the resurrection of the body, to eternal punishment, Acts xxiv. 15.

XII. And here again, the Socinian divinity, adopted by the Remonstrants, thwarts the truth: maintaining, Ap. p. 57. that “by these words, thou shalt surely die, or by any others elsewhere, Adam was not threatened with eternal death, in the sense of the Evangelists (or Protestants), so as to comprise the eternal death of body and soul, together with the punishment of sense: but directly corporal death on

or a separation of soul and body; which, all the evils disposing to death do precede; and upon which, at length, the eternal punishment of loss, that is, the privation of the vision of God, or of grace and glory, will ensue.” Another of that class, who examined in French the doctrine of Amiralduis and Testard, violently contends, that “in the law there is no mention of the sense of infernal pains, but that it is peculiar to the gospel, and threatened at last, against the profane despisers thereof,” p. 59. and 114. Though elsewhere he adds, those “who stifle the light of reason, or hold the truth in unrighteousness, the more freely to fulfil the lusts of the flesh.” As to others, he thinks, a middle state is to be assigned them, into which they may be received, different from the kingdom of heaven, and the damnation of hell fire: such as perhaps, that they are for ever to remain in the dust, to which they are to be reduced, and from thence never to arise, Curcellæus, dissert. de necess. Cognit. Christian. § 5.

XIII. But this is the rankest poison. For, either they would insinuate that the soul of a sinner is to be cut off, destroyed and annihilated, like some of the Jews, and Maimonides himself, as quoted by Abarbanel, on Mal. iv. who place eternal death in this, that “the soul shall be cut off, shall perish, and not survive:” from which leaven of the Epicureans and Sadducees, the Socinians profess themselves not averse: or else they assert what is the most absurd, repugnant, and tends to weaken the authority and meaning of the whole scripture. For it is impossible to conceive the soul of man in a state of existence, excluded from the beatific vision of God, deprived of the sense of his grace and glory, and not be most grievously tortured with the loss of this chief good; especially as conscience shall incessantly upbraid the soul, who, through its own folly, was the cause of all this misery, and torment it with the most dire despair of ever obtaining any happiness. And seeing God does not exclude man from the vision of his face, where is fulness of joy, without the justest displeasure, a holy indignation, and an ardent zeal against sin and the sinner; the privation of this supreme happiness arising from the wrath of God, cannot but be joined with a sense of the divine displeasure and

malediction. These things flow from the very nature of the soul, and deserve a fuller illustration.

XIV. The soul of man was formed for the contemplation of God, as the supreme truth, truth itself, and to seek after him, with all the affection of his soul as the supreme good, goodness itself; and it may be said truly to live, when it delights in the contemplation of that truth, and in the fruition of that goodness. But when, by the just sentence of a despised Deity, it is excluded that most pleasant contemplation of truth, and most delightful fruition of goodness; then it must certainly own itself to be dead. And as it is so delightful to enjoy a good, most desirable and desired; so it must be afflicting and painful, to be disappointed of it. But since the soul, which is a spiritual substance, endued with understanding and will, cannot be without the active exercise of these faculties, especially when let loose from the fetters of the body; it must necessarily perceive itself miserable, by being deprived of the chief good; and being conscious of its misery, most bitterly lament the want of that good, which it was formed to seek after. To suppose a soul that has neither understanding nor will, is to suppose it not to be a soul. Just as if one supposed a body without quantity and extension: again, to suppose a soul sensible of its misery, and not grieved because of it, is contrary to the nature, both of the soul, and of misery. It is certainly, therefore, an absurd and contradictory fiction, to suppose the human soul to be under the punishment of loss without the punishment of sense at the same time.

XV. Further, as the soul cannot be ignorant that God is infinitely good, and that it is the nature of goodness to be communicative; it thence certainly gathers, that something exceedingly contrary to God must be found in itself, which he has the most perfect detestation of, and on account of which he, who is infinitely good, can have no communion with his creature: and that therefore that non-communion is the most evident sign and sad effect of the divine displeasure, depriving the man of the fruition of that good by which alone he could be happy. And thus, in this punishment of loss there is an exquisite sense of the wrath of God: with which no torments of the body by material fire can be compared.

XVI. Besides, the soul being conscious to itself of having by its sins been the cause of this misery, becomes enraged against itself, accuses, abhors, tears itself acts the tormentor against itself; and under this lash more severely smarts, than any criminal under the hands of the most unrelenting executioner. Add, that all hope of a happy restitution failing, being racked with horrid despair, it is appointed to eternal misery. All these things are so closely connected, as to make themselves manifest to every conscience, upon the least attention.

XVII. The same things the scripture expressly teach, when they speak of eternal punishment, Matt. xxv. 46. and torments, Luke xvi. 23, 28. of “the worm that dieth not, and the fire that is not quenched,” Mark ix. 44. and the like; expressions too strong to be understood of the punishment of loss only, without that of sense.

XVIII. And it is absurd to say, that this punishment is threatened only against the contemners of the gospel, seeing Paul testifies, that Christ is to come “in flaming fire, taking vengeance, not only on them that obey not the gospel, but on them that know not God,” 2 Thess. 1. 8. compare 1 Thess. iv. 5. “the Gentiles which know not God.” Such namely, who would not know God even from the works of creation, and “did not like to retain God in their knowledge,” Rom. i. 28. The very power of truth obliged Curcellæus to say, in the place above cited, “these are altogether inexcusable before God, and therefore it is not to be wondered, if, hereafter, they be consigned to the punishment of eternal fire.” And our adversaries will not say, that the gospel was preached to those of Sodom and Gomorrah, and the neighbouring cities. And yet, concerning them Jude writes, ver. 7. that “they are set forth for an example, suffering the vengeance of eternal fire.” Words not to be restricted to that fire wherewith those cities were burnt, but to be extended to the flames of hell, with which the lewd inhabitants of those cities are at this very day tormented. These things are to be distinguished, which the nature of the things teaches to be distinct. Thus, we are to understand, “giving themselves over to fornication, and going after



strange flesh,” of the inhabitants and not of the towns. But it is true of both, that they were burnt with fire: which, with respect to the towns, may in some measure be said to be eternal, they being so consumed as that they never shall or can be restored. But it is truly eternal with respect to the inhabitants, who, by the vengeance of God, were not annihilated; but at the time, when the apostle was writing, having been cast headlong into everlasting pain and torment, they suffered the punishment of that fire, of which “whoremongers shall have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone,” Rev. xxi. 8. So these cities are an emblem or type of eternal fire, but their wicked inhabitants “suffer the vengeance of eternal fire,” and so both are for an example (Peter says, 2 Pet. ii. 6. an example,) by which we are reminded, what whoremongers are to expect.

XIX. Christ also expressly declares to the same purpose, Matt. xxv. 41. that all who shall be placed on his left hand, and not declared heirs of eternal life, shall by a righteous sentence, be condemned to “everlasting fire, which is prepared for the devil and his angels,” which fire, ver. 46. is explained to be “everlasting punishment.” We cannot approve what Curcellæus in the said dissertation, § 6. has written; that in “Matthew is not described a judgment in every respect universal, of all who ever had existed, but only of those who made a profession of the Christian religion; some of whom behaved becoming the gospel, others not.” These are expressions not of the best stamp. For, shall riot that judgment be universal, which our Lord extends to all nations? Matt. xxv. 32. “To all the tribes of the earth?” Matt. xxiv. 30. In which every eye shall see Christ the judge? Rev. 1. 7. In which, according to Paul, Acts xvii. 31. “he will judge the world? In which both sea, and death, and hell will deliver up their dead to be judged? Rev. xx. 13. In which shall be accomplished the prediction which God solemnly confirmed by oath, saying, “every knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall confess to God?” Rom. xiv. 11. In which even the men of Nineveh and the queen of the south, shall rise to condemn the wicked Jews? Matt. xii. 41, 42. And their portion of torment be assigned to those of Tyre, and Sidon, and Sodom? Matt. xi. 22, 24. In which shall be inflicted on that servant who knew not his master’s will, and did commit things worthy of stripes, his due measure of stripes?

Luke xii. 48. In which, in fine, “they who have sinned without law, shall perish without law?” Rom. ii. 12. To restrict all this to those to whom the gospel has been preached, is to make sport with scripture, but God will not be sported with.

XX. But should Curcellæus perhaps reply, that he denies not an universal judgment to come, but that it is not described either in Matt. xxv. or in those passages, in which the men to be judged are divided into two classes, as John v. 28, 29. 2 Thess. i. 6, &c. I answer, 1st. That the scripture makes mention but of one judgment to be held on the last day, and no where teaches us, that a different tribunal is to be erected for those to whom the gospel was not preached, and for those to whom it was. Paul w preaching, Acts xxiv. 25. “of the judgment to come,” in the singular number; in like manner, Heb. vi. 2. “of eternal judgment.” 2dly. The passages alleged, have the marks of universality affixed to them. For, John v. 28. it is said, “all that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of man,” and v. 29. this universality is not to be divided into those who either by faith received the gospel preached to them, or perversely rejected it; but into those, “who have done good or evil,” without mentioning the gospel in the least. And 2 Thess. i. 6, &c. the punishment of eternal destruction will be inflicted, by the sentence of the judge, not only on those who were disobedient to the gospel, but also on those who knew not God, viz. God the Creator, to the knowledge and worship of whom nature alone might have led men, unless they had extinguished its light through their wickedness, as Curcellæus himself explains it. 3dly. Nor is it any thing singular to distribute the persons to be judged into two classes, but common in every judgment concerning all mankind: of which there are but two dissimilar bodies, either of those to be acquitted, or those to be condemned. An intermediate state the scripture knows nothing of.

XXI. The only thing specious adduced by Curcellæus is this, that Christ cannot upbraid those who knew nothing of his will, with these words, *I was an hungered, &c.* But we answer; 1st. That Christ, in what he here speaks, takes not in the whole process of the judgment, but only mentions

this by way of example. For who can doubt that more things are to be considered in this judgment even with respect to those to whom the gospel was preached, than barely those effects of charity towards the godly when afflicted? 2dly. The scripture declares that *all the actions* of all persons shall be tried in this judgment, Eccl. xii. 14. 2 Cor. v. 10. Rom. ii. 5, 6, &c. Even *words*, Matt. xii. 37. both *the idle and hard*, Jude 15. nay, even *the secrets of the heart*, Rom. ii. 15, 16. 1 Cor. iv. 5. 3dly. It is not our business to determine with what the Judge may justly upbraid the damned. It is plain, he will upbraid them with those things at least, which they shall hear with the most dreadful amazement. And seeing all the damned have discovered many evidences of an unrelenting, unmerciful, and unbeneficial disposition; who of us shall dare to censure Christ, for interpreting this their conduct, as if they would have shewn himself no kind of compassion, had he come among them in person? 4thly, and lastly. Granting that Christ may not upbraid all the wicked with this, yet does it not follow, that they are not to come to judgment; because there are many other things that shall be tried in this judgment, and for which they shall be condemned, which the scripture elsewhere declares, though, in this summary, Christ makes no mention of them. There is nothing to constrain us to believe that every thing relative to this judgment is to be learned from this passage alone: other testimonies of scripture are to be consulted, which treat on the same subject.

XXII. It remains that we enquire whence this Penal Sanction is to be derived; whether from the mere good pleasure of the divine will only, or rather from the natural and immutable justice of God, to which it would be unbecoming to have ordered otherwise. I shall not now repeat what the antagonists of the Socinians have fully and happily illustrated, concerning vindictive justice, as an essential property of God, and the necessity of its exercise, in case of sin. First, I shall only propose some arguments, by which this general proposition may, I think, be most evidently demonstrated, that it is agreeable to God's very nature and immutable right, not to let sin go unpunished; and them more especially inquire into the eternity of punishment.

XXIII. And first, let us duly consider the infinite *majesty* of God, and his supreme authority over all things; which is so illustrious, that it obliges rational creatures capable of knowing it, to obey and serve him, as we proved, chap. ii. §VIII. As often then as they in the least deprive him of this obedience, they directly incur the guilt of high treason against the divine majesty, and consequently are bound over to a punishment adequate to this crime, for neglect of obedience. For *the sinner*, as Thomas [Aquinas] justly said, *as much as in him lies, destroys God and his attributes*, slighting that majesty of God to which it is necessary that all things be subject, from the consideration both of God and the creatures. But it is altogether impossible that God should not love in the tenderest manner, both himself, his majesty, and his glory. Now he cannot but resent an injury done to what he thus loves. And therefore he calls himself, **אל קנא** *a jealous God*, and declares that this is his name, Exod. xxxiv. 14. But **קנאה** denotes *resentment for the dearest thing*: and hence *jealousy* and *great fury* are joined together, Zech. viii. 2. But above all things he is jealous for his *name*, that is, that it be made known to men as it is, Ezek. xxxix. 25. *and will be jealous for my holy name*. In which name even this is contained, *and will by no means clear the guilty*, Exod. xxxiv. 7.

XXIV. We may likewise argue from the majesty of God in this manner: It is altogether *impossible* that God *should deny himself* 2 Tim. ii. 13. that is, that he should conceal his own imperfections, or do any thing to make him appear to be what he is not, or that he is not possessed of properties truly divine: and that because he himself is the archetype and exemplar of the intelligent creature; to whom he is to discover in his works, his nature, dignity, prerogative, and excellence. He would therefore deny himself, did he conceal his majesty, much more did he suffer man to slight it, which is done by every sin. For the sinner behaves so in his presence as if there was no God to whom he owed obedience: nay, as if himself was God, who had a right to dispose of himself, his faculties, and other things with which he sins, at his own pleasure and without any control, saying, *Who is lord over me?* Psal. xii. 5. This is indeed to usurp the majesty of

the Supreme Being. But how can God suffer this to go unpunished? Unless we can suppose he can bear any to be equal to him, which would have been an open denial of his supremacy, majesty, and excellency. But he then appears glorious in the eyes of sinners, when he inflicts punishment on those who throw contempt upon his majesty. Thus, Numb. xiv. 20. he swears, that “all the earth shall be filled with the glory of God;” namely, by destroying in the wilderness, those who did not believe though they had seen the glory of God and his signs. The *glory of God*, in this passage, signifies the manifestation of his jealousy against those who despised him, for he will not suffer himself *to be mocked*. And therefore, as he cannot but seek his own glory, so he cannot suffer any to profane his majesty and go unpunished.

XXV. Secondly. There are also several ways by which this may, as evidently, be made appear from *the holiness* of God.

XXVI. 1. God’s holiness is such, that he cannot admit a sinner to union and communion with himself without satisfaction first made to his justice. For, *τις γαρ μετοχη* “what fellowship (participation) hath righteousness with unrighteousness?” 2 Cor. vi. 14. Whoever touches what is unclean can have no communion with God, verse 17. Every one whom God unites to himself, “he causeth to cleave to himself as a girdle,” that he may be unto him “for a name, and for a praise, and for a glory,” Jer. xiii. 11. But was he thus to unite the sinner to himself, without a previous satisfaction made for removing the guilt of sin, holiness itself would, in that case, be united to, clothed and attended with sin; which is a plain contradiction. It is indeed true that God had set all these things before sinful Israel; but that was done by virtue of the covenant of grace, which supposes a due satisfaction. Nor are we to imagine that this union which God describes in such magnificent language, was the lot of any others, in its full emphasis and spiritual import, but of those who were internally in covenant. Compare Deut. xvi. 19. Should any object, that though it is really unbecoming the holiness of God to favour the sinner with a communion of friendship, while he continues such; yet he may certainly, out of his goodness, take away sin, and so admit to his fellowship him who was before a sinner: I answer, that with out a

satisfaction, it is not consistent with the holiness of God, even to sanctify the sinner, and thereby prevent him with that greatest effect of his love. For if the beginning of such a communion of God with the sinner, be not unbecoming his holiness, why do all allow it as to the progress thereof? It is plain, it is not suitable to the holiness of God to cultivate a friendship with the sinner, so long as he continues such. But before sanctification he is nothing but a sinner, nay, he is sin itself. Nor can a greater instance of friendship be given to man than that by which he is sanctified. And therefore it is not consistent with the holiness of God, without any satisfaction, to grant so great a favour to the sinner, who is most worthy of his wrath. If it be still urged, that though God cannot, consistent with his holiness, love the sinner with a love of complacency, yet nothing hinders him from loving him with a love of benevolence, which may so transform him as to render him a fit object of the love of complacency: I answer, that this is spoken at random: for those effects of the love of benevolence, by which we are regenerated, are proposed to us in scripture, as consequences of the engagement and satisfaction of Christ, and of our reconciliation with God, Tit. iii. 4, 5. 1 Cor. vi. 11. 1 Pet. i. 3. Faith, without which it is impossible to please God, is freely bestowed on the elect, “through the righteousness of God, and our Saviour Jesus Christ,” Pet. i. 1. Whatsoever way you interpret this, it at last appears, that the gift of faith is founded on Christ and his satisfaction. If therefore the satisfaction of Christ was previously requisite to the sinner’s being blessed with those effects of the love of benevolence; it is rashly asserted, that it was becoming the holiness of God to bestow them on the sinner without satisfaction. Besides, God must needs punish those to whom he cannot grant union with himself; for the greatest punishment consists in the want of this union. This is that death with which the law threatens the sinner, as we have already made appear.

XXVII. 2. The holiness of God is so unspotted, that *he cannot behold evil, and look on iniquity* Hab. i. 13. that is, bear it in his sight. He cannot therefore, “lift up the light of his countenance upon him,” Psal. iv. 7. in which the salvation of men consists: but the privation of this is the highest

punishment. As long as David refused to admit his son Absalom into his presence, though almost reconciled to him, this appeared to Absalom more intolerable than any death, 2 Sam. xiv. 32. So that in a nature conscious of its unhappiness, a punishment of sense cannot but accompany a punishment of loss.

XXVIII. 3. From the holiness of God flows a mortal and implacable hatred of sin. It is as much the nature of holiness to “hate iniquity, as to love righteousness,” Psal. xlv. 8. Sin is “an abomination to his soul,” Prov. vi. 16. that is, to his very essence, and essential holiness: and neither *sin* only, but also the *sinner* is the object of his hatred. “For all that do such things, and all that do unrighteously, are an abomination to the Lord thy God,” Deut. xxv. 16. He therefore separates from himself, and from his chosen people, all whom he cannot make partakers of his favour: and so he cannot but inflict upon them that punishment which is the effect of his hatred. According to Solomon’s reasoning, Prov. xvi. 5. “Every one that is proud in heart, is an abomination to the Lord.” And the consequence is, *He shall not be unpunished*. In the same manner David reasons, Psal. v. 4 5, 6. “Thou art not a God that hast pleasure in wickedness.” Thou hatest sin, and the sinner too, because of it. “Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity.” And surely the fruit of this must be exceeding bitter: “Thou shalt destroy them that speak leasing.” And thus from the holiness of God, arises a hatred of sin and the sinner; from hatred, punishment.

XXIX. 4. It is doubtless diametrically opposite to the holiness of God, that he should become like unto the sinner. For, as his image consists in a holiness every way perfect, it is a contradiction that it should consist in sin; but if God was unwilling to punish sin he would then become like unto the sinner. This is what we may learn from himself, Psal. l. 21. when he would tell the sinner, thou thoughtest that I would not punish thy sin, he thus expresses it “thou thoughtest that I was altogether such an one as thyself.” But, says he, I will shew the contrary. And how? *I will reprove thee*, or punish thee. And by that I will, in effect, shew, that I am not like unto thee. Whence I conclude, that not to punish sin, would very much resemble the sinner; on the contrary, to punish sin in its proper time, is to shew himself most

unlike to the sinner. Unless then God reproves the sinner, he will be like unto him, and deny himself. For since God is a pattern to man, and man was made in order that God may be glorified in him; and every thing that God hath made, has a tendency to this, namely, that man may from them know what a God he is: if God should by no method shew that sin deprives man of communion with him and of his kingdom; nay, should he make the sinner eternally happy; while it is the highest degree of punishment to be accounted unworthy of it, God would certainly in that case testify himself not worthy to be loved, desired, and glorified, and that sin is not an object unworthy of man’s delight. As it is then impossible that God should be altogether like unto the sinner, it is likewise so, that he should let sin go unpunished.

XXX. 5. Hence God says, he is sanctified when he punishes, Lev. x. 3. On which place, Crellius himself, *de Vera Relig.* lib. i. c. 28. makes this annotation, which some learned men explain (and himself agrees with them), “I shall appear holy, that is, shall inflict punishment on them.” The same thing he owns in the same chapter, that “neither the holiness, nor the majesty of God, can in any respect bear to have his commands violated with impunity.” Such is the power of truth, that even the most obstinate are constrained to confess it! And the sense of this word is very evident, Ezek. xxxviii. 16.: where the punishment of Gog is foretold in these words “That the heathen may know me, when I shall be sanctified in thee,” viz, by thy punishment, “before their eyes:” more clearly still, Isa. v. 16. “God that is holy, shall be sanctified in righteousness,” by inflicting on sinners the punishments threatened in the foregoing verses, and by not pardoning the elect, but only on account of the right of Christ, in whose sufferings and death he displayed his most unspotted holiness, and his hatred of sin, before the whole world, nay, even before hell itself. It is therefore as necessary, that God should punish sin, as that he should be holy, lest he should seem to give up with his holiness. I shall conclude in the words of Joshua, xxiv. 19. “for he is a holy God.” What then? “He is a jealous God” And what does he infer hence? “He will not forgive your transgressions, nor your sins.” And thus from his

holiness flows his jealousy, from his jealousy his vengeance.

XXXI. Thirdly. This may also be inferred from that attribute of God, which is usually called, *vindictive justice*. That it is the property of this to punish sin, the scriptures tell us in a thousand places; and heretics impudently cavil, when they assert it to be the work, not so much of divine justice, as of wrath and passion. They unadvisedly disjoin, what the apostle has conjoined, who speaks of *the day of wrath, and of the righteous judgment of God*, Rom. ii. 5. And is God's wrath any other than that ready disposition of the divine mind to do that which his hatred of sin, justice towards the sinner, and his character as the supreme judge, do require? I omit a thousand other considerations which occur every where. I shall rather shew where the stress of the whole lies. First, That this perfection is as natural to God, as infinity, holiness, omnipotence. Secondly, That in virtue of it, God cannot suffer sin to go unpunished.

XXXII. The former of these I thus prove. That perfection must belong to the nature and essence of God, and cannot be referred to the good pleasure of his will, if what is opposite to it cannot be conceived without a contradiction. But it is contradictory to conceive of God under any character opposite to that of just, or, as unjust, Job xxxiv. 10. But it is not contradictory, if I conceive of God even contrary to those things which depend on the mere good pleasure of his will: for instance, it was from the free will and pleasure of God, that he chose Israel for his peculiar people: if therefore I conceive of God, as having never been the God of Israel, I shall doubtless have formed a false conception, but nothing that, by an evident contradiction, destroys the nature of God. For he might have been God, and yet not the God of Israel; but if he had so pleased, the God of the Egyptians or Chaldeans. But whosoever says, that God is, and asserts that he is unjust, speaks contradictory things. For the first conception of the Deity is to be perfectly and infinitely good. But justice, in giving to every one his due, by a suitable compensation, belongs to this goodness: especially when we consider, that as he is the Lord of rational creatures, so he cannot but be their judge. Whoever

therefore says that any is unjust, or not just, denies such to be God, of whom he thus speaks.

XXXIII. The latter I make out thus: The justice of God requires, that whatever is his righteous judgment be done; for it is necessary that God do himself justice; who, properly speaking, owes nothing to any one but to himself. As that is *the judgment* (righteousness) *of the law*, Rom. viii. 4. which the law demands, and which, without injustice, cannot be denied the law: what God requires, is the judgment of God, and cannot be denied him, unless he would be unjust to himself. But it is *the (judgment) of God, that they which do evil, are worthy of death*, Rom. i. 32. And therefore there is a connection between sin, and worthy of death, not only in virtue of the will, but of the justice of God. Moreover, as *the judgment of God is always according to truth*, Rom. ii. 2. he must pronounce the person unworthy of life, and worthy of death, who is worthy of it, consequently condemn him, unless a satisfaction intervene. To act otherwise, would be unworthy the just God. The apostle intimates this, Rom. iii. 25, 26. declaring, that "God set forth Christ to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness, that he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus." By which words he shews, if God should justify the wicked, and admit them to happiness without the atonement of the blood of Christ, he would not be just, at least, his justice would not be displayed.

XXXIV. Jeremiah has a most memorable passage, in which God says, ch. ix. 29. "Shall I not visit for these things, saith the Lord, and shall not my soul be avenged on such a nation as this?" The meaning is, shall I be Jehovah, nay, shall I not deny myself, if I bear with those things in my people? It is impossible I should do this, and that in virtue of *my soul*, that is, of my very essential holiness and Deity. Should I have a divine *soul*, that is, a divine *nature*, and just, and not be avenged of sin? For *the soul* of God denotes *the most holy nature* of God, or, which is the same, *the essential holiness* of God. As appears from comparing Amos iv. 2. with Amos vi. 8. In the former it is said, *the Lord hath sworn by his*

*holiness*: in the latter, *the Lord hath sworn by (his soul) himself*.

XXXV. Crellius therefore trifles, *de vera Relig.* lib. i. c. 28. when he ridiculously said, that to punish is God's foreign and strange work; as if to shew mercy was God's proper work, but to punish his strange work. To that end wresting, Isa. xxviii. 21. "that he may do his work," which he thus translates, "his strange works; that he may work his work, foreign (or strange) is his work to him." We freely own, that by that foreign and, strange work, we ought to understand his vengeance against the rebellious Jews. But it is said to be strange and foreign, in a quite different sense from what this perverter of scripture would have it. It was *strange and foreign*, because altogether uncommon and extraordinary. For, it was a *great tribulation, such as was not since the beginning of the world to that time*, Matt. xxiv. 21. Likewise, because any would think it strange, that God should deal thus with his own covenant people, on whom he had multiplied so many favours, and make examples of them, in a manner he had not done to his enemies, who were strangers to his covenant. What he had done in mount Perazim against the Philistines, Sam. v. 21 and in the valley of Gibeon, could scarcely be compared to this. It is likewise so called, because such an extraordinary punishment from God (as strange and unusual things very commonly do) would fill any with such astonishment as they would be obliged to take notice of the hand of God in it. Thus the miseries of the Jews struck Titus himself with horror; and, on viewing the walls and towers of Jerusalem, confessed, that without God, such a city could never be taken. It is very remarkable what Philostratus relates in the life of Apollonius Tyanæus, lib. v. c. 14. When the neighbouring nations came, according to custom, to adorn Titus with crowns, for his conquest of the Jews; he said, *that he deserved no such honour: that he did not achieve those things, but only was the instrument of God, who was then displaying his wrath*. In like manner also, because it was strange and foreign to the Israelites; who, that the Romans might not come and destroy their city, brought upon themselves the guilt of that wickedness against the Lord Jesus, which was the cause of so great a destruction. It was therefore strange and foreign, not to God, (for the

text says no such thing,) but in itself and to men. Or if we would say, that it was altogether strange and foreign to God; it must be meant, because God delights not either in destruction, or in the destruction of his creatures, as such, but, (to speak after the manner of men,) is rather inclined to acts of goodness and mercy. But this is so far from being of service to the heretic, that, on the contrary, it furnishes us with a new and solid argument. Thus,

XXXVI. Fourthly. It is certain that penal evil, as such, is not in itself desirable, even to God, because it is connected with the destruction of his own work. "Is it good unto thee that thou shouldst oppress? that thou shouldst despise the work of thine hands?" Job x. 3. Nay, God confirms by an inviolable oath, that *he has no pleasure in the death of the wicked*, Ezek. xxxiii. 11. It must then be something else, which renders it desirable, that God declares, that *he exults* in it, and *derives great consolation* from it, as being that alone which can, as it were, be sufficient to mitigate his grief, and appease his indignation occasioned by sin. Nothing can be stronger than the scripture phrases on this subject, some of which I shall exhibit; Hos. x. 10. "It is in *my desire* that I should chastise them." Amos v. 9. "That *refreshes himself* by desolation, (strengtheneth the spoiled) against the strong." Deut. xxviii. 36. "The Lord will rejoice over you to destroy you." Isa. i. 4. "I will ease me of my adversaries, and avenge me of my enemies." God, you see, desires to punish sinners. Whenever he pours out desolation upon them, he refreshes (*strengtheneth*) himself; nor slightly only, but he both rejoices and exults; and that with such a joy as may be capable of mitigating the pain caused by sin, and consequently of yielding consolation to God. What can it be which makes that evil of the creature so desirable to the Creator? What other but that by inflicting punishment, he preserves inviolable the glory of his supremacy, holiness, and justice, which sin would wholly obscure? For, all the usefulness of punishment (as Crellius himself speaks,) *must needs regard God*. But we can conceive here no advantage redounding to God, unless his rejoicing in the declaration of his glory, shining forth in that judgment, the justice of which the holy angels acknowledge with applause,

Rev. xi. 17. and xvi. 5, 6. and even the damned themselves, though unwilling and gnashing their teeth, are constrained to confess. It is indeed impossible that God should set light by this his most excellent glory, of which he is so jealous. As it is then necessary, that God should prefer the destruction of his wicked creature to that of his own glory, so it is necessary that he should punish the wicked. God indeed loves his creatures, but he does, as he ought, much more himself: He would act inconsistent with that love, was he not to recover his glory, which his sinful creature has by horrible sacrilege robbed him of; by inflicting punishment upon it.

XXXVII. Fifthly, and lastly. We shall use arguments, *ad hominem*. Socinus owns, *de Servato*, P. i. c. 1. that “not to pardon the impenitent is certainly right and agreeable to *the divine nature*,” and consequently to rectitude and equity. Crellius, in like manner, *de Vera Relig.* lib. i. c. 23. says, that “it is unworthy of God to suffer the crimes of the obstinate to escape unpunished.” Let us here a little examine these concessions. They say, it is unworthy of God not to punish the obstinate: nay, it is due the nature of God not to pardon them. Why pray? Is it because they are stubborn and obstinate? But obstinacy is not punished on its own account, because there is a good and laudable obstinacy or constancy. It is therefore only punished because of the evil that is in it; it is then necessary that sin be punished on its own account, and obstinacy only because of the sinfulness of it. And if it be necessary to punish sin on its own account, therefore where ever it is to be met with, it must necessarily be punished. Besides, all men after having once sinned, obstinately persevere in sin, unless they are brought to repentance by the preventing grace of God. But how can they obtain this without a previous satisfaction, if it be a debt which the divine nature owes to itself, not to grant them pardon.

XXXVIII. We likewise readily admit what Crellius advances in the very same chapter: “by the same claim of right that we owe obedience to God, by the same also we become liable to punishment for neglect of obedience and service: for, punishment succeeds, as it were, in the place of the duty omitted, and if possible, ought to atone for it.” But doubtless,

by a claim of natural right, obedience is due to God; and it would be repugnant to the divine perfections, not to require it of a rational nature. I speak without reserve, he is not God who cannot demand obedience from his rational creature. And the very same thing, according to Crellius’ very just hypothesis, is to be affirmed of punishment. I am well aware, that Crellius founds both claims as well to obedience as to punishment, on the dominion of God, as Lord; though this ought rather to be founded on the essential majesty and supremacy of God, which is the foundation of his sovereign dominion. But he is forced to confess that this sovereign dominion is so natural to God, that he cannot renounce it; nay, indeed, that without it, “it is scarce intelligible how he can be God; since it is on account of that very authority, and the power from which it flows, he is said to be God.” It therefore stands firm, that the penal sanction of the covenant is founded in the supereminent, most holy, and just nature of God, and not in the mere good pleasure of the divine will only.

XXXIX. We might here further enquire, whether the eternity of punishment is to be derived from this natural right of God; or, which is the same thing, whether a punishment, justly equivalent to each sin, ought necessarily to be eternal, according to God’s natural right; so that to maintain the contrary, would be unworthy of God, and consequently impossible. A difficult question this, because to determine concerning this absolute right of God in special cases, seems to be above human reach. “God is greater than man, he giveth not an account of his matters,” Job xxxiii. 12, 13. Let us however try, whether from the consideration of the divine perfections, we may not gather what may in this case be worthy of God.

XL. I now presuppose there is in sin committed against the infinite majesty of God, a malignity *in its measure infinite*, and therefore a demerit of punishment *in its measure infinite* also. I say, there is in sin a malignity only, *in its measure infinite*. For it cannot be called infinite in an absolute sense: if we consider the entity of the act in itself, an act infinitely intense cannot be produced by a finite creature; if the irregularity, and the privation of

moral good, adhering to the act, it is a privation of a finite rectitude, which is all that can be found in a creature: if, in fine, we consider the whole complex, namely sin, in the concrete, as they speak; neither in that case will its malignity be absolutely infinite. For neither are all acts of sin equally vicious, there being a great difference among them, which could not be if they were infinite. However, the malignity of sin is *in its measure* infinite: 1st. Objectively, because committed against an infinite good. 2dly. Extensively, in respect of duration, because the blot or stain of sin endures forever, unless purged away by the blood of Christ. There is not therefore in sin a desert of punishment absolutely infinite as to intensesness of torments. 1. Because such a punishment is absolutely impossible; for, a finite creature is not capable of infinite torments. 2. Because it would follow, that God could never satisfy his justice by inflicting condign punishment on the wicked, because they are incapable of this punishment. It is then absurd to say, that any punishment is of right due to sin, which God can never inflict. 3. Because it would follow, an equal punishment was due to all sins, or that all in fact were to be punished alike, which is an absurdity, and against Matt. xi. 22, 24. The reason of this consequence is, because there neither is, nor can be, any disparity between infinities. Nevertheless, there is in sin a desert of punishment *in its measure* infinite: namely, in the same manner that the malignity of it is infinite. That is, 1st. Objectively, so as to deprive man of the enjoyment of the infinite good, which is God. 2dly. Extensively, so that the punishment shall last forever. And thus I consider this desert of eternal punishment, so far only as to conclude, that God does nothing contrary to equity and justice, when he punishes the sins of men with eternal torments, both of soul and body. Which the event shews, as I have made appear § XVII.

XLI. But I know not if it can be determined whether this eternity ought necessarily to consist in the punishment of sense, or whether the justice of God may be satisfied by the eternal punishment of loss, in the annihilation of the sinful creature. This, I apprehend, may be said with sufficient probability and sobriety: if God should be pleased to continue forever in existence the sinner, it is necessary (without a satisfaction) that he forever inflict

punishment on him, not only the punishment of loss, but likewise that of sense. The reason is, because not only the guilt of sin always remains, but also the stain with which sin, once committed, infects the soul, and which can never be purged out, but by the blood of Christ. But it is impossible, as we proved, § XXII, XXIII, XXIV. that God should admit man, stained with sin, to communion with himself: and it cannot be that a rational creature, excluded the enjoyment of the divine favour, should not feel this indignation of God with the deepest anguish. Conscience most severely lashes the wretches for having deprived themselves of the chief good. Which with no small care we have also shewn, § XIII. and the following sections.

XLII. But whether it be necessary that God should condone forever the sinful creature in a state of existence, I own I am ignorant. May it not, in its measure, be reckoned an infinite punishment, should God please to doom man, who was by nature a candidate for eternity, to total annihilation, from whence he should never be suffered to return to life? I know, God has now determined otherwise, and that with the highest justice. But it is queried, whether agreeably to his justice, he might not have settled it in this manner: If thou, O man, sinnest, I will frustrate thy desire of eternal happiness, and of a blessed eternity; and on the contrary, give thee up to eternal annihilation. Here at least let us hesitate, and suspend our judgment.

#### CHAP. VI. - *Of the Sacraments of the Covenant of Works.*

I. **IT** hath pleased the blessed and almighty God, in every economy of his covenants, to confirm, by some sacred symbols, the certainty of his promises, and, at the same time, to remind man in covenant with him of his duty: to these symbols ecclesiastical practice has long since given the name of Sacraments: this was certainly appointed with an excellent design by the all-wise God. For, 1st. What God has known concerning his covenant, is, by this means, proposed to man's more accurate consideration; since he is not only once and again instructed in the will of God by a heavenly oracle, but frequently and almost daily beholds with his



eyes those things which by heaven are granted him as pledges of the greatest blessings: what believers see with their eyes, usually sink deeper into the soul, and leave deeper impressions of themselves, than those only which they hear with their ears. Elegantly to this purpose says Herodotus, “men usually give less credit to the ears than to the eyes. 2dly. These symbols also tend to confirm our faith. For, though nothing can be thought of that deserves more credit than the word of God, yet, where God adds signs and seals to his infallible promises, he gives a twofold foundation to our faith. “Thus he more abundantly shews unto the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel: that by two immutable things, in which it was impossible For God to lie, we might have a strong consolation,” Heb. vi. 17, 18. 3dly. By means of this institution, a holy man does, by the sight, touch, and taste, of the sacred symbols, attain to some sense of eternal blessings, and accustoms himself under the symbols, to a contemplation and foretaste of these things, to the plenary and immediate fruition of which he will, one time or other, be admitted without any outward signs. 4thly, and lastly. The man has in these something continually to remind him of his duty: and as, from time to time, they present to his thoughts, and give a foretaste of his Creator, so at the same time they put him in mind of those very strong obligations, by which he is bound to his Covenant-God. And thus, they are both a bridle to restrain him from sin, and a spur to quicken him cheerfully to run that holy race which he has so happily entered upon.

II. God also granted to man such symbols under the Covenant of Works; concerning which we are now to speak, that nothing may be wanting in this treatise, and, if I mistake not, were four in all which I reckon up in this order: 1. *Paradise*. 2. *The Tree of Life*. 3. *The Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil*. 4. *The Sabbath*. In speaking of each of these I shall distinctly shew first, What good they signified and sealed to man, with respect to God. Secondly, What duty and obligation they reminded him of.

III. But I must previously observe, that it is altogether foreign to this treatise, and out of its place, to propose such significations either of Paradise, or of the Tree of Life, or of the Sabbath, as relate to the gospel, the grace of Christ, and to glory, as freely

given to the elect by the Mediator and Spirit of grace. For here, I observe, that men of learning in other respects, have stumbled, who, when explaining the nature of those Sacraments, too uncautiously blend things belonging to a quite different covenant. Nothing is here to be brought in which does not belong to the covenant of works, the promises of that covenant, and the duties of man under the same: all which are most distinct from the covenant of grace. Here we are to say nothing of Christ, nothing of justifying faith in him, nothing of our ceasing from our own works as impure, nor any thing of that rest after the miseries of this life. All these belong to another covenant. I do not however refuse, that the unsearchable wisdom of God did appoint and order these symbols in such a manner, that the remembrance of them after the fall might be able to instruct man in many things relating to the covenant of grace and its Mediator. As that according to Paul, the first Adam himself was a type of the second: Eve, curiously formed out of Adam’s rib while asleep, was a type of the church, as it were, taken from Christ in virtue of his death, and that the first marriage represented that great mystery which regards Christ and the Church. These things, however, were neither known nor thought of in the state of nature; nor to be mentioned in a discourse on the Sacraments of the covenant of works. Having premised these things, let us now enquire into each particular with all the care possible, beginning with Paradise.

IV. It is far from our design, elaborately to enquire into the situation and topography of Paradise. Let it suffice to observe, that it was a garden, and a most agreeable enclosure, planted by God himself, toward the east, in Eden, a most fertile region, and abounding in all kinds of delights, as very learned men think, near Haran, the mart of Arabia, at the conflux of the Euphrates and Tigris, not far from Mesopotamia; which was watered with four rivers, washing, by many windings and meanders, the most fertile orchard. When man was formed from the earth without Paradise, he was introduced by God as a new guest to till the ground, and give an account of his stewardship and care. Here was every thing that could contribute to the proper pleasures of this life,

God frequently revealing himself to man, and familiarly admitting him to the sweetest fellowship with himself. Moses also mentions the gold and the precious stones of that country, as of the best kind and in the greatest plenty. And what now was the meaning, or mystical signification of all these things?

V. First. In general, the pleasantness of this place, which every moment set before man the most profuse bounty of the Deity, exhibiting the same to the enjoyment of all his senses, assured him, that he was to expect another residence far more noble and grand; where he should not, as now, enjoy his God through and in the creatures, but immediately delight in his Creator, to his being fully satisfied with his likeness. For if God now conferred upon him such things while here, before the course of his appointed trial was finished; what might he not, nay, what ought he not to promise himself from that immense munificence, after he had acted his part well, when he had acquired a right to come with boldness to his rewarder, and ask for his most ample recompense? Was not the Lord amidst this abundance, that lacked nothing pertaining to this animal life, [as it were] frequently addressing him, How shall I one day place thee among my sons, if thou constantly continuest obedient to my voice? If there is so much sweetness in these created rivulets of my goodness, in which now thou swimst with so much pleasure; what will there not be in myself, the unexhausted fountain, and the most plentiful spring? Ascend, O man, by the scale of the creatures, to me the Creator, and from a foretaste of these first fruits, conclude what I have prepared for thee against that time, when I myself shall be “thy exceeding great reward.” And certainly, unless we suppose Adam to have been stupid and devoid of all divine light, such thoughts must needs have arisen in his mind.

VI. The scriptures declare, that by Paradise is signified a place of perfect bliss, when they call heaven, the habitation of the blessed, by the name of *Paradise*, Luke xxiii. 43. 2 Cor. xii. 4. A manner of expression commonly used by the Holy Ghost, by which the names of the sign, and the thing signified, of the type and antitype, are mutually exchanged. The Jews themselves saw this, with whom it is usual to call the place of absolutely perfect happiness, **גן עדן**

and **גן עדן** *Eden* and *the garden of Eden*; and no wish was more frequent among them, than this, *Let his rest*, that is, the place of his rest, *be Eden*. There is also a most suitable analogy between Paradise and heaven, which we are now more expressly and particularly to shew.

VII. 1st. Paradise was a garden planted by God himself, to that life which is really and emphatically so. 6thly. Man being first created in the earth was translated into Paradise, as the better residence. For, if I mistake not, the words of Moses intimate this, Gen. ii. 8. “And there he put the man that he had formed.” Compare Gen. iii. 23. where after his sin, he is said “to be sent forth from the garden of Eden, to till the ground from whence he was taken.” In like manner also, man was in due time to be translated from that natural and animal state in which he was created, to another altogether supernatural and heavenly: of which this desirable translation from earth to Paradise reminded him, which Zanchius also observed on Gen. ii. 15. as also Musculus. 7thly. Had not man been innocent, he would have had no place in Paradise. This garden did not suffer him when once tainted with sin. *So nothing that defileth can enter into heaven*, Rev. xxi. 27. that being *the habitation of God’s holiness and glory*, Isa. lxiv. 15. 8thly. In Paradise man enjoyed the familiar fellowship of his God: and in this sense Paradise might also be styled *the garden of God*, as God dwelt there, delighting himself in the work of his hands, and especially in man himself. As it was a pleasure to man to be thus near and familiar with his Maker, so it was a delight to God. But in heaven the habitation of his Majesty, God will be always present with man, and give himself, in the most familiar manner possible, to be seen and enjoyed by him.

VIII. As Paradise might set forth all these things to man, so in like manner the use of this pledge reminded him of several duties. And, first, he might hence learn that he ought not to seek for his good and felicity in any thing upon earth, which, when appearing even most perfect, discovers its own imperfections; thus, this animal life in Paradise was to be recruited continually with meat, drink, and a succession of sleeping and waking. By which means he was taught to aspire after a greater

happiness, namely, the immediate fruition of his God; in the seeking after this happiness the principal holiness of *a traveller* consists. For, you love God above all things, if you ardently pant after an intimate union with him.

IX. Secondly. As this Paradise was given man to be cultivated and kept, the Lord thereby reminded him, that he took no pleasure in a lazy idleness, but in an active industry. His will was, that man should employ his labour and care upon the garden, that he might have something to do, in which he might continually experience the goodness and providence of his Creator. He did not choose that angels themselves should be idle, whom he made ministering spirits. And so he assigned man the care of cultivating and keeping Paradise, that he might have something to employ himself in the works of God; just as a king's son has some office assigned him, lest he should become indolent by an excess of pleasures, honour, and riches. Thus it became him to be conformed to his God by a most holy diligence, and be employed about the very work of God's hands, till he should come to enjoy an eternal sabbath with himself.

X. Thirdly. This also had a further respect to himself. For 1. As Paradise was the pledge of heaven, so the careful keeping of it reminded him to have heaven continually in his thoughts. 2. The labour and culture of Paradise taught him, that only he that labours and does that which is acceptable to God, can get to the heavenly habitation. 3. He was also instructed to keep his soul for God as a most pleasant garden cultivated like the Paradise of God, and shew forth those trees of virtues, which God planted as producing the most excellent fruits; that is, works proceeding from good habits: that so the Lord might come into this his garden, and eat his pleasant fruits, Cant. iv. 16. 4. It pointed out to him that he should, above all things solicitously keep his soul, that garden of God, lest any wild beasts of depraved passions should break in to lay every thing waste. And when God said to him, Keep this my garden, may he not at the same time be supposed to say, Keep thy heart with all diligence, or above all keeping, Prov. iv. 23. 5. The keeping of Paradise virtually enjoined him, of all things to be anxiously concerned not to do any thing against God, lest as a

bad gardener he should be thrust out of the garden, and in that discern a melancholy symbol of his own exclusion from heaven. We then conclude, that when man was, with joy and exultation, admitted into Paradise, he was bound, and was willing to be bound, to perform all these things to God; and so upon entering into Paradise, he bound himself as by a sacrament to these duties.

XI. We now proceed to consider the Tree of Life: but whether a single tree, or an entire species of trees, is a question among the learned. Some think that the former, which is indeed the common opinion, is founded on no probable reason: and suppose it more suitable to the goodness of God, that such a beautiful, useful tree should be in the view of his favourite, in as many parts of the enclosure as possible. They also allege the divine benediction, Gen. i. 11, 12. by which God conferred on all trees the virtue of multiplying themselves. But they chiefly insist on Rev. xxii. 2. where John pitches the Tree of Life on each side of the river, which they compare with Ezek. xlvi. 12. Others, on the contrary, do not think it probable that it was an entire species: First, Because the universal particle *כָּל* *all*, is not added as before when Moses would express many things of the same species, or many species themselves. Next, Because it is said to have been placed in the middle of the garden, so as to have the other trees surrounding it in order. To the passages alleged from the Revelations and Ezekiel, they answer, that John speaks only in the singular number, both in that place and Rev. ii. 7. and that one tree could properly be said to stand *in the midst of the street*, and on both sides of the river, because the river run through the midst of the street, and because that single tree extended its roots and branches to each side, so that there was no defect on either side. They likewise conclude from its being a type, that it must be a single one; because Christ is one. But Ezekiel saw many on the bank of the river representing the church militant; because, though one Christ quickens the church, yet it is by several means he now communicates life to the elect. These are the arguments on both sides: if any should desire our judgment, we are of opinion, that the arguments of neither side have the force of a demonstration: but from the consideration of its

being a type, we rather incline to the more common opinion.

XII. Whether this Tree was endowed with a singular virtue above others, so as perfectly to cure the disorders of the body, who, with certainty, can either affirm or deny? To ascribe to it a medicinal virtue against diseases, does not appear suitable to the state of innocent man. For diseases and such like infirmities are only the effects of sin. But nothing sure is more ridiculous than the paradoxical and altogether untheological assertion of Socinus, that Adam, by the benefit of that food, would have prolonged his life to a much longer time than God chose he should, had he not been deprived of the opportunity of reaching forth his hand to that Tree. As if God, when he expelled man out of Paradise, and said, *lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the Tree of Life and live forever*, Gen. iii. 22. was apprehensive, that man upon tasting again of that tree should live for ever, notwithstanding his will and threatening, which is downright blasphemy. For by these words, God only intended to restrain the vain thoughts of man, now become such a fool as to imagine that, by the use of that Tree he could repair the loss he had sustained by sin; or, as if the use of the sacrament, or the *opus operatum* as it is called, could be of any advantage without the thing signified. And by driving man from that outward sign of immortality he cut him off from all hopes of salvation by that covenant, of which that Tree was a symbol. However, there must be some great reason why that Tree obtained this designation, which we will now enquire into.

XIII. The Tree of Life signified the Son of God, not indeed as he is Christ and Mediator, (that consideration being peculiar to another covenant,) but in as much as he is the life of man in every condition, and the fountain of all happiness. And how well was it spoken by one, who said, that it became God from the first to represent, by an outward sign, that person whom he loves, and for whose glory he has made and does make all things; nay, “to whom he sheweth all things that he doth, that he may also do likewise,” John v. 19. as the author of life to man; that man even then might acknowledge him as such; and afterwards, when he was to be manifested as his saviour and physician,

Adam and his posterity might bring him to remembrance, as exhibited by a symbol at the very beginning. As in fact it has happened, that they who believe Moses, the Prophets, and the Gospel, avow, that in the beginning there was no life but in him, for whose glory, to be displayed in the work of salvation, the earth was also made. Wherefore Christ is called *the Tree of Life*, Rev. xxii. 2. What indeed he now is by his merit and efficacy, as Mediator, he would have always been, as the Son of God, of the same substance with his Father. For, as by him man was created and obtained an animal life, so, in like manner, he would have been transformed by him and blessed with a heavenly life. Nor could he have been the life of the sinner, as Mediator, unless he had likewise been the life of man in his holy state, as God; having life in himself, and being life itself.

XIV. The fruit of this Tree, charming all the senses with its unparalleled beauty, signified the pleasures of divine love, with which happy man was one day to be fully regaled, and which never cloy, but, with their sweet variety, do always quicken the appetite. In this sense, wisdom is said to be *a Tree of Life to them that lay hold of her*, Prov. iii. 18. because the study and practice of true wisdom, fill the soul with an ineffable pleasure.

XV. Moreover, it was man's duty: 1st. Attentively to consider this tree *as pleasant to the eyes*, Gen. iii. 6. and to contemplate therein the perfections of the Son of God, whose brightest vision was one day to complete his happiness. 2dly. By the use and enjoyment of this tree, to testify his communion with the Son of God, and acknowledge him as the author of the life he longed for; which, though innocent, he was to seek after, not in himself, but in God as a liberal rewarder. 3dly. He himself, in imitation of the Son of God, and as in communion with him, ought to be as a tree of life to his wife and posterity, by giving them holy advice and example, as a plant of the garden of God, a partaker of the divine life, and as ministering to the life of his neighbour. “The fruit of the righteous is a tree of life,” Prov. xi. 30.

XVI. Besides the tree of life, Moses speaks of another tree, deriving its name from THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL, concerning whose name and use

we began to speak, chap. iii. § XX, XXI. That it was designed for man's probation is undoubted: but whether it was also a symbol of the covenant is disputed. I freely own I see no reason why this should be denied. For all the requisites to constitute a symbol of a covenant here concur. We have an external and visible sign instituted by God: we have the thing signified, together with a beautiful analogy; we have, in fine, a memorial of man's duty: all which fully constitute the nature of a sacred symbol or sacrament.

XVII. The external sign was a certain tree, "in the midst of the garden, good for food, pleasant to the eyes, and to be desired to make one wise," Gen. iii. 3, 6. The use of this sign was twofold: 1st. That it might be attentively viewed and considered by man, while he carefully meditates on the mystical signification of this tree. For that end it was so beautiful and so desirable to the view, and placed in the middle of the garden, where man most frequently resorted. 2dly. That from a religious obedience he should abstain from eating of it, and thereby acknowledge God's absolute dominion over him, and his expectation of another world, in which he should be forbid nothing truly desirable.

XVIII. The thing signified was in like manner twofold, the sealing both of the promise and the threatening of the covenant. For its being called *the tree of knowledge of good*, intimated, that man, if from a principle of love he obeyed this probationary precept, should come to the knowledge, sense, and fruition of that good which is truly and excellently so, and the full knowledge of which is only obtainable by sense and enjoyment. On the other hand, when called *the tree of the knowledge of evil*, thereby is signified, that man, if found disobedient, should be doomed to the greatest calamity, the exceeding evil and wretchedness of which he should at last know by experience. And even they, who, in other respects, would not have this tree called a symbol of the divine covenant, do confess,

XIX. There was here a very plain memorial of duty. For this tree taught, 1st. That man was sincerely to contemplate and desire the chief good, but not to endeavour after it, but only in the manner and way prescribed by heaven; nor here to give in to his own reasonings, how plausible soever they might

appear. 2dly. That man's happiness was not to be placed in things pleasing to the senses of the body. There is another and a quite different beatifying good, which satiates the soul, and of itself suffices to the consummation of happiness. 3dly. That God was the most absolute Lord of man, whose sole will, expressed by his law, should be the supreme rule and directory of all the appetites of the soul, and of all the motions of the body. 4thly. That there is no attaining to a life of happiness, but by perfect obedience. 5thly. That even man in innocence, was to behave with a certain religious awe, when conversing with his God, lest he should fall into sin. To these add what we have already observed, chap. iii. § XXI.

XX. That very accurate and great divine, Hieronimus Zanchius, after giving a history of these trees, expresses their mystical signification in these words; *de creat. Hom. lib. i. c. i. § 8.* "Moreover, these two trees in the midst of Paradise, and near each other, were very evident types of the law and gospel, or of Christ. The law declares what is good, and what is evil: Christ is the true and eternal life. Both were in the midst of Paradise, because the law and Christ, in the midst of the church, are always to be proposed to the posterity of Adam. One near the other, because the law leads to Christ." I cannot fully express what regard I pay to this great divine, whose commentaries I exceedingly prefer to the new-fangled comments, with which the minds of students are at this day distracted and led astray. Nevertheless, these expressions seem to be more ingenious than solid and judicious. For under the covenant of works, Adam neither had, nor was it necessary he should have any sacraments which respected Christ, the gospel and grace. This however may be said in excuse of these and the like things, which often occur even in the most learned authors, that though these things were not proposed to man at first in innocence in order to represent to him the grace of Christ, yet they were so wisely ordered by God, that man, by reflecting upon them, could after the fall discover in them the dark resemblance of those things which God afterwards, by a new promise, was pleased to reveal.

XXI. Other learned men have not thought proper to reckon the tree of knowledge among the symbols and seals of the covenant of works, for these following reasons: 1st. Because all sacraments are given for use, but man was forbid the use of this tree. 2dly. Because sacraments are signs of a blessing which they seal to those who use them in a proper way; but this tree sealed no blessing to any who should use it, but rather a curse. These considerations, however, are not of that weight that we should therefore depart from the more received opinion. And it is easy to answer both these arguments, not only from the truth of the thing itself, but also from the very hypotheses of these learned men.

XXII. It is indeed true, that all sacraments were given for use; but it is also certain, that the external use of all sacraments is not after one and the same manner; all are not granted to the mouth and palate. There are sacraments whose use consists in the contemplation of the sign, and meditation on the thing signified. Some learned writers maintain, that the rainbow was not a symbol only of the œcumenical, or general covenant with the whole earth, but also of the covenant of grace in Christ, and they think that the colours of the rainbow, the red, the fiery, and the green, denote, that by blood, holiness and mercy are united. But we can conceive no other sacramental use of the rainbow, besides the contemplation of it. In like manner, they place the brazen serpent among the sacraments of the Old Testament, whose use consisted only in the beholding of it. Nay, they are of opinion concerning the tree of life itself, that it was not promiscuously to be used by man, since “to him alone that overcometh, it is given to eat of the tree of life,” Rev. ii. 7. “Whence,” say they, “it does not appear that Adam touched it before the fall; nay, the contrary is rather evident.” And yet they say, that it was the first and most ancient representation of the Son of God, and of the life to be possessed through him. Why then may not the tree of knowledge also be called a symbol of the covenant, though proposed only to be looked at by man, though he was never to eat of it?

XXIII. I go a step farther, and say, that there is no absurdity, should such a sacrament be appointed

whose use should consist in a religious abstinence. Nor should those learned men, if consistent with themselves, be averse to this opinion. The deluge, say they, from which *Noah was preserved, must needs be reckoned among the types*. But the use of the waters, in respect to Noah, consisted in this, that they were neither to touch him and his, to their hurt, nor force themselves into the ark in which he was shut up; the waters of the *Red sea* likewise signified the same thing in the same manner to *Israel*. Nay, what may seem strange, these learned men say, that the first sacrament of the covenant of grace was “the ejection of Adam out of Paradise, and the barring up his access to the tree of life:” or, as one is pleased to express himself, “the first sacrament was the tree of life, which, though at first it regarded the covenant of works, and the exclusion from it was the punishment of fallen man; nevertheless that very exclusion was at the same time a sign of the grace and goodness of God.” I would beg of those very learned men, to explain in what the sacramental use of the tree of life was to have consisted under the covenant of grace, after man was expelled Paradise, and that tree was no longer to be in his view. There is here no other use but a mystical abstinence and deprivation. And thus we imagine we have fully answered the first argument.

XXIV. Let us now consider the second, and we say, it is not inconsistent with the nature of sacraments, to seal death and condemnation, to those who unduly and irregularly use them: for the covenant of God with man is ratified, not only by the promises, but also by certain threatenings belonging to it; but sacraments are the seals of the whole covenant, not excepting the threatenings to the profane abusers of them. When a man partakes of the sacraments, he comes under an oath and curse, and makes himself liable to punishment if he deals treacherously. To say nothing of the sacraments of the covenant of works, the very sacraments of the covenant of grace are *the savour of death unto death* to hypocrites and profane persons, who in the bread and wine of the Eucharist *eat and drink damnation to themselves*, 1 Cor. xi. 27, 29. But it is not true, that the tree of knowledge sealed only death; for it also sealed life and happiness. It was the tree of knowledge, not

only *of evil* but *of good*. As these learned men themselves acknowledge, while they write, that “had Adam obeyed, he would upon his trial have come to the knowledge and sense of his good to which he was called, and had a natural desire after, even eternal life and consummate happiness.” Whence we conclude, that notwithstanding these reasonings, we may justly reckon the tree of knowledge among the sacraments of the covenant of works.

#### CHAP. VII. - *Of the First Sabbath.*

I. WE said, that the first Sabbath was the fourth sacrament of the covenant of works. In order to treat somewhat more fully on this, it will not be improper to make it the subject of a whole chapter: Moses gives us the history of it, Gen. ii. 2, 3. in these words: “And on the seventh day God ended his work, which he had made; and he rested on the seventh day from all his work, which he had made: and God blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it, because that in it he had rested from all his work, which God created and made.” The more fully to understand these words, and from them to answer our design, we shall distinctly discuss these three things: 1st. Enquire whether what is here said about *sanctifying and blessing the seventh day*, ought to be applied to that *first* day, which immediately followed upon the six days of the creation, and which was the first that shone on the works of God when completed; or whether it be necessary to have recourse to a *prolepsis*, or anticipation, by which we may look upon those things as spoken of the day on which many ages after the manna was given in the wilderness. 2dly. We shall explain the nature of that first Sabbath. 3dly. and lastly, Point out in what respect it was a Sacrament.

II. There is no occasion to mention, that the first of these points has been matter of great dispute among divines, without coming to any determination to this day; nor do I choose to repeat what they have said; I shall only observe, that perhaps the parties might easily agree, did we know what we are to understand by *sanctifying and blessing* the seventh day, mentioned by *Moses*, and which we shall presently consider. But if we suppose in general, that God *rested* on the seventh day from his work, that is, not only desisted from creating new species of creatures,

but *acquiesced* and *took complacency* in the work which he had now finished, especially in man, who was formed after his image, and furnished with those faculties, by which he was enabled to acknowledge, and celebrate the perfections of God, shining forth in his works; and that he set this his *resting* before man as a pattern, by which he should be taught to acquiesce in nothing but in God, for whom he was created, please himself in nothing but in glorifying God, which is the end of his creation; moreover, that he *sanctified* this day, of which we are speaking, by commanding it to be employed by man for that sacred work, adding a *promise*, that all that time, thus employed by man, should be highly *blessed* to him: if I say, we thus in general suppose, as all these things are evidently truth, there is good hope, that all equitable judges will allow that we adhere to the simplicity of the letter, and interpret this history of Moses as the narrative of a thing done at that time, which the holy Prophet was then describing.

III. I am glad to find the celebrated *Cocceius* assents to this. His words are these, on Gen. ii. § 6. “Some imagine, that this verse (namely 3.) is put by way of anticipation.—But it is not probable that Moses, in recording this blessing and sanctification, did by no means speak concerning the original Sabbath, but only concerning the Jewish Sabbath. This is plainly doing violence to the text, if one day be understood, which God blessed and sanctified, and another on which he rested from his work.” And the very eloquent Burman, though inclining to an anticipation, yet owns, that “the words of Moses may be understood of that perpetual Sabbath, the seventh day after the creation, which first saw the works of God perfected, and most auspiciously shone on the world; whence it is said to be peculiarly blessed by God, and afterwards to be celebrated and sanctified by man, for all ages to come.” Synops. Theol. lib. 2. c. 5. § 11. See the same author; *de œconomia fœderum Dei*, § 208, 209. We shall say no more on this, as we could rather wish to see the orthodox agreeing among themselves, than contending with one another. And indeed this must be acknowledged, if we would properly explain, in what manner this Sabbath was a sacrament of the covenant of works.

IV. The best Hebrew authors, on whose authority those of the opposite opinion are wont to build upon, agree with us in this dispute. For in the Talmud they enquire, “why man was created on the evening of the Sabbath,” and of the three reasons they give, this is the last; “that he might immediately enter on performing the command.” The famous Ludovicus de Dieu, mentioning these words, on Gen. i. 27. adds by way of explication; “for, since the Sabbath immediately succeeded the creation of man, he immediately entered on the command of sanctifying the Sabbath.” Baal Hatturim, after various interpretations of this passage, also subjoins this other; “in the hour, that he created the world, he blessed the Sabbath and the world.” Jarchi also mentions this opinion, though himself was otherwise minded; “what would the world have been without rest; on the coming of the Sabbath came rest, and thus at length the work was finished and completed.” By which he intimates, that the institution of the Sabbath was joined to the completing of the works of God. There are also some Jews, who will have Psal. xcii. whose title is, “a Psalm or Song for the Sabbath day,” to have been composed by Adam. For thus the Chaldee paraphrases: “a Hymn and Song, which the first man said of the Sabbath.” And R. Levi in *Bereschit Rabba*, sect. 22. at the end: “the first man spoke this Psalm, and from his time it was buried in oblivion, but Moses came and renewed it.” Now I bring these testimonies to shew that they speak too confidently who assert that it is running counter to the unanimous opinion of the Jews, for any to insist that the precept of the Sabbath was enjoined on the first man. Whoever wants more to this purpose, may consult *Selden de jure nature, &c. lib. 3. c. 13.*

V. These things supposed, we are further to enquire in what the nature of the first Sabbath did consist. Here again the learned run into very different opinions. I now take it to be my province, to lay down such propositions, to which it is to be hoped that the orthodox, who are lovers of truth, will without difficulty give their assent.

VI. We are to distinguish first between the rest of God, and the rest of man, which God enjoined upon him, and recommended by his own example: in this manner also, Paul distinguishes, Heb. iv. 10. “he also

hath ceased from his own works, as God did from his.”

VII. The rest of God consisted, not only in his ceasing from the work of any new creation, but also in that sweet satisfaction and delight he had in the demonstration of his attributes and perfections, which were gloriously displayed in the work he had now finished, especially after he had added a lustre to this inferior world, by bestowing upon it a most excellent inhabitant, who was to be a careful spectator, and the herald and proclaimer of the perfections of his Creator, and in whom God himself beheld *ου μικρον της δοξης αουτου απαυγασμα*, *no small effulgence to his own glory*. Wherefore it is said, Exod. xxxi. 17. “and on the seventh day he rested, and was refreshed;” not as if he was fatigued, but as rejoicing in his work so happily completed, and in which he beheld what was worthy of his labour.

VIII. God having rested on the seventh day, sanctified it, as well by example as by precept. By example, in as much as he brought man, whom he had newly formed to the contemplation of his works, and revealed to him both himself and his perfections, that he might love, thank, praise, and glorify him. And indeed, because God rested on the seventh day from all other works, and was only intent upon this, we may conclude, that he sanctified it in a most extraordinary manner. He likewise sanctified it by precept, enjoining man to employ it in glorifying his Creator. “To sanctify, (as Martyr, whom several commend, says well,) is to set apart something for the worship of God,” as it is also taken here. And it was very justly observed by Calvin, that it was the will of God, his own example should be a perpetual rule to us. Rabbenu Nissim, quoted by Abarbanel, on the explication of the law, fol. 21. col. 3. is of the same opinion: “and this is the sanctification of the Sabbath, that on that day, the soul of man be employed on nothing profane, but wholly on things sacred.

IX. God’s blessing the seventh day may be also taken in a twofold sense: First, for his declaring it to be blessed and happy, as that in which he had peculiar pleasure to enjoy, by observing all his works in such order as to be, not only to himself,



but to angels as well as men, a most beautiful scene, displaying the glory of his perfections. This is what David says, Psal. civ. 13. “the glory of the Lord shall endure for ever, the Lord shall rejoice in his works.” Thus, God himself rejoiced on that day, and consequently blessed it. For, as to curse a day is to abhor and detest it, as unfortunate and unhappy, as afflictive and miserable, Job ii. 14. Jer. xx. 14. so, by the rule of contraries, to bless a day is to rejoice in it, as delightful and prosperous. And indeed, what day more joyful, more happy, than that which saw the works of God perfected, and yet not stained by any sin either of angels or probably of men? There has been none like it since that time, certainly not since the entrance of sin. Secondly, It was also a part of the blessing of this day, that God adjudged to man, if he religiously imitated the pattern of his own rest, the most ample blessings, and likewise in that very rest, the earnest of a most happy rest in heaven; of which more fully presently. Elegantly said the ancient Hebrew doctors that the “blessing and sanctifying the Sabbath redound to the observers thereof, that they may be blessed and holy themselves.”

X. The rest here enjoined and recommended to man, comprises chiefly these things: in general, that he shall abstain from every sin, through the whole course of his life, that giving nothing but uneasiness, both to himself and his God. As the Lord complains, Isa. xliii. 22. “thou hast been weary of me, O Israel,” and ver. 24. “thou hast wearied me with thine iniquities.” By sinning, we dreadfully transgress against the rest of God, who cannot delight in a sinner, of whom and his work he says, Isa. i. 14. “they are a burthen to me, I am weary to bear them.” But more especially, it is likewise man’s duty, that as he is the concluding part of the works of God, and the last of all the creatures, that came out of the hands of his Creator, not so to harass and fatigue himself about the creatures, as to seek his happiness and good in them, but rather, by a holy elevation of mind, ascend to the Creator himself; and acquiesce in nothing short of the enjoyment of his unbounded goodness, of the imitation of the purest holiness, and of the expectation of the fullest rest, and intimate union with his God. This indeed is the true and spiritual rest, always to be meditated upon, sought after, and to be observed by man.

XI. Moreover, as man, even in the state of innocence, was to perform solemn acts of piety, together with his consort and children, and to be their mouth in prayer, thanksgiving, and praises; it was necessary, at that time, that laying aside all other occupations, and all cares about what related to the support of natural life, and ordering those about him to rest, he might, without any hindrance from the body, religiously apply himself to this one thing: which I hope none of my brethren will refuse. At least the celebrated Cocceius readily allows it. Whose words are these, *Sum. Theol.* c. 21. § 10. “It is right in itself, and a part of the image of God, that man should, as often as possible, employ himself in the worship of God, (that is, laying aside the things pertaining to the body and its conveniencies, be wholly taken up in those duties which become a soul delighting in God, glorifying him and celebrating his praise,) and that too in the public assembly, for the common joy and edification of all.

XII. After man had sinned, the remembrance of God’s resting and sanctifying the seventh day, ought to rouse him from his slowness and dulness, in the worship of God, in order to spend every seventh day therein, laying aside, for a while, all other employment. But it will be better to explain this in Calvin’s words: “God therefore first rested, and then he blessed that rest, that it might be ever afterwards holy among men: or, he set apart each seventh day for rest, that his own example might be a standing rule.” Martyr speaks to the same purpose: “Hence men are put in mind that, if the church enjoins them to set apart a certain day in the week for the worship of God, this is not altogether a human device, nor belongs only to the law of Moses, but likewise had its rise from hence, and is an imitation of God.” All this is also approved of by Cocceius, whose excellent words we will subjoin from the place just quoted, § 12. “The consequence of these things in the sinner is,—that if encompassed with the infirmities of the flesh, and exposed to the troubles of life, he may at least each seventh day recollect, and give himself up to far preferable thoughts, and then cheerfully, on account of that part of the worship of God which cannot be performed without disengaging from business, abstain from the work of his hands, and

from seeking, preparing, and gathering the fruits of the earth.” And as this celebrated expositor approves of this, I know not why he should disapprove the elegant observation of Chrysostom, Not, at Heb. § 13. That “hence, as by certain preludes, God hath enigmatically taught us to consecrate and set apart for spiritual employment each seventh day in the week.” If we all agree, as I hope we may, in these positions, which seem not unhappily to explain the nature of the first Sabbath; I truly reckon, that a way is paved, and a great deal done, to compose those unhappy disputes about the Sabbath of the decalogue, which for some years past have made such noise in the Dutch universities and churches.

XIII. Having thus explained the nature of the first Sabbath, we proceed to enquire into its spiritual and mystical signification; from whence it will be easy to conclude, that we have not improperly called it a sacrament; or, which is the same, a sacred sign or seal (for, why should we wrangle about a word, not scriptural, when we agree about the thing?) of the promises of salvation made by God to Adam. We have Paul’s authority to assert, that the Sabbath had some mystical meaning, and respected an eternal and happy rest, Heb. iv. 4, 10. And this is justly supposed by the apostle, as a thing well known to the Hebrews, and which is a cornerstone or fundamental point with their doctors. It was a common proverb, quoted by Buxtorf, in *Florilegio Hebræo*, 299. “The Sabbath is not given but to be a type of the life to come.” To the same purpose is that which we have in Zohar, on Gen. fol. 5. chap. xv. “What is the Sabbath day? A type of the land of the living, which is the world to come, the world of souls, the world of consolations.” These things indeed, are not improper to be said in general; but as you will not readily find any where, [or in other authors] the analogy between the Sabbath and eternal rest specially assigned; can it be thought improper, it by distinguishing between the rest of God, the rest of man, and the seventh day, on which both rested, we should distinctly propose the mystical meaning of each.

XIV. The rest of God from the work of the creation, was a type of a far more glorious rest of God from the work of the glorification of the whole universe. When God had created the first world, so as to be a commodious habitation for man during his

probation, and an illustrious theatre of the perfections of the Creator; he took pleasure in this his work, and rested with delight. For he bestowed upon it all the perfection which was requisite to complete that state. But he had resolved, one day, to produce a far more perfect universe, and by dissolving the elements by fire, to raise a new heaven and a new earth, as it were out of the ashes of the old; which new world, being blessed with his immutable happiness, was to be a far more august habitation for his glorified creatures; in which, as in the last display of his perfections, he was for ever to rest with the greatest complacency. And besides, as God according to his infinite wisdom, so very wisely connects all his actions, that the preceding have a certain respect to the following; in like manner, since that rest of God after the creation was less complete than that other, when God shall have concluded the whole, and which is to be followed by no other labour or toil; it is proper to consider that first rest of God as a type, and a kind of prelude of that other, which is more perfect. In fine, because it tends to man’s greatest happiness, that the whole universe be thus glorified, and himself in the universe, that God may altogether rest in him as having now obtained his last degree of perfection, he is said “to enter into the rest of God,” Heb. iv. 10.

XV. This rest of God was after the creation, immediately succeeded by the rest of man. For, when he had formed man on the sixth day, (as possibly may be gathered from the simplicity of Moses’ narrative,) he had brought him into Paradise on the seventh, *and put him*, or, as others think the words may be translated, “he made him rest in the garden of Eden,” Gen. ii. 15. Was not this a most delightful symbol or sign to Adam, that after having finished his course of labour on this earth, he should be translated from thence into a place far more pleasant, and to a rest far more delightful than that which he enjoyed in Paradise? And when at certain times he ceased from tilling the ground in Paradise, and gave himself wholly up to the religious worship of God, with a soul delighting in God: was not this a certain earnest and a prelibation to him of that time, in which, exempted from all care about this animal life, he should immediately delight himself in the intimate

communion of God, in being joined with the choirs of angels, and in doing the works of angels.

XVI. May not this rest both of God and man, falling upon the seventh day, after the six of creation, properly denote, that the rest of the glory of God is then to be expected, after the week of this world is elapsed? And that man is not to enter into rest, till he has finished his course of probation, and God upon strictly examining it by the rule of his law, finds it complete and in every respect perfect? And are we to reject the learned observation of Peter Martyr; that “this seventh day is said to have neither morning nor evening, because this is a perpetual rest to those who are truly the Sons of God?”

XVII. It is indeed true, that upon Adam’s sin, and violation of the covenant of works, the whole face of things was changed: but all these things [we have been speaking of] were such, as might have been signified and sealed by this Sabbath to Adam, even in the state of innocence, and why might it not really have been so? For the apostle expressly declares, that “God’s resting from his works, from the foundation of the world,” Heb. iv. 3. had a mystical signification. It is therefore our business to find out the agreement between the sign and the thing signified; for the greater analogy we observe between them, we shall the more clearly and with joy discover the infinite wisdom and goodness of God, various ways manifesting themselves. It cannot but tend to the praise of the divine architect, if we can observe many excellent resemblances between the picture given us by himself, and the copy. Indeed I deny not, that Paul, when discoursing of the Sabbath, leads us to that rest purchased for believers by the sufferings of Christ. But it cannot thence be inferred, that after the entrance of sin, God’s Sabbath borrowed all its mystical signification from the covenant of grace. For, as to the substance of the thing, the glorious rest promised by the covenant of works, and now to be obtained by the covenant of grace, is one and the same, consisting in a blessed acquiescence or rest of the soul in God. As this was sealed to Man in innocence by the Sabbath, under the covenant of works; so likewise it is sealed by the Sabbath under the covenant of grace, though under another relation, and under other circumstances, For God having perfect knowledge, that man would not

continue in the first covenant, had from all eternity decreed to set on foot a quite different order of things, and bring his elect by a new covenant of grace to the most peaceful rest. Accordingly he settled in his unsearchable wisdom, whatever preceded the fall, in such a manner, that man viewing them after the fall with the enlightened eyes of faith, might discover still greater mysteries in them, which regarded Christ and the glory to be obtained by him. But we are not to speak of this here. Whoever desires a learned explanation of those mysteries, may consult Mestresat’s sermons on the fourth chapter of the Hebrews.

XVIII. This Sabbath also put man in mind of various duties to be performed by him, which having pointed out above, § X, XI. I think needless to repeat now. And thus we have executed what we promised concerning the sacraments of the covenant of works.

XIX. And here I might conclude, did not a very learned man come in my way, whose thoughts on the first Sabbath being widely different from the commonly received notions, I intend, with his permission, calmly to examine. He therefore maintains, that Adam, on the very day of his creation, being seduced by the devil, had involved himself and the whole world in the most wretched bondage of corruption: but that God on the seventh day restored all things thus corrupted by the devil and by man, by his gracious promise of the Messiah: upon this restoration he rested on that very day: and that rest, upon the reparation of the world, being peculiar to the seventh day, may be the foundation of the Sabbath. Doubtless, “on the sixth day, the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the host of them,” Gen. ii. 1. And God beholding the works of his creation so perfect, pleasantly rested in them. This was the rest of the sixth day. But, on the same day, Satan corrupted all; for, upon losing heaven, of whose host he was one, and which he greatly diminished by associating many other angels to himself, and so far rendered that habitation a desert; and on earth, by means of a calumnious lie, he rendered man, the prince of the terrestrial host, a subject to himself, a rebel to God, and destitute of life. This was the corruption of the earth. And thus heaven and earth

so beautifully finished by God on the sixth day, were on the same basely defiled by Satan and by man. This occasioned God to be engaged in a new work on the seventh, even to restore what had been thus defiled and corrupted, and to complete them anew. Which he did on the seventh day, when the Mediator, God-man, was revealed by the Gospel, whom, in the promise, he appointed to triumph over Satan the corruptor of all, and so to restore all things; both of the earth, where he began the restoration, by delivering the elect of mankind from the bondage of corruption; and of heaven, by bringing the same chosen people into the heavenly habitation, in order to its being again re-peopled with that colony of new inhabitants: in this manner he will complete the restoration. Which completion Moses intimates, verse 2. “and on the seventh day God ended his work, which he had made.” *This finishing of the restoration*, signified, verse 3. by the word *made*, is very distinct from *the finishing of the creation*, mentioned verse 1. When God had done all this, upon giving his Son to men for a Mediator and Redeemer, he himself rested in this his last work, as this is “the man of his delight,” Isa. xlii. 1. And this rest was the only foundation for instituting the Sabbath. This institution consists of a twofold act: the first is of *blessing*, by which God blessed that very day, by a most distinguishing privilege, to be the day devoted to the Messiah, who was revealed in it by the Gospel. For this is the honour of the Sabbath, that it is “the delight, on account of the holy of the Lord being glorified,” Isa. lviii. 13. The other act is that of *sanctification*, by which he set it apart for a sign and memorial of that benefit, because through and *for the holy of the Lord*; he chooses to sanctify the elect. This is the sum of that opinion. Let us now consider whether it be solid, and can be proved by scripture.

XX. The whole foundation of this opinion is, that Adam fell on the very day in which he was created: which the scripture no where says. I know that some Jewish doctors, with boldness, as is their way, assert this; and, as if they were perfectly acquainted with what God was about every hour, declare, that man was created the third hour of the day, fell the eleventh, and was expelled Paradise the twelfth. But this rashness is to be treated with indignation. The learned person deems it his glory to be wise from the

scriptures alone, and justly, for thus it becomes a divine. But what portion of scripture determines any thing about the first sin? We have here scarce any more than bare conjectures, which at best are too sandy a foundation, on which any wise architect will ever presume to build so grand an edifice.

XXI. Nay, there are many things from which we rather incline to think that man’s sin happened not on the sixth day. For it was after God had on that day created the beasts; after he had formed Adam of the dust of the earth; after he had prescribed him the law concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil; after he had presented to him the beasts in Paradise, that, upon enquiring into the nature of each (which also he performed with great accuracy, as the great Bochart has very learnedly shewn, Hierozoic. lib. i. c. 9.) he might call each by their proper names; after Adam had found there was not among them any help meet for him, for the purposes and convenience of marriage; and after God had cast Adam into a deep sleep, and then at last formed Eve from one of his ribs. All these things are not of a nature to be performed like the other works of the preceding days, in the shortest space of time possible, and as it were, in a moment; but succeeded one another in distinct periods, and during these, several things must have been done by Adam himself. Nay, there are divines of no small note, who insist that these things were not all done in one day, and others postpone the creation of Eve to one of the days of the following week: but we do not now engage in these disputes. After all these things the world was yet innocent, and free from all guilt, at least on the part of man. And God contemplating his works, and concluding his day, approved of all as very good and beautiful. He had yet no new labour for restoring the fallen world, which would have been no ways inferior to the work of the creation. But what probability is there, that in those very few hours which remained, if yet a single hour remained, Adam should have parted from Eve, who had been just created, exposed his most beloved consort to an insidious serpent, and that both of them, just from the hands of the Creator, should so suddenly have given ear to the deceiver? Unless one is prepossessed in favour of the contrary opinion, what reason could

he have, notwithstanding so many probabilities to the contrary, prematurely thus to hurry on Adam's sin? Since therefore the whole of this foundation is so very weak, what solid superstructure can we imagine it is capable of?

XXII. Let us now, take a nearer view of the superstructure itself, and examine whether its construction be sufficiently firm and compact. The very learned person imagines he sees a new labour, or work on the seventh day, and a new *rest* succeeding that labour, which is the foundation of the Sabbath. The *labour* was a *promise of the Messiah*, by which the world, miserably polluted with sin, was to be restored; and that Moses treats on this, chap. ii. 2. "and on the seventh day God ended his work, which he had made." The rest was the satisfaction and delight he had in that promise, and in the Messiah promised. But let us offer the following considerations in opposition to this sentiment: 1st. If God, on the seventh day, performed the immense work of recovering the world from the fall, a work, which if not greater, yet certainly is not less than the creation of the world out of nothing, and he was again to rest when he had finished it, certainly then, the seventh day was as much a day of work to God, and no more a Sabbath, or day of rest, than any of the preceding days. For God having finished the work of each day, rested for a while and delighted in it. 2dly. Moses in the second verse makes use of the same word by which he had expressed the finishing of the world in the first. But *the finishing* in the first verse, as the learned person himself owns, relates to the finishing of the creation; what necessity then can there be for giving such different senses to one and the same word, in the same context, when there is not the least mark of distinction. 3dly. Hitherto Moses has not given the least imaginable hint of the fall of our first parents: is it then probable that he would so abruptly mention the restitution of the world from the fall; and that in the very same words which he had just used, and was afterwards to use for explaining the first creation? What can oblige, or who can suffer us to confound the neatness of Moses' method, and the perspicuity of his words, by this feigned irregularity, and ambiguity? 4thly. It may be doubted, whether we can properly say, that by the promise of the Messiah all things were perfected and finished; since God, if we

follow the thread of Moses' narrative, did, after this promise, punish the world with a deserved curse: and the apostle still says of the world, that "the creature was made subject to vanity, and groans under the bondage of corruption," Rom. viii. 20, 21. It is indeed true that the promise of the Messiah, which could not be frustrated, was the foundation of the comfort of the fathers; but the scripture no where declares, that by this promise, as immediately made after the fall, all things were finished, nay, even this promise pointed out that person, who after many ages, and by various acts, not of one and the same office, was to effect the true consummation.

XXIII. Our learned author urges the following reasons why those two finishings are not to be looked upon as the same: 1st. It would be a *tautology*, if not an *inexcusable battology*, or idle repetition, in such a compendious narrative; and either the first verse, or the beginning of the second, would be superfluous. 2dly. The finishing or ending of verse 2. is annexed to *the seventh day*, by a double article in the same manner as *the rest* is. "And on the very seventh day God ended his work which he had made, and he rested on the very seventh day from all his work which he had made." So that if the former verb ויכל be rendered by the preterpluperfect, *and he had ended*, the latter וישבת must be rendered so too, *and he had rested*; but this is incongruous. Nay, since on the other days we reject the preterpluperfect sense, lest the works of the following day should be referred to those of the preceding, contrary to historical truth; it ought not then here to be admitted on the seventh day. 3dly. When the third verse shews the cause of this rest, it speaks of distinct finishings, the latter of which is that of the seventh day, "and God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it, because that in it he had rested from all his work, which God created and made." By two verbs he describes two actions; ברא denotes *to create*, and עשה, *to adorn, to polish*: these words are frequently of the same import, yet when joined together they are to be distinguished, as is owned not only by Christian, but by Jewish interpreters. (Thus it is, Isa. xliii. 7. where another word is added, צר, *to form*, and, as to all the three, ברא certainly signifies, the creation of the soul, but צר, the

formation of the body, and עשה reformation by grace.) But these two actions are so described, that עשיה making, immediately precedes resting, and was the work of the seventh day; but בריאה, creation, the work of the six preceding days. 4thly. To the same purpose is the recapitulation of verse 4. which repeats and confirms the distinction just now mentioned: “these are the generations of the heavens and of the earth, when they were created; in the day that the Lord God made the earth and the heavens.” Thins he recites the generations both of the first six days, (in which the heavens and the earth, with their respective hosts, were created) and of the beginning of that one day, namely, the seventh, which is that of operation, in which he made and polished, inverting the order; first the earth, then the heavens. Thus far our very learned author.

XXIV. But we cannot assent to these things, and therefore we answer each in order. To the first, I would earnestly entreat our brother, both to think and speak more reverently of the style of the Holy Ghost; nor charge those simple and artless repetitions of one and the same thing, even in a concise narrative, with an inexcusable tautology, if not a battology, or vain and useless repetitions. It does not become us, the humble disciples of the Divine Spirit, to criticise on the most learned language, and the most pure style of our adorable master, it is very frequent, in the sacred writings, more than once to repeat the same thing, in almost the same words, at no great distance asunder. This very second chapter of Genesis, of which we now treat, gives us various examples of this. The reason of the sanctification of the seventh day, namely, the rest of God upon that day, is proposed in nearly the same words, in the second and third verses. This learned person himself calls the fourth verse a recapitulation of what was just said. And what is the whole of the second chapter, but a fuller explication of the formation of man, which indeed we have plainly, but more briefly related in the first chapter, or the whole of the second, is in a great measure, superfluous? Or, shall we dare to charge God with tautologies, if not with inexcusable battologies? Is it not more becoming to tremble with awe at his words, and rather return him thanks, that on account of the dulness of our apprehension he has vouchsafed to propose two or three times the same truths, either in the same, or in a variety of words,

having all the same meaning? For my own part I would act in this manner without any doubt of acting as becomes.

XXV. To the second, I would answer. 1st. The words of Moses may be taken in this sense; namely, that God finished the work of the sixth day, and consequently of all the six days, in the very moment in which the seventh began. Thus the ancient Hebrews, and after them, R. Solomon, explains this manner of speaking; as thereby to intimate that God, in the very moment in which he entered on the Sabbath, finished his work; for God alone knows the moments and least parts of time in another manner than men do. 2dly. Nor is it an improper observation of Aben Ezra, *that the finishing of the work is not the work itself*, but only means the ceasing from work, and that the text explains itself thus; *and he finished*, that is, *and he rested*; having finished his work, he worked no longer. 3dly. But we need not insist on this: Drusius speaks to excellent purpose on this place: “The preterperfect Hebrew may be as well rendered by the preterpluperfect as otherwise. It is really so: the Hebrews have only one preterperfect, which they use for every kind of past time; and therefore according to the connection, it may be rendered sometimes by the preterperfect, and at other times by the preterpluperfect.” Let it therefore be rendered here by the preterpluperfect, *and he had finished*, as the Dutch translation has also done, and all the difficulty will disappear. Our learned author may insist, that if this be granted, then the following וישבת must be also rendered by the preterpluperfect. But it does not follow; for we are to consider the nature of the subject and the different circumstances. The learned person insists, that the word *finishing*, is used in a different sense in the first, from what it is in the second verse; and shall we not be allowed to interpret a preterperfect, which, by the genius of the language is indeterminate, sometimes by the preterperfect, and at other times by the preterpluperfect, as the subject shall require? And if elsewhere we justly reject the preterpluperfect sense, it is not because the genius of the Hebrew tongue does not admit of it, but because, as the learned person himself observes, such an interpretation is contrary to the truth of the history. Which not being the case here,

such a reason cannot be urged. I will only add, if Moses wanted to say, what we imagine he has said, *et consummaverat die septima, &c. et cessavit. &c. and on the seventh, God had finished, &c. and rested, &c.* could he possibly have expressed in other words, or more aptly, according to the genius of the language, this sense? Was the learned person himself to render into Hebrew, word for word, these Latin words, he would certainly have rendered them in the same tense and mood, as Moses has done.

XXVI. To the third reason, I reply, 1st. The word עשה, is very general, and signifies, *to do a thing any how, well or ill.* It is said of penal or physical evil, Amos iv. 13. *who maketh the morning darkness;* and Ezek. xxxv. 6. *I will prepare (make) thee unto blood.* And of moral evil, Mic. ii. 1. *when the morning is light they practise it;* we shall give more instances presently. Hence it appears, that the learned person too much restricts the meaning of this word, when he explains it by the words, *to adorn, or polish:* especially, if he would precisely confine it to *the reformation by grace.* 2dly. The same word is often expressive of the six days work; as Gen. i. 31. *and God saw all that he had made;* and Exod. xx. 11. *in six days the Lord made heaven and earth:* likewise Ezek. xlvi. 1. *the six working days* are opposed to the Sabbath. Neither does the learned person deny, that the words ברא and עשה are often equivalent. And why not here also? I there any necessity, or probable reason, for taking עשה for *the work of the seventh day,* and בריאה for *the work of the six preceding days?* 3dly. I think he goes a little too far, when he asserts that both Christian and Jewish interpreters admit that these words, when joined together, have distinct significations. Truly for my own part, of the several interpreters, both Jewish and Christian, whom I have consulted, I never found one, who distinguishes the meaning of these words, as this learned author has done. (See Fagius on Gen. i. 1. Manasseh-Ben-Israel, de Creat. Probl. 4. Cocceius Disput. select. p. 70. sect. 72.) Let us in this case hear the learned De Dieu, who thus comments on this passage: “It appears to be an usual hebraism, whereby the infinitive, added to a verb, including a like action, is generally redundant;” such as Judges xiii. 19. and acting, he acted wonderously, that is, *he acted wonderously.* I Kings xiv. 9. and doing, thou hast done evil, that is, *thou hast done evil.* 2 Kings

xxi. 6. and working, he multiplied wickedness, that is simply, *he multiplied wickedness,* or *he wrought much wickedness.* 2 Chron. xx. 35. he doing, did wickedly, *he doing* is redundant. Psal. cxxvi. 2. the Lord doing, has done great things for them, *doing* is again redundant. Eccl. ii. 11. on the labour, that doing I had laboured, that is simply, I *had laboured.* Which last passage is entirely parallel with this in Genesis, for, whether you say, לעשות *he doing, laboured,* or ברא לעשות *he making, created,* you say the same thing: unless that ברא signifies to produce something new, without any precedent or pattern, and which had no existence before;” therefore, he making, created, is no other than, *he made something new.* These things neither could, nor ought to be unknown to this learned person, considering his great skill in Hebrew learning. 4thly. He ought not to have made such a distinction barely and without any proof between the words ברא, יער, and עשת, which are used by Isaiah, xliii. 7. as if the first intends *the creation* of the soul; the second, *the formation* of the body, and the third, *the reformation* by grace: there not being the least foundation for it in scripture. For, 1. ברא sometimes signifies reformation by grace, as Psalm. li. 10. Create in me a clean heart. 2. יער is sometimes applied to the soul, Zech. xii. ver. 1. and formeth the spirit of man within him: and Psalm xxxiii. ver. 15. and fashioneth their hearts alike; sometimes too it denotes formation by grace; as Isa. xliii. 21. this people have I formed for myself, they shall shew forth my praise. 3. עשת is more than once used for *the first formation* of man; as Gen. i. 26. *Let us make man:* and Gen. ii. 18. *I will make him an help meet for him;* Jer. xxxviii. 16. *that made us this soul,* says king Zedekiah to Jeremiah, without having any thoughts of a reformation by grace. As therefore all these words are so promiscuously used in scripture, ought we not to look upon him, who distinguishes them in such a magisterial manner, as one who gives too much scope to his own fancy? And what if one should invert the order of our author, and positively assert, that here denotes, reformation by grace, as Psalm li. 10.: the production of the soul, as Ezek. xii. 1. and the formation of the body, as Gen. ii. 8. What reply could the learned person make? But these are weak

arguments. It is more natural to take these words in Isaiah, as meant of the new creation and reformation by grace. And this accumulation or multiplying of words, is very proper to denote the exceeding greatness of the power of God, and his effectual working in the sanctification of the elect. There is a parallel place, Eph. ii. 10. *for we are his*, Heb. (workmanship), Heb. *created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained, that we should walk in them:* as Isa. xxii. 11. *fashioned it long ago*, which properly προητοιμασε he hath *before ordained*. From all this it appears, that this passage in Isaiah can be of no service to our learned author. 5thly. But if we must distinguish between and *ברא* and *עשה*, nothing, I think, is more to the purpose than the interpretation of Ben Nachman. “He rested from all his works which he created, by producing something out of nothing, to make of it all the works mentioned in the six days: and lo! he says, he rested from *creating* and from *working*; from *creating*, as having created in the first day, and from *working*, as having completed his working in the remaining days.”

XXVII. The fourth reason coincides with the foregoing, only that it is still more cabbalistical. 1st. It is a strange interpretation to say, that *by the generations of heaven and earth*, we are to understand not only their first creation, but their restoration by the promise of the Messiah; for it is quite foreign to the subject, to tell us, that by the sin of the angels, a state of corruption was introduced into the heaven of heavens, and thereby the throne of the divine majesty was basely defiled; for though by the angelic apostacy, corruption had been introduced into heaven, yet by their ejection, whereby they were hurled into hell, the heavens were purged from that corruption. Nor was there any new heaven made by the promise of the Messiah, that was given on the sixth day; for that promise made no alteration there, but only foretold, that after many years some elect souls were to be received into that holy and blessed habitation. 2dly. As to the order in which the earth is put before the heavens, it is well known that the scripture does not always relate things in the same order; nor from the mere order of the narrative, which is an arbitrary thing, can any arguments be formed: However, Junius’ observation is not to be rejected: “Earth and heaven are mentioned in an

inverted order, because the formation of the earth preceded that of the heavens; for the earth was perfected on the third day of the creation, heaven on the fourth.” 3dly. It is doing manifest violence to the text, if we understand the formation of the earth and heavens, of their reformation by grace, in virtue of the promise of the Messiah, made on the seventh day; because Moses treats of that formation of earth and heaven, which was prior to that of plants and herbs, as appears from the connexion of ver. 3. with ver. 4. For thus the words run: “These are the generations of the heavens and of the earth, when they were created, in the day that the Lord God made the earth and heavens, and every plant of the field, before it was in the earth, and every herb of the field,” &c. Or, as the learned De Dieu shews, they may otherwise be very properly rendered, “in the day that the Lord made the heavens and the earth, there was yet no plant of the field created,” &c. So that this formation of the earth and heavens was prior to man’s own creation, much more to the fall, and to the restitution from the fall. And this verse wholly overturns the distinction which this learned person has invented.

XXVIII. And as we have thus shewn, that the words of Moses neither mention nor intimate any work by which God restored all things from the fall on the seventh day; so neither of any rest from the work of restoration, which is the foundation of the rest of the Sabbath. For, 1st. It is irrational to suppose, that when God promised the Messiah, he then rested from the work of the gracious reformation of the universe; because that promise was a prophecy of the sufferings, conflicts, and at the last of the death of Christ, by which that reformation was to be brought about and accomplished. 2dly. How can it be said that God rested, immediately after having made that promise, from all his work, when directly upon it he pronounced, and executed sentence upon Adam, Eve, and the earth that was cursed for their crime, and expelled them paradise? which work (to speak after the manner of men, compare Isa. xxviii. 21.) was truly a greater labour to God than the very creation of the world. And thus, instead of a Sabbath which Moses describes, this day is made one of the most laborious to God. 3dly. The Sabbath day after the publication of the first gospel



promise, was doubtless sacred to the Messiah, and to be celebrated to his honour by the saints with a holy exultation of soul. Nor shall I be much against the learned person, should he choose to translate, Isa. lviii. 13. that the Sabbath may be called, “a delight, on account of the holy of the Lord being glorified;” but it cannot with any probability be inferred from this, that the promise of the Messiah was the foundation of the first Sabbath, since the Sabbath, as well as other things, did not acquire that relation till after the fall. 4thly. The scriptures in express terms declare, that the rest of God from the work of the first creation which was completed in six days, was the foundation of the Sabbath. “In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested on the seventh day; wherefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath day, and hallowed it,” Exod. xx. 11. Which being plain, it sufficiently, if I mistake not, appears, that it is much safer to go in the old and beaten path, which is the king’s high way, than in that other new trodden and rough one, which the learned person, whose opinion we have been examining, has chosen to tread in. And so much for this subject.

CHAP. VIII. - *Of the Violation of the Covenant of Works on the part of Man.*

I. **AS** the scripture does not declare, how long this covenant, thus ratified and confirmed, continued unbroken, we are satisfied to remain in the dark. And we would have a holy dread of presuming rashly to fix the limits of a time which is really uncertain. It is however evident, that man, wickedly presuming to eat the fruit of the forbidden tree, incurred the guilt of violating the covenant. Nor ought that to be deemed a small sin, (as the apostle, Rom. v. calls it, the *offence, disobedience, and transgression*) because it may seem to have been committed about a thing of no great importance: For the meaner the thing is, from which God commanded to abstain, and for which man despised the promise of the covenant, makes his transgression of it the more heinous; as may be illustrated by the profaneness of Esau, which was so much the greater, as the mess was of so little value, for which he sold his birth-right, Heb. xii. 16. In that sin, as divines generally observe, there was, as it were, a kind of complication of many crimes.

But it is our chief purpose to shew, that this was the violation of the whole covenant: for not only that tree, as we proved above, was a sacrament of the covenant, the abuse of which ought to be looked upon as a violence done to the whole; not only the precept concerning that tree, which was the trial of universal obedience; but likewise the covenant in its whole constitution, was violated by that transgression; the law of the covenant was trampled upon, when man, as if he had been his own lord and master in all things, did, in defiance of his Lord, lay hold on what was not his property, and throw off the yoke of obedience that was due to God: the promises of the covenant were set less by than a transitory gust of pleasure, and the empty promises of the seducer; and that dreadful death which the author of the covenant threatened the transgressor with, not considered and thought of in all its dreadful effects, but he presumed to act in opposition to it. And thus *Adam transgressed the covenant*, Hos. vi. 7.

II. Though Eve had the first hand in this crime, yet it is usually in scripture ascribed to Adam: *by one man sin entered into the world*, according to Paul, Rom. v. 12 whom ver. 14. he declares to be Adam: For Adam was the head of the covenant, with whom, even before the creation of Eve, God seems to have transacted. Adam was the root of all mankind, and even of Eve herself, who was formed out of one of his ribs; neither is it customary to deduce a genealogy from a woman: nor was the covenant judged to be entirely broken, till Adam also added his own crime to that of his wife’s. Then it was that the Creator, first acting in the character of a judge, summoned to his bar the inconsiderate pair, already condemned by their own conscience. But we are not to think that this inheritance of sin was so derived from our father Adam, as to excuse our mother Eve from that guilt: for as by marriage they were made one flesh, so far they may be considered as one man. Nay, Adam is not considered as the head and root of mankind, but in conjunction with his wife. To this purpose is what Malachi (ch. ii. 15.) says, that God, *seeking a godly seed, made one: one pair, two into one flesh*.

III. It was doubtless a wicked spirit who seduced man to this apostasy, and who, tormented with the

horrors of his guilty conscience, envied man his happiness in God, and God the pleasure he had in man, and sought to have the wretched consolation of making one a partaker of his misery. And, the more easily to insinuate himself into man's favour by his ensnaring discourse he concealed himself in the serpent, the most subtle of all animals, and at that time not less acceptable to man, than the rest of the obsequious creatures. The great *du Moulin, disput. iii. de Angelis, § 44.* conjectures this serpent was of a conspicuous form, with fiery eyes, decked with gold, and marked with shining spots, so as to draw the eyes of Eve to it, and that he had before that time more than once insinuated himself by his soothing sounds, into Eve's favour, in order that having preconceived a good opinion of him, she might be brought the more readily to yield to him. In fine, he was such, that what Moses says of the subtlety of the serpent must be applied to him only, and not to the whole species. To this conjecture it is also added, that Eve, perhaps such was her simplicity, did not know whether God had bestowed the use of speech on any other animals besides man. Laurentius Camirez in his *Pentecontarch, c. i.* (quoted by Bochart, *Hierozoic, lib. i. c. iv. p. 30.*) goes a step farther, and feigns that Eve was wont to play with the serpent, and adorn her bosom, neck, and arms with it; and hence at this day the ornaments for those parts have the resemblance of serpents, and are called οφεις, serpents, by the Greeks.

IV. But all this is apocryphal. We are not to advance such romantic things without any scripture authority. Whether this was the first, or the only apparition of the serpent, as having the use of speech, I shall neither boldly affirm, nor obstinately deny. But what we are told as probable of some extraordinary serpent so curiously spotted and set off; and now made familiar to Eve, by an intercourse repeated several times, are the pleasing amusements of a curious mind. The subtlety of serpents is every where so well known, that among many nations they are proposed as the distinguishing character and hieroglyphic of prudence. Bochart in his *Hierozoic. lib. i. c. 4.* has collected many things relating to this from several authors. To this purpose is what our Saviour says, Matt. x. 16. *Be ye wise as serpents.* It is also injurious and reproachful to our mother Eve, to represent her so weak, and at so small a remove

from the brutal creation, as not to be able to distinguish between a brute and a man, and to be ignorant that the use of speech was the peculiar privilege of rational creatures. Such stupid ignorance is inconsistent with the happy state of our first parents, and with the image of God, which shone so illustriously also in Eve. We are rather to believe, that the devil assumed this organ, the more easily to recommend himself to man as a prudent spirit, especially as this looked like a miracle, or a prodigy at least, that the serpent should speak with human voice. Here was some degree of probability, that some spirit lay concealed in this animal, and that too extraordinarily sent by God, who should instruct man more fully about the will of God, and whose words this very miracle as it were seemed to confirm: for that serpents have a tongue unadapted to utter articulate sounds, is the observation of Aristotle, *de Part. anim. lib. ii. c. 17.* See *Vossius de Idol. lib. iv. c. 54.*

V. As this temptation of the devil is somewhat like to all his following ones, we judge it not improbable, that Satan exerted all his cunning, and transformed himself, as he usually does, into an angel of light, and addressed himself to Eve, as if he had been an extraordinary teacher of some important truth, not yet fully understood. And therefore does not openly contradict the command of God, but first proposes it as a doubt, whether Adam understood well the meaning of the divine prohibition; whether he faithfully related it to Eve; whether she herself too, did not mistake the sense of it; and whether at least that command, taken literally, was not so improbable, as to render it unnecessary to think of a more mysterious meaning. And thus he teaches to raise reasonings and murmurings against the words of God, which are the destruction of faith.

VI. Next, he undermines the threatening annexed to the command; *Ye shall not surely die,* says he; God never meant by death what you in your simplicity are apt to suspect. Could death be supposed to hang on so pleasant and agreeable a tree? or do you imagine God so envious as to forbid you who are his familiars and friends to eat the fruit of this delicious tree, under the dreadful penalty of death this is inconsistent with his

infinite goodness, which you so largely experience, and with the beauty of this specious tree and its fruit; and therefore there must be another meaning of this expression which you do not understand. And thus he instilled that heresy into the unwary woman, the first heard of in the world, that there is a sin which does not deserve death, or, which is the same thing, a venial sin. The false prophet, the attendant on Antichrist, *who hath horns like a lamb, and speaketh as a dragon*, Rev. xiii. 11. does at this very day maintain this capital heresy in the church of Rome, and nothing is still more usual with Satan, than by hope of impunity, to persuade men to sin.

VII. He adds the promise of a greater happiness; *your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil*. He presupposes what in itself was true and harmless, that man had a desire after some more perfect happiness; which he made to consist in his being made like to God, which John affirms to be, as it were, the principal mark of salvation, that we *shall be like God*, 1 John iii. 2. He says farther, that this likeness was to be joined with the opening of their eyes, and a greater measure of knowledge. Now this is not unlike the doctrines of the scripture, which affirm that we *shall see God*, and that *as he is*, and *shall know him, even as we ourselves are known*. And thus far indeed it might appear, that Satan spoke not amiss, blending many truths, and those evident to the conscience, with his own lies, the more easily to deceive under the appearance of a true teacher. But herein the fraud lies concealed: 1st. That he teaches them not to wait for God's appointed time, but unadvisedly and precipitately lay hold on the promised felicity. Man cannot indeed too much love and desire perfection, if he does it by *preparation*, and *earnest expectation*; preparing himself in a course of holy patience and subjection to the will of God, desiring not to anticipate, even for a moment, the good pleasure of God. 2dly. That he points out a false way, as if the eating of that tree was either a natural, or, more probably, a moral mean to attain the promised bliss; and as if God had appointed this as a necessary requisite, without which there was no possibility of coming to a more intimate communion with God, and a more perfect degree of wisdom; nor, in fine, of obtaining that state, in which, knowing equally good and evil, they would be no longer in danger of any

degree of deception. And it is most likely he perverted the meaning of the name of the tree. But all these were mere delusions.

VIII. At last this disguised teacher appeals to the knowledge of God himself; God *doth know*. Most interpreters, both Jewish and Christian, ancient and modern, interpret these words, as if Satan would charge God with open malignity and envy, as if he forbade this tree, lest he should be obliged to admit man into a partnership in his glory. And indeed there is no blasphemy so horrid that Satan is ashamed of. But we are here to consider whether such bare-faced blasphemy would not have rather struck with horror, man, who had not yet entertained any bad thoughts of God, than recommended itself by any appearance of probability. For why? is it credible, that a man in his right senses could be persuaded that the acquisition of wisdom, and a likeness to God, depended on a tree, so that he should obtain both these by eating of it, whether God would or not? and then, that God, whom man must know to be infinitely great and good, was liable to the passion of envy, a plain indication of malignity and weakness; in fine, that there was such a virtue in that tree, that, on tasting it, God could not deprive man of life: for all these particulars are to be believed by him who can imagine, that out of envy God had forbid him the use of that tree. It does not seem consistent with the subtlety of Satan to judge it advisable to propose to man things so absurd, and so repugnant to common notions, and the innate knowledge which he must have had of God. May it not be made more proper, to take that expression for a form of an oath? as Paul himself says, 2 Cor. xi. 11. God *knoweth*. And thus the perjured impostor appealed to God as witness of what he advanced.

IX. Some think that Adam was not deceived, and did not believe what the serpent had persuaded the woman to, but rather fell, out of love to his wife, whom he was unwilling to grieve; and therefore, though he was conscious of a divine command, and not exposed to the wiles of Satan, yet that he might not abandon her in this condition, he tasted the fruit she offered; probably believing, that this instance of his affection for the spouse whom God

had given him, if in any measure faulty, might be easily excused. To this they refer the apostle's words, 1 Tim. ii. 14. "For Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived, was in the transgression." But this carries us off from the simplicity of the divine oracles; the design of the apostle is plainly to shew, that the woman ought not to exercise any dominion over her husband, for two reasons which he urges: 1st. Because Adam was first created as the head, and then Eve, as a help meet for him. 2dly. Because the woman shewed she was more easily deceived, for being deceived first, she was the cause of deceiving her husband, who was likewise deceived (though not first) but by her means: for we commonly find in scripture, that some things seem to be absolutely denied, which we are to understand only as denied in a restrictive sense: John vi. 27. and Phil. ii. 4. are instances of this. Nor can we conceive how Adam, when he believed that what he did was forbidden by God, and that if he did it he should forfeit the promised happiness, nay, incur most certain death, (for all this he must know and believe, if he still remained uncorrupted by the wiles of Satan,) would have taken part in the crime only to please his wife. Certainly if he believed that the transgression of the divine command, the contempt of the promised felicity, and his rash exposing himself to the danger of eternal death, could be excused only by his affection for his wife, he no less shamefully erred, nor was less deceived, if not more, than his consort herself. Nor can it be concluded from his answer to God, in which he throws the blame, not on the serpent's deceit, but on the woman whom God had given him, that the man fell into this sin, not so much by an error in the understanding, as giving way to his affection; for this subverts the whole order of the faculties of their soul, since every error in the affection, supposes some error in the understanding. This was doubtless an error, and indeed one of the greatest, to believe that a higher regard was to be paid to his affection for his wife, than to the divine command. It was a considerable error to think that it was an instance of love to become an accomplice in sin; because it is the duty of love to convince the sinner, and as far as may be restore him to the favour of God, which certainly Adam would have done, had he been entirely without error. In whatever light therefore we view

this point, we are obliged to own that he was deceived: the only apology Adam would make, seems to be, that his beloved consort had, by her insinuations which she had learned from the serpent, persuaded him also, and that he was not the first in that sin, nor readily suspected any error or deception by her, who was given him as an help by God.

X. It cannot be doubted, that providence was concerned about this fall of our first parents. It is certain that it was foreknown from eternity; none can deny this, but he who sacrilegiously dares to venture to deny the omniscience of God. Nay, as God by his eternal decree laid the plan of the whole economy of our salvation, and preconceived succession of the most important things, presupposes the sin of man, it could not therefore happen unforeseen by God. And this is the more evident, because, according to Peter, "He (Christ) was foreordained before the foundation of the world," and that as the Lamb whose blood was to be shed, 1 Pet. i. 19, 20. which invincible argument Socinus knew not how otherwise to elude, but by this ridiculous assertion, that "after men had sinned, Christ indeed came to abolish their sins, but that he would have come, notwithstanding, though they had never sinned." But as this idle assertion is unscriptural, nay, anti-scriptural, so it is not apposite to this place; for the order of Peter's words obliges us to interpret them, concerning Christ's being foreknown as a Lamb to be slain, and to shed his blood to be the price of our redemption. And he likewise speaks, Acts ii. 3. of this determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, according to which Christ was delivered into the hands of wicked men. Since therefore Christ was foreknown from eternity, as one to be slain for the sins of men, man's sin was also necessarily foreknown.

XI. And if foreknown, it was also predetermined; thus Peter, in the place just quoted, joins together *the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God*. Nor can God's prescience of future things be conceived, but in connection with his decree concerning them.

XII. From all this may be inferred by a plain consequence, that man could not but fall on

account of the infallibility of the divine prescience, and of that necessity which they call a necessity of *consequence*; for it is inconsistent with the divine perfection, that any decree of God should be rendered void, or that the event should not be answerable to it. It is the prerogative of Jehovah to say, “My counsel shall stand,” Isa. xlvi. 10. “His counsels of old are faithfulness and truth,” Isa. xxv. 1. God himself has ratified the stability of his purposes by an oath, the more certainly to declare the immutability of his counsel, Heb. vi. 17. “The Lord of hosts hath sworn, saying, Surely as I have thought, so shall it come to pass, and as I have purposed, so shall it stand,” Isa. xiv. 24.

XIII. The infallibility of the event, as to man’s sin, may be proved by another argument; if we only attend to that subordination, by which all creatures depend on God, in their operations. For, it is not possible that God shall by his almighty concurrence, influence any creature to act, and yet that creature suspend its acting. And if God shall not influence to the moral goodness of that natural action, the creature cannot, without that influx, perform that action morally good. This is evident from the nature of God and the creature; as he cannot ineffectually influence his creatures to act, so they cannot but act, when under his influence. These things being supposed, as they are evident to any person of attention, it is impossible that man can abstain from reasoning, willing, and eating, where God influences to these acts by his almighty concurrence. Nor is it any more possible that man can reason, will, and eat in a holy manner, if God by his almighty concurrence does not influence the holiness of it. Supposing therefore, that God had afforded his influence to the natural act of reasoning, willing, and eating, as he actually did, but not the moral goodness of those acts, as he did not; it could not otherwise be, but that man should act at that time, and perform his action wrong. All this holds true, not only of this first sin of man, but of all other sins. I see not, therefore, why we may not boldly maintain these things, as they are most evidently true, and more especially as they tend to the glory of God, and to demonstrate his supereminence, and the absolute dependence of the creatures upon him, as much in their operations as in their existence. Should those of the contrary Pelagian sentiments pervert these truths,

it will be at their peril. Nor ought we so much to regard that, as on their account to conceal the truth.

XIV. However, it will not be amiss to insist a little longer on this subject, that all the apparent harshness of this doctrine may be entirely removed by an evident demonstration of the truth, which we think we shall be able to effect, by beginning with the more evident truths in one continued chain of arguments, flowing from each other, in such a manner as to gain the assent even of the most obstinate.

XV. And first, I think it will be readily granted, that there is but one first cause; that all other causes so depend upon that, both in existing and acting, as without it to be able neither to exist nor to act. Paul inculcated this upon the Athenians, Acts xvii. 28. “in him we live, and move, and have our being.” Nor indeed can the most powerful monarch in the world, such as the Assyrian was, in the time of Isaiah, any more move without God, than “the axe without him that heweth therewith, or the saw without him that shaketh it,” Isa. x. 15.

XVI. Reason in this concurs with scripture. For if there was any cause besides God, which could act independently of him, it would follow, there were more first principles than one; as Thomas Aquinas reasons well in his *Secundo sentent. distinct. xxxvii. quæst. 2. art. 2.* whose reasoning, as it is both solid, and very much to the purpose, we shall not scruple to give in his own words: “It is, says he, essential to the first principle, that it can act without the assistance and influence of a prior agent; so that if the human will could produce any action, of which God was not author, the human will would have the nature of a first principle.”

XVII. Though they endeavour to solve this, by saying, that notwithstanding the will be of itself capable of producing an action, without the influence of a prior agent, yet it has not its being from itself, but from another; whereas the nature of a first principle is to be self-existent. But it seems inconsistent to say that what has not its being of itself, can yet act of itself; for, what is not of itself, cannot continue of itself. For, all the power of acting arises from the essence, and the operation from the power. Consequently, what has its

essence from another, must also have its power and operation from that other. Moreover, though this reply denies that it is simply the first; yet, we cannot but see, that it is the first agent, if its acting cannot be referred to some prior agent as the cause. Thus far Thomas Aquinas.

XVIII. Nor does God only concur with the actions of second causes when they act, but also influences the causes themselves to act. Because the beginning of actions depends if not more, at least not less on God, than their progress. This opinion is not unhappily expressed in the Roman Catechism, published by the decree of the council of Trent, at the command of Pope Pius V., part I. on the first article of the Creed, No. 2. to this purpose; “But God, not only by his providence, preserves and governs all things that exist; but he likewise, by a secret energy, so influences those that move and act, to motion and action, that though he hinders not the efficiency of second causes, yet he prevents or goes before it; seeing his most secret power extends to each in particular; and, as the wise man testifies, reaches powerfully from one end to the other, and disposes all things sweetly. Wherefore it was said by the apostle, when declaring to the Athenians the God, whom they ignorantly worshipped; he is not far from every one of us; for in him we live, and move, and have our being.”

XIX. Moreover, as a second cause cannot act, unless acted upon and previously moved to act, by the preventing and predetermining influence of the first cause: so, in like manner, that influence of the first cause is so efficacious, as that supposing it, the second cause cannot but act. For, it is unworthy of God to imagine any concurrence of his to be so indifferent, as at last only to be determined by the co-operation of second causes: as if the rod should shake him who lifts it up; or, as if the staff should lift up what is not wood, Isa. x. 15. for so the words properly run. And the meaning is, that it is highly absurd to ascribe to an instrument of wood, the raising and managing of what is of a more excellent nature, namely spirit. By this allegory is intimated the absurdity of that opinion, which makes God to be determined in his actions by the creature.

XX. Didacus Alvarez, de Auxiliis divinæ gratiæ lib. iii. disput. 21. p. 163. makes use of the following

argument against this: namely, the manner of concurring by a will, of itself indifferent to produce this or the other effect, or its opposite, is very imperfect; because, in its efficacy, it depends on the concurrence of a second cause; and every dependence imports in the thing which depends, some imperfection and inferiority, in respect of him on whom it depends; and therefore, such a manner of concurrence cannot be ascribed to God, or agree with his will, which is an infinite and most perfect cause.

XXI. And then this insolvable difficulty likewise remains; if the second cause determines the concurrence of God, in itself indifferent; in that act of determination, it will be independent of God; and so become the first cause. And if in one action it can act independently of God, why not in a second? If in the beginning of the action, why not also in the progress? Since the transition from non-acting to acting is greater than the continuing an action once begun.

XXII. As these things are universally true, they may be applied to those free actions of rational creatures, in which there is a moral evil inherent: namely, that creatures may be determined to those actions by the efficacious influence of God, *so far as they are actions*, according to their *physical entity*. Elegantly to this purpose Thomas Aquinas, in the place just quoted. Since the act of sin is a kind of being, not only as negations and privations are said to be beings; but also as things, which in general exist, are beings because even these actions in general are ranked in that order, and if the actions of sin [as actions] are not from God, it would follow that there would be some being, which had not its essence from God: and thus God would not be the universal cause of all beings. Which is contrary to the perfection of the first being.

XXIII. Neither does God only excite and predetermine the will of men to vicious actions, so far as they are actions; but he likewise so excites it, that it is not possible, but, thus acted upon, it shall act. For, if upon supposition of that divine influx, it was possible for the created will not to act, these two absurdities would follow: 1st. That the human will could baffle the providence of God, and either

give to, or take from the divine influx, all its efficacy. 2dly. That there could be some act in the creature, of such weight as to resist the divine influence, and be independent of God. Nor do I imagine, they will say, that God concurs to the production of that action, whereby his influx is resisted. But we have already refuted any concurrence as in itself indifferent, to be determined by the free will of the creatures.

XXIV. Further, the free will of man excited to actions cannot, according to its physical essence, give them a moral and spiritual goodness, without the divine providence influencing and concurring to that goodness. This is evident from what has been said. For, as moral goodness is a superior and more perfect degree of entity, than a physical entity alone, and man in the physical entity of his actions depends on God; so it is necessary he should much more depend on God, in producing the moral goodness of his actions, that the glory thereof ought to be rendered to God as the first cause.

XXV. If all these truths thus demonstrated be joined and linked together, they will produce that conclusion which we laid down § XIII. For if all creatures depend on God in acting; if he not only concurs with them, when they act, but also excites them to act; if that excitation be so powerful, as that upon supposing it, the effect cannot but follow; if God, with that same efficacy influences vicious actions, so far as they are physical; if the creature cannot give its actions their due moral goodness without God; it infallibly follows, that Adam, God himself moving him to understand, will, and eat, could not but understand, will, and eat; and God not giving goodness to those actions, man could not understand and will in a right manner. Which was to be proved.

XXVI. But it does not follow, that man was obliged to what was simply impossible. For, it is only a consequential and eventual infallibility and necessity, which we have established. God bestowed sufficient powers on man, even such as were proper for a creature, by which he could have overcome the temptation. But then he could not proceed to action without presupposing the divine concurrence. Who shall deny, that man has a locomotive faculty, so sufficient in its kind, that he requires no more? For,

will any affirm, that man, by that locomotive faculty, can actually move independently of God, as the first cause, without discovering his ignorance both of the supremacy of God, and the subordination of man? In like manner, we affirm, that, though God granted man such sufficient abilities to fulfil all righteousness, that he had no need of any further habitual grace, as it is called; yet, all this ability was given him in such a manner that he should act only dependently of the Creator, and his influence, as we hinted, chap. ii. § XIII.

XXVII. Much less should it be said, that man, by the above-mentioned acts of divine providence, was forced to sin. For, he sinned with judgment and will; to which faculties, liberty, as it is opposed to compulsion, is so peculiar, nay essential, as to be neither judgment nor will without it. And when we affirm, that God foreordained and infallibly foreknew, that man should sin freely, the sinner could not but sin freely; unless we would have the event not answer to the preordination and prescience of God. And it is so far from the decree of God, in the least to diminish the liberty of man in his acting, that, on the contrary, this liberty has not a more solid foundation than that infallible decree of God.

XXVIII. To make God the author of sin, is such dreadful blasphemy, that the thought cannot, without horror, be entertained by any Christian. God, indeed created man mutably good, infallibly foresaw his sin, foreordained the permission of that sin, really gave man sufficient powers to avoid it, but which could not act without his influx; and though he influenced his faculties to natural or physical actions, without influencing the moral goodness of those actions, all which appear from the event; yet God neither is, nor in any respect can be, the author of sin. And though it be difficult, nay impossible for us, to reconcile these truths with each other; yet we ought not to deny what is manifest, on account of that which is hard to be understood. We will religiously profess both truths, because they are truths, and worthy of God; nor can the one overturn the other; though in this our state of blindness and ignorance of God, we cannot thoroughly see the amicable harmony between them. This is not the alone, nor single difficulty,

whose solution the sober divine will ever reserve for the world to come.

XXIX. This is certain, that by this permission of sin, God had an opportunity of displaying his manifold perfections. There is a fine passage to this purpose in Clemens, *Strom.* lib. i. which with pleasure we here insert. "It is the greatest work of divine providence, not to suffer the evil arising from a voluntary apostasy, to remain unuseful, or in every respect to become noxious. For it is peculiar to divine wisdom and power not only to do good (that being, to speak so, as much the nature of God, as it is the nature of fire to warm, or of light to shine) but much more, to make the evil devised by others, to answer a good and valuable end, and manage those things which appear to be evil to the greatest advantage."

XXX. It remains now lastly, to consider how, as Adam, in this covenant, was the head of mankind; upon his fall, all his posterity may be deemed to have fallen with him, and broken the covenant of God. The apostle expressly asserts this, Rom. v. 12. "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned."

XXXI. To illustrate the apostle's meaning, we must observe these things: 1st. It is very clear to any not under the power of prejudice, that when the apostle affirms that all *have sinned*, he speaks of an act of sinning, or of an actual sin; the very term, to sin, denoting an action. It is one thing to sin, an other to be sinful, if I may so speak. 2dly. When he affirms *all* to have sinned; he under that universality likewise includes those who have no actual, proper, and personal sin, and who, as he himself says, *have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression*, verse 14. Consequently these are also guilty of some actual sin, as appears from their death; but that not being their own proper and personal sin, must be the sin of Adam, imputed to them by the just judgment of God. 3dly. By these words *εφ ω παντες ημαρτον for that all have sinned*, he gives the reason why he had asserted that by the sin of one man death passed upon all. This, says he, ought not to astonish us, for all have sinned. If we must understand this of some personal sin of each, either actual or habitual, the reasoning would

not have been just and worthy of the apostle, but mere trifling. For, his argument would be thus, that by the one sin of one all were become guilty of death, because each in particular had, besides that one and first sin, his own personal sin: which is inconsequential. 4thly. The scope of the apostle is to illustrate the doctrine of justification he had before treated of. The substance of which consisted in this, that Christ, in virtue of the covenant of grace, accomplished all righteousness for his chosen covenant people, so that the obedience of Christ is placed to their charge, and they, on account thereof, are no less absolved from the guilt and dominion of sin, than if they themselves had done and suffered in their own person, what Christ did and suffered for them. He declares that in this respect, Adam was the type of Christ, namely, as answering to him. It is therefore necessary, that the sin of Adam, in virtue of the covenant of works, be so laid to the charge of his posterity, who were comprised with him in the same covenant that, on account of the demerit of his sin, they are born destitute of original righteousness, and obnoxious to every kind of death, as much as if they themselves, in their own persons, had done what Adam did. Unless we suppose this to be Paul's doctrine, his words are no thing but mere empty sound.

XXXII. The last words of this verse, *εφ ω παντες ημαρτον*, are differently explained by divines, because the Greek phraseology admits of various significations. The principal explanations are three: 1st. Some render them, *in so far*, or, *because all have sinned*. For, it is allowed, that *εφ ω* frequently admits this sense; and thus it seems to be taken, 2 Cor. v. 4. *εφ ω ου θελομεν εκδυσασθαι*, "not for that we would be unclothed;" as if written, as Frobenius prints it, *επειδη*, though Beza here greatly differs. 2dly. Others observe, it may be explained, *with whom*, i.e. *who sinning, all have sinned*.. For *επι* in a similar construction denotes a time, in which something was done. Thus we say in Greek, *επι εμοι μειρακιω τουτο γεγονε*, *when I was a boy this happened*, and *επι κυνι*, *in the dog days*; and the apostle Heb. ix. 15. *επι τη πρωτη διαθηκη*, *under the first testament*. And then the meaning would be, that upon Adam's sinning, all are judged



to have sinned. 3dly. Augustine, and most of the Orthodox have explained it, *in whom*. Which Erasmus in vain opposes, saying, that *επι* when signifying *upon*, or, *in*, is joined to the genitive case; as *επι οικου και επι της χωρας*; also when denoting *time*, as *επι κιασαρος Οκταβιου*. In all this he is strangely mistaken. For, not to say any thing now of *time*, it is certain, that *επι* when joined to the dative denotes *in*: as Matt. xiv. 8. *επι πινακι*, *in a charger*; and in this very context of Paul, verse 14. *επι τω ομοιωματι*, *in the similitude*. And which is more, *το εφ ω*, cannot sometimes be otherwise explained, than by *in which*, [or in whom]: as Mark ii. 4. *εφ ω ο παραλυτικος κατεκειτο*, *wherein the sick of the palsy lay*, and Luke v. 25. *αρας εφ ω κατεκειτο*, *took up that whereon he lay*. Nor is it taken in this light, in the sacred writings only, but he might learn from Budæus, *Commentar. lingf. Græc.* p. 506. that Aristotle used this phraseology in the same sense, *εφ ω μεν η θηλεια, επι θατερω δε ο αρην επωζει*, *on the one the female, on the other the male broods*. However, we reckon none of those explanations to be impertinent as they are almost to the same purpose; yet, we give the preference to the last, because most emphatical and very applicable to the apostle's scope; it is a bad way of interpreting scripture to represent it as declaring what is the least thing intended. For, the words are to be taken in their full import, where there is nothing in the context to hinder it.

XXXIII. Grotius really prevaricates, when he thus comments on the passage before us. It is a common metonymy in the Hebrew, to use the word *sin*, instead of *punishment*; and *to sin*, instead of *to undergo punishment*, whence extending this figure, they are said, by a metalepsis, *שׁוּט* *to sin*, who suffer any *evil*, even though they are innocent, as Gen. xxxi. 36. and Job vi. 24. Where *שׁוּט* is rendered by *δυσπραγε* *iv* to be unhappy, *εφ ω* here denotes *through whom*, as *επι* with the dative is taken, Luke v. 5. Acts iii. 36. 1 Cor. viii. 11. Heb. ix. 17. Chrysostom on this place says, *On his fall, they who did not eat of the tree, are from him all become mortal*.

XXXIV. This illustrious person seems to have wrote with out attention, as the whole is very impertinent. 1st. Though we allow, that sin does

sometimes metonymically denote the punishment of sin, yet we deny it to be usual in Scripture, that he who undergoes punishment, even while innocent may be said to sin. Grotius says, it is frequent but he neither does nor can prove it by any one example; which is certainly bold and rash. Crellius confuting his book on the satisfaction of Christ, brings in the saying of Bathsheba to David, 1 Kings i. 21. *I and my son Solomon shall be counted offenders*; that is, says he, *we shall be treated as offenders*, or, *be ruined*. But a *sinner*, or even *sin* and *to sin* are different things. The former is said of Christ, 2 Cor. v. 21.: but not the latter on any account. Moreover, to be a sinner, does not signify, in the passage alleged, to undergo punishment, without any regard to a fault or demerit, but to be guilty of aiming at the kingdom, and of high treason, and as such to be punished. The testimonies advanced by Grotius are so foreign, that they seem not to have been examined by that great man. For, neither in the Hebrew do we find *שׁוּט* *to sin*, nor in the Greek version, *δυσπραγειν*; nor do the circumstances admit, that what is there said of sin, or mistake, can be explained of punishment. it is necessary therefore to suppose, that either Grotius had something else in his view, or that here is a typographical error. 2dly. Though we should grant, which yet we do not in the least, that to sin sometimes denotes to undergo punishment, yet it cannot signify this here; because, the apostle in this place immediately distinguishes between death, as the punishment, and sin, as the meritorious cause, and death by sin. And by this interpretation of Grotius, the apostle's discourse, which we have already shewn is solid, would be an insipid tautology. For, where is the sense to say, "So death passed upon all, through whom all die." 3dly. Grotius discovers but little judgment in his attempt to prove, that *εφ ω* signifies *through whom*: certainly Luke v. 5. *επι πω ρηματι σου*, does not signify *through thy word*, but *at thy word*, or as Beza translates, *at thy command*. And Heb. ix. 17. *επι νεκροις* does not signify *through the dead*, but *when dead*, and rather denotes a circumstance of time, Acts iii. 16. is alleged with a little more judgment; and 1 Cor. viii. 11. not improperly. But it might be insisted, that *επ εμοι εστι* signifies, *it is owing to me*, that

the meaning shall be, “to whom it was owing that all sinned.” Which interpretation is not altogether to be rejected. Thus the sholiast εφ ω Αδαμ, δι ου. And if there was nothing else couched under this, I would easily grant Grotius this explanation of that phraseology. 4thly. it cannot be explained consistent with divine justice, how without a crime death should have passed upon Adam’s posterity. Prosper reasoned solidly and elegantly against Collator, c. xx. “Unless, perhaps, it can be said, that the punishment, and not the guilt passed on the posterity of Adam, but to say this is in every respect false; for it is too impious to judge so of the justice of God; as if he would, contrary to his own law, condemn the innocent with the guilty. The guilt therefore is evident where the punishment is so, and a partaking in punishment shews a partaking in guilt; that human misery is not the appointment of the Creator, but the retribution of the judge.” If therefore through Adam all are obnoxious to punishment, all too must have sinned in Adam. 5thly. Chrysostom also is here improperly brought in, as if from Adam he derived only the punishment of death, without partaking in the guilt; for the homily from which the words are quoted begins thus: “When the Jew shall say, How is the world saved by the obedience of one, namely, Christ? you may reply, How was the world condemned by one disobedient Adam?” Where it is to be observed, 1st. That he supposes the miseries of mankind to proceed from God as a judge, who can not justly condemn but for sin. 2dly. That he compares the condemnation of the world by Adam’s disobedience, with its salvation by Christ’s obedience. But this last is imputed to believers, and deemed to be theirs, and therefore Adam’s sin is in like manner imputed to all. As also Gregory of Naziansen, quoted by Vossius, *Hist. Pelag.* lib. ii. P. ii. p. 163. said, that Adam’s guilt was his. “Alas! my weakness,” says he, “for I derive my weakness from the first parent.”

XXXV. But we only understand this of Adam’s first sin. We no wise agree with those who absurdly tell us, that Adam’s other sins were also imputed to us; for Paul, when treating on this subject, Rom. v. every where mentions *transgression* in the singular number; nay, expressly verse 18. *one transgression*, by which guilt passed upon all; and the reason is manifest, for Adam ceased to be a federal head when

the covenant was once broken, and whatever sin he was afterwards guilty of, was his own personal sin, and not chargeable on his posterity, unless in so far as God is sometimes pleased to visit the sins of the fathers on the children. In which Adam has now nothing peculiar above other men. So much for the violation by the covenant of man.

#### CHAP. IX. - *Of the Abrogation of the Covenant of Works on the part of God.*

I. **H**AVING sufficiently considered the violation of the covenant by sin; let us now enquire whether, and how far it is made void, or abrogated by God himself.

II. And first, we are very certain, that there are many things in this covenant of immutable and eternal truth, which we reckon up in this order: 1st. The precepts of the covenant, excepting that probatory one, oblige all, and every one to a perfect performance of duty, in what state soever they are. 2dly. Eternal life, promised by the covenant, can be obtained upon no other condition, than that of perfect, and in every respect complete obedience. 3dly. No act of disobedience escapes the vengeance of God, and death is always the punishment of sin. But these maxims do not exclude a surety, who may come under engagements in man’s stead, to undergo the penalty, and perform the condition. But we shall speak of this afterwards, and now proceed to what has been proposed.

III. It is indeed a most destructive heresy to maintain, that man, sinful and obnoxious to punishment, is not bound to obedience. For by no misconduct of man, can God forfeit his right and supremacy; but the right and supremacy of God requires, that man, and even every creature, be subject in all respects to God, so far as possible. Moreover, the rational creature, such as sinful man is, and does continue to be, can be subject, not only to the natural, but also to the moral providence of God; nor only to his vindictive justice, but also to his legislative authority; and as he can, so he ought to be subject to him, as to the obligation of obedience, because every possible subjection is essential to the creature.

IV. If the sinner who deserves punishment was not subject to the law, he could no longer sin, and therefore by one sin he would set himself free from, the danger of farther sinning; for where no law is binding, there is no transgression, no sin, which John defines to be *the transgression of the law*, 1 John iii. 4. But nothing can be imagined more absurd, than that man by sin has acquired an impeccability.

V. Moreover, according to this hypothesis, all sinners would be equal, and an equal degree of punishment remain for every one; which is contrary, both to sound reason and scripture, where the inequality of sins and punishment, is so often inculcated.

VI. There is a plain passage, Gal. v. 3. which confirms, that even by the promulgation of the new gospel covenant, the breakers of the covenant who are without Christ, are not set free from that obligation of the law, which demands perfect obedience, but continue debtors to do the whole law.

VII. Nay, even in a human court, the penal compact is deemed an additional compact, adding to the principal convention, and consequently not abrogating, but accumulating the former obligation. Much less at the bar of God, can the obligation to punishment, arising from the violation of the covenant abrogate the primary and principal, obligation of the law, whereby the covenant was ratified.

VIII. Arminius therefore, (*in Epist. Præstantium virorum*, p. 173.) very basely refuses, that God, when man once fell from the state of innocence, and became obnoxious to punishment, even of right required obedience of man, as if God had forfeited his right by man's disobedience. He makes use of these arguments: 1st. Because when man is in a state of sin, he is not in covenant with God; therefore there is no contract between God and man, by which he can require obedience; for by what reward, what punishment, can he give sanction to the law, since man, for the disobedience already committed, has forfeited the reward, and is become obnoxious to punishment? 2dly. As God has, because of sin, deprived man of ability and power to fulfil the law, so by this very thing he has signified, that he will no longer require man to fulfil it, unless he restore his

ability, nay he cannot in justice do it. If any shall say, Could therefore the creature be exempted from the right or authority of the Creator, as no longer to be bound to obey him? He answers, Yes, indeed, if the creature be accursed, and the Creator reckon it unworthy to require obedience from it; for it is the highest punishment so to conclude the sinner under sin, as not to require any more obedience from him, that being an evidence of irreconcilable anger, namely, in that state. 3dly. The law itself, to be performed, is such, as it would be unbecoming, it should be performed by a sinner who is out of the favour of God. He is commanded to have God for his God, to love, honour, and adore him, to put his trust in him, to use his name with reverence, &c. is it probable that such an obedience is required of him who is under the curse of God? Thus far Arminius, whose arguments deserve to be carefully examined.

IX. We begin with the first. Arminius supposes a great many things in this argument, which we cannot admit; such as, that all the obligation of man arises from the covenant, that the law does not oblige, but in so far as it is enforced by rewards and punishments; that God cannot threaten a greater punishment, after man is once become obnoxious to the penalty; now, since we deny all this, so if we prove them to be false, as we hope to do, there will not remain the least appearance of force in this argument. The obligation of man to obedience is not founded first and principally on a covenant, but in the super-eminent sovereignty, majesty, and holiness of God; and every rational creature, from a consideration of these, is bound to be subject to his sovereignty, adore his majesty, and form himself according to the example of his holiness. God would not be the absolute sovereign, if any rational creature existed which was not bound to take the rule of its actions from him, and therefore in regulating its actions was not subject to God. God would not be the supreme Majesty, if there was any rational creature who was not bound to acknowledge, worship, adore, and be subject to him in every respect. God would not be perfect in holiness, if any rational creature existed, who was not bound to acknowledge that holiness as most worthy of imitation. As God is such a being, he cannot but require to be acknowledged to be so.

The creature cannot acknowledge him in this manner, without owning its obligation at the same time to obey him, who is the first, the most high, and most holy God. Which we have here explained and proved more fully, chap. iii. § VIII. Moreover, it is not true that the law is not binding, but because of the sanction of rewards and punishments. The principal obligation of the law arises from the authority of the lawgiver, and the perfect equity of all his commands. Though God had enforced his law neither by rewards nor punishments, we had been no less bound to obedience; lest self-love, whereby we are led to obtain the reward, and avoid the penalty, should be the only motive to stir us up to obey God: the reverence of the Supreme Being, and the love of holiness are to hold the chief place here; in fine, it is also false, that no further punishment will be inflicted, after that man having once broken the covenant, is become obnoxious to the penalty; for there are degrees in condemnation. And if that was true, it would not take off the obligation to obedience. It would not be lawful for a robber, condemned to be burnt alive, or broken on the wheel, or to the most cruel death that man can devise, to commit, in the mean time, a new capital crime; for as we have said, the obligation arises neither primarily nor chiefly from the penal sanction, but from the authority of the lawgiver.

X. To the second, I answer, 1st. Man himself is not only the meritorious, but also the physical cause of his own impotence, which he brought upon himself by his misconduct; as if an insolent and naughty servant should put out the candle by which he ought to carry on his master's business, or by drinking to excess, willingly render himself unfit for the service of his master. In this case, the master does by no means forfeit his right of requiring every piece of service properly due to him, and of punishing that naughty servant for nonperformance. 2dly. Though God as a just judge had deprived man of ability to fulfil the law, yet, on that account, he both will in point of right, and can require the performance of it by man. He can very justly, because no wickedness of man, justly punished by God, can diminish God's authority over him, otherwise it would be in man's power, at his own pleasure, either to extend or limit the authority of God, which is contrary to the immutable perfection and blessedness of God. He

also does require this for wise reasons, of which this is one, that sinful man may by that means be convinced of his irreparable misery, upon finding such things justly required of him, which he has rendered himself incapable to perform. And since he is as unwilling as unable to obey God, he is the more inexcusable, the more clearly the duty of the law is inculcated upon him. 3dly. It is absurd to say, that it is the greatest punishment that God inflicts on man, not to require obedience from the rebellious creature. It is indeed true, that the creature ought to reckon it a part of its happiness to have the glory of obeying. And it is the punishment of the creature, if, by the just judgment of God, it is condemned never to perform what is incumbent, and may be acceptable to God. But it is another thing to say, that God will not require obedience from it. If God requires not obedience, the creature owes none; if it owes none, it does not act amiss, by disobeying, and if it does not amiss by disobeying, that cannot be the highest punishment for it. And thus Arminius destroys his own argument; who would have spoke rightly, had he said, that it is, instead of the highest punishment to the creature, to be condemned by the just judgment of God not to perform that obedience, which God consistently with his justice and holiness requires of it. 4thly. Should we deal more closely with a bold disputant, we might say, that there is a contradiction in the adjunct, when he supposes God addressing himself thus: I will not have thee to perform any obedience to me: for if any calls for obedience, he presupposes not only some authority by which he can require it, but also a command, which requires obedience, and which must be obeyed. Whoever by his authority gives such a command, requires that obedience be yielded to it. If he should give another command to this purpose, I will not have you to obey me, he would then contradict himself; nay, contradict the nature of the command, which consists in an obligation to obedience. 5thly. It is the highest absurdity imaginable, that a creature shall, by its sin, obtain exemption from the authority of the Creator, and be no longer bound to obey him. If this is true, then the first of all deceivers spoke truth, that man, by eating the forbidden fruit, would become as God. Whoever is exempted from the authority of the

Creator, is under the authority of none, is at his own disposal; in fine, is God. For to be at one's own disposal, is to be God. Ah! how ridiculous is this!

XI. The third argument is no less weak. For, 1st. The sum of the law is to love God with all the heart, mind, and strength, and our neighbour as ourselves. As this is reasonable in itself, so it cannot but be proposed as such by God to man; for conscience itself, even that of the most abandoned, will bear witness with God to the reasonableness of this. What? is it not certain that God is the chief good, consequently the most amiable? Can he be unwilling that any should acknowledge him as the chief good, or to be what he really is, what he cannot but be? Is he not the supreme Majesty? Can he be unwilling to be honoured as such with the most submissive reverence? 2dly. Arminius urges, that the law also commands us to trust in God. It does so; what can be more right, what more becoming, than that man, even a sinner, should be bound to believe the testimony of God, should give him this glory, namely, that he alone both can and will justify the ungodly, that he should seek him even when angry, hunger and thirst after his righteousness, and willingly endeavour to be for his glory; namely, that God may be glorified and admired in him by his justification and glorification by free grace; and that he should neither neglect the salvation which God has most surely revealed, and neither despise nor reject the Saviour? This is to trust in God; and will any pious person ever doubt of the probability, nay, even of the most infallible certainty of this, that man under the curse of God till now, is not called upon to this? 3dly. He will still urge, that when he speaks of trusting in God, he means thereby that full assurance of mind, whereby we hold God to be our God; that at least this is also enjoined by the law. We are to consider this more distinctly. When the law enjoins us to take God for our God, it is to be understood in this manner, *viz.* to take him for our Creator, preserver, lawgiver, and Supreme Lord; this is absolutely and without distinction enjoined upon all men: but if we understand it thus, to take him for our saving good, this is enjoined upon none, but in that method which the revealed will of God prescribes. And this is the way; either that men shall obtain the salvation of God by a most personal obedience, as proposed to Adam in innocence, which is now

impossible for the sinner; or, that sinful man be converted, and united by faith to Christ, then examine himself whether he be in the faith, and in Christ, which being discovered, he may then indeed glory and exult in God his Saviour; this is the way that is now proposed in the gospel. But the law enjoins us to embrace every truth by faith, which God either has revealed, or shall reveal, and to walk agreeably to that truth. But the law nowhere enjoins the impenitent sinner to look upon God as the God of his salvation. Nay, the law, as it was given to Adam himself, enjoins him to believe the contrary. And thus I imagine I have fully dispatched the quaint subtleties of Arminius, that it is of immutable right, that man, even under sin and guilt, is still under obligation to obey the law.

XII. We proceed a step farther, to shew that man, even after the violation of the covenant, continues bound, not only to obedience, but to a perfect performance of duty. Paul said of those who are without the covenant of grace, Gal. v. 3. that "they are debtors to do the whole law." Nor can it otherwise be; for the law of the covenant, as to the natural precepts, is immutable, being the transcript of the image of God, which is no less immutable than God himself: for if the image which had the nearest resemblance is changed, and yet continues still to resemble its archetype, or original, the archetype itself must also necessarily be changed. But the law of the covenant did undoubtedly require perfect obedience.

XIII. Besides, if we imagine any abatement and relaxation of the law after sin, we are to conceive, that God addressed sinful man after this manner: "I formerly commanded thee to esteem as the supreme truth, thy chief good, and thy sovereign Lord, and consequently to assent with the fullest assurance of faith to all my precepts, to love me with all thy soul, and all thy strength, and esteem nothing preferable to that which is acceptable to me, to employ thy all in my service, at all times and in all things, to be at my command and beck, and never venture on any thing that is not agreeable to my will. But now, since thou hast once presumed to disobey me, I require no more for the future, but that thou esteem me indeed to be the truth, but not infallible; to be thy good, but not

the chief; to be thy Lord, but not the Supreme: and I allow thee to doubt of some of my testimonies, to love other things besides, and above me; to place thy happiness in other things besides my favour; in fine, to depend on me in some things, but in other things to act at thy own discretion.” If all these be absurd and unworthy of God, as they certainly are; it is also absurd and unworthy of God, to abate and relax any thing of his law. But if these general propositions are of immutable truth; that as God is the chief good, he is, at all times, and by all persons, to be loved with the whole heart; as he is the supreme Lord, none can ever, under any pretence, act but according to his command; now the most perfect performance of every duty, must be the manifest consequence of all this.

XIV. Again, to perform duty perfectly, as every one will allow, is better than to do it in a slight manner. For all the goodness of duty consists in its agreement with the rule and directory of it. There must therefore be a certain rule, enjoining that perfection, which is a greater degree of goodness. If God has prescribed such a rule, it must certainly bind man to conform himself to it.

XV. The conscience of man, upon due attention, cannot but assent to these things. To make this appear I shall adjoin two excellent passages, one from Epictetus, the other from the emperor Julian. The former speaks thus, Dissertat. lib. 2. c. xi. “Having found a rule, let us keep it inviolable, and not extend so much as a finger beyond it.” The latter thus, Orat. 1. “There is an ancient law given by him who first taught mankind philosophy, and which runs thus: that all who have an eye to virtue and to honesty, ought, in their words and actions, in society and in all the affairs of this life, both small and great, endeavour altogether after honesty.” The law therefore of the old covenant continues to bind all mankind, without exception, to a perfect performance of duty.

XVI. The second thing, which we said, § II. was immutable in the covenant of works, was this; that eternal life was not obtainable on any other condition but that of perfect obedience: as may thus be invincibly proved: for, by virtue of this general rule, it was necessary for Christ *to be made under the law*, Gal. iv. 4. and *fulfil all righteousness*, and that for

this end, *that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled*, Rom. viii. 4. But if this righteousness had not been sacred and inviolable, Christ would have been under no necessity to submit to the covenant of the law, in order to merit eternal life for his people. This therefore is evident, that there ought to be a merit of perfect obedience on which a right to eternal life may be founded. Nor is it material whether that perfect obedience be performed by man himself, or by his surety.

XVII. The third thing which we affirmed as an unchangeable truth, regards the penal sanction; for that immutable and indispensable justice which we already defended by so many arguments, chap. v. § XVIII. seq. certainly requires this, so that there is no occasion to add any thing further.

XVIII. Since then these three things, the law, the promise, and the threatening, constitute the entire nature of the covenant, as proposed by God, stand so firm; one may conclude, that though man has really on his part broken the covenant, yet no abrogation of the covenant is made on the part of God. But, on duly weighing the matter, we must also acknowledge some abrogation on the part of God: as may be evidently inferred from the substitution of the new covenant of grace. For thus the apostle has taught us to reason, Heb. viii. 13. “In that he saith a new covenant, he hath made the first old.” For though the abrogation of the old does not necessarily infer the substitution of a new; yet the substitution of a new does certainly import the abrogation of the old. It is indeed true, that the apostle, in this place, does not speak precisely of the covenant of works, but of the old economy of the covenant of grace, which he says is abrogated. But yet we properly build on his reasoning, which we may also, and ought to apply to this subject; namely, that every substitution of a new covenant supposes the abrogation of an old one.

XIX. That abrogation on the part of God consists in this, that God has declared, That no man can, by virtue of this covenant, have friendship with him, or obtain eternal life; so that he has declared all to have forfeited the promise of the covenant, and the hope of enjoying that promise according to that covenant. This is what the apostle says; “there is not now a law, which can give life, as that

righteousness should be by the law,” Gal. iii. 21. To this purpose is *what the law cannot do*, which he inculcates, Rom. viii. 3.

XX. And that covenant is so really abrogated, that it can on no account be renewed. For should we imagine God saying to man, “If, for the future, thou canst perfectly keep my law, thou shalt thereby acquire a right to eternal life,” God would not by such words renew this very covenant of works; for sin is now presupposed to exist, which is contrary to that perfection of obedience which the covenant of works requires. God would therefore transact here with man on a different condition, whereby forgiving the former sin, he would prescribe a condition of an obedience less perfect than that which he stipulated by the covenant of works; which, excluding all sin, knew nothing of forgiveness of sin. Nay, such a transaction would be so far from a renewal of the covenant of works, that it would rather manifestly destroy it. For the penal sanction makes a part of that covenant, where by God threatened the sinner with death, so that if he forgave him without a due satisfaction, he would act contrary to the covenant and his own truth.

XXI. The law therefore remains as the rule of our duty; but abrogated as to its federal nature; nor can it be the condition by the performance of which man may acquire a right to the reward. In this sense the apostle says, “We are not under the law,” Rom. vi. 14. Namely, as prescribing the condition of life. There is indeed still an indissoluble connection between perfect righteousness and eternal life, so that *the last* cannot be obtained without *the first*. But after that man, by falling from righteousness, had lost all his hope of the reward, God was at liberty either to punish the sinner according to his demerit, or give him a surety to fulfil all righteousness in his stead.

XXII. There are learned men, who, besides this abolition of the covenant of works, which regards the possibility of giving life and justification, enumerate four other degrees of abolition in this order. 1st. *Of condemnation*, by Christ being proposed in the promise, and apprehended by faith. 2dly. *Of terror*, or the power of the fear of death and bondage, by *the promulgation of the new covenant*, after the expiation of sin: which being once accomplished,

they who are redeemed are under the law of the Redeemer. So that the same law, abolished in the Redeemer as the law of sin, becomes the law of the Saviour, and adjudges righteousness to those who are his. 3dly. *Of that war* or struggle with sin, by *the death of the body*. 4thly. *Of all the effects* of it, by *the resurrection* from the dead.

XXIII. But let us give our reasons why we have hitherto doubted whether these things are with sufficient accuracy conceived and digested. 1st. All the particulars here mentioned belong to the covenant of grace. But the covenant of grace does not abrogate, but supposes the abrogation of the covenant of works: because there could be no place for this, without the abrogation of the other in the sense now mentioned. 2dly. The covenant of grace is not the abolition, but rather the confirmation of the covenant of works, in so far as the Mediator has fulfilled all the conditions of that covenant, so that all believers may be justified and saved, according to the covenant of works, to which satisfaction was made by the Mediator. This is the apostle’s meaning, Rom. iii. 31. “Do we then make void the law through faith? God forbid; yea, we establish the law.” And again, Rom. viii. 4. “That the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us.” Which signifies, (as the learned person, whose opinion we are now examining, comments on this place,) “that what the law accounts for righteousness, is fully bestowed on us; and consequently, that what merits the reward of the law, becomes perfectly ours.” 3dly. The very law of the covenant which gave up the human sinner to sin, when his condition is once changed by union with Christ the surety, does now, without any abolition, abrogation, or any other change whatever, absolve the man from the guilt and dominion of sin, and bestow on him that sanctification and glorification, which are gradually to be brought to that perfection which he shall obtain at the resurrection of the dead; as being constrained to bear witness to the justification of the covenant of grace. This is what the learned person not improperly says in the words we have just quoted: “So that the same law, abolished in the Redeemer as the law of sin, becomes the law of the Saviour and bestows righteousness on those who are his:” which he has

at large and learnedly explained on Rom. viii. 2. In a word, the same law which was to man in innocence a commandment to life, and is to man in sin, the law of sin, giving him up to the dominion and guilt of sin, becomes again in the Redeemer the law of the spirit of life, testifying that satisfaction was made to it by the Redeemer, and bestowing on man, who by faith is become one with the Redeemer, all the fruits of righteousness for justification, sanctification, and glorification. All the change is in the state of the man, none in the law of the covenant, according to which man, in whatever state he is, is judged. Which things seem not to have escaped the observation of the learned person himself; when, Summa Theolog. c. xxxi. § 1. he speaks to this purpose. Nevertheless, *when we say this*, we mean, that *this fourfold* abolition and removal of the covenant concerning works to be done, which is connected without our own happiness, *is founded on the same law: not that this could be done by virtue of the law in itself alone, but that the intervention of a surety and redeemer made it, at last possible to the law.* I allow that what he calls the abolition of the covenant concerning works, is founded in the law of works; but I leave it to the reader's consideration, whether it is not a strange way of talking, to say, that "the abolition and removal of the law, is founded on the law itself, and that the intervention of a surety and redeemer made it, at last, possible to the law;" namely, that itself should effect its own abolition and removal? From all which I conclude, that it will be more proper to treat of these things when we speak of *the fruits and effects of the covenant of grace*, than when considering *the abolition of the covenant of works*: which is on no account abolished, but in so far as it is become impossible for man to attain to life by his own personal works.

## **End of Book 1**